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A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF LEARNING, PERCEPTION, 
AND CONCEPTION AS THESE ARE TREATED IN CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY
INTRODUCTION
The Setting of the Problem
Psychologists have been concerned of late with the problem of 
integrating the vast wealth of data arrived at in different areas 
of this rapidly growing science. Integration has been sought in 
more than one way. Personality, learning, motivation, perception 
and learning, learning and motivation, motivation and perception, 
personality and perception and/or learning and conditioning and 
so on, almost without limit, are examples which illustrate this 
effort. Some theorists, indeed, have been struggling with the 
idea of formulating a general psychological theory.
lihy is this concern now, one may ask? The answer is not hard 
to seek. David Krech answers the question partially by asserting 
that "Other sciences have found that scientific inquiry frequently 
becomes more fruitful in almost direct proportion to the process 
of unification of principles.This statement implies dis­
satisfaction with the host of unrelated, if not antagonistic, 
psychological principles now current in psychological studies. And 
this state of affairs does, in fact, hinder our understanding of
^ David Krech, "Notes Toward a Psychological Theory," Journal 
of Personality, Vol. 18 (19U9-19$0), p. 68.
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the object psychology sets itself to study— namely, man. Kretch 
goes on to suggest that in physics, one of the most advanced of 
the sciences, 11 'Fields1 of physics disappear and 'physics'
O
begins to appear."*1
The scientific method is a systematized way of relating 
and interrelating different phenomena of nature and formulating 
them in all-encompassing laws. If we have to draw upon a different 
and independent "law" to explain each separate observation, we 
are hardly better off than without such laws. This state of affairs 
is critical in the case of psychology, where that unity we call 
the human organism is the object of study. But the problem, by its 
very nature, is most complicated. Man, when he sets himself to 
study himself, is apt to dwell upon the host of names he assigns 
to the different and varied experiences he has. And, for many 
thinkers, when a name exists there is a tendency to believe that 
a distinct entity must lie behind it; and, conversely, that where 
no name exists there is nothingness. Thus, Plato, with all his 
genius, could not escape this pitfall and to him the psychological 
processes of man corresponded to his ultimate values: truth,
beauty, and goodness. He even went so far as to assign different 
bodily centers for (1) cognition, the head; (2) affection, the 
heart; and (3) conation, the abdomen, 
p "
David Krech, Ibid., p. 68.
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It is significant, and instructive, to note that regardless 
of what we claim to the contrary, we have and still are following 
his lead in this respect, as well as in many others. We speak 
of the thinking process and of motivational factors as essential 
ingredients of cognitive behavior and just because we do we are 
fain to speak of these ingredients, intellect and emotion, as 
interacting entities. We may even consider them to be independent 
entities* Were we to realize that we are dealing with abstractions 
or constructs that describe different facets of an ongoing experience, 
many of our difficulties would disappear. For whence comes the 
distinction between the intellectual and the emotional factors in 
any phase of the thinking process? No matter how we may look at
the problem, we cannot help but see that the formulation of 
hypotheses, for instance, is but a sort of art production in the 
full implication of this term. As such, it is an aesthetic endeavor 
as much as an intellectual onej intellect and emotion are thus 
aspects of one act. Intellect and emotion or motivation are 
treated as separate entities only because our nomenclature treated 
them so historically. We speak of them as separate entities in part, 
at least, because we lack a name for the whole process. The 
distinction is not without its usefulness; it is simply when it is 
taken for granted that we tend to err.
If we turn to perception as a particular and specific 
psychological phenomenon, we run into a series of questions. What
ix
is perception? Where do so-called directive factors intervene?
What is the place of motivation in perception? Where do attitudes 
come into the picture? Where is the line that separates per­
ception as psychophysical from autistic perception, so-called?
What is the relation between perception and conception? Does 
behavior start with a percept or a concept? What role does 
thinking play in perception, if any? And where does perception 
stand with respect to the theory of experience? In other words, 
how are organic or physical, social and idiosyncratic factors 
related in the process of perception? Further questions could be 
raised but, again, the problem is whether or not we realize that 
we deal with abstractions or constructs which describe a dynamic 
process, whether or not we realize that the distinctions we make 
between these different constructs are merely arbitrary, whether 
we realize that we isolate variables, so far as the actual 
experience is concerned, which do not lend themselves to this 
process. The problem looks still more dramatic when we find that 
some psychologists specialize, or at least tend to emphasize, one 
aspect of behavior and treat it as if complete unto itself. Hence, 
we find learning theorists (mainly behaviorists) and perception 
theorists (mainly gestaltists) in conflict with each other; with 
different points of emphasis, different methodologies and different 
outlooks.
x
Statement of the Problem
A look at the status of psychological theory today will show 
that despite the genuine efforts made to bring different points 
of view closerj some obstinate obstacles stand in the way. We 
need not at this point reflect upon the remote past history of 
psychology to trace the sources of the present difficulties but 
the problem is complicated by an inheritance from the past. 
Suffice it here to notice that by the turn of the present century, 
and even into its first decades, psychology had established 
itself in terms of distinct schools, each with its enthusiastic 
followers and each with its own mode of thought.
Today, Hiough the differences are not as sharp or as acute
as they were earlier, some irreconcilable differences seem to
exist. Behaviorism, for instance, is by and large concerned with
learning. This is not surprising, since this is a proper concern
of all psychology. The point is that it has little, if anything,
to say about perception. If it refers to perception in passing,
it does not conceive it as a concept which is necessary for
explaining behavior. On the contrary, perception as a concept is
explained, as is everything else, in terms of the principles
derived from the field of learning. In contrast, gestalt theory
focuses its attention upon perception and comes at learning
through the principles it derives from this area.
xi
Both theories, however, presumably deal with the same subject- 
matter. One may wonder, then whether the theories say essentially 
the same thing in different language. There may be some truth 
in this statement, but it neither diagnoses nor solves the problem. 
Learning does play, of course, a vital role in human activities, 
in human problems and concerns. It is a legitimate area of 
human inquiry, therefore. Yet the question has been asked whether, 
in their preoccupation with learning theories, American psychologists 
have not had the boot on the wrong foot, neglecting, in consequence, 
the relation between the two fields— perception and learning.
Perception is also equally important. Many branches of 
psychology find perception an invaluable tool for the explanation 
of behavior. In the preface of the Volume Perception and Person­
ality (A Symposium), Bruner and Krech write: "Here we see experi­
mental psychologists— traditional ’perceptionists'— social
psychologists, students of personality, clinicians, all concerned
3
with the determinants of perceptual operations."
The need for the reconsideration of psychological theories 
in an attempt to arrive at a broader envisionment of man in his 
environment is clear. The present writer, in confronting the 
problem, is merely undertaking what some psychologists have been 
asking for. The present study, is therefore, an echo of a need
 ^Jerome Bruner and David Krech, Perception and Personality 
(A Symposium) p. v.
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strongly expressed by psychologists, though the writer's approach 
will be philosophical. It is hoped that a philosophical examination 
of some of the present systems and approaches in psychology may 
throw new light on the problem of human behavior.
Assumptions Underlying the Study
1. The organism is the focal point in the study of 
behavior.
2. All sciences are of one piece. The method of 
science as developed in other natural and physical 
sciences should be utilized for the understanding 
of behavior.
3* ”Transaction, is Fact such that no one of its
constituents can be adequately specified as fact 
apart from the specification of other constituents 
of the full subject-matter.''^  In other words, 
whatever variables are involved in the process of 
perception can not be fully dealt with or understood 
in isolation from other variables. The limitation 
of specifying or isolating a certain variable for 
the sake of clarifying or investigating the process 
should always be borne in mind.
U. Factors and variables involved in any psychological 
process are essentially social abstractions or 
constructs which aim at describing, interpreting, 
clarifying and manipulating psychological phenomenon.
Scope, Implications, and Limitations of the Study
This study is essentially theoretical. It will undertake to 
survey, criticize, and re-interpret some basic aspects of
J. Dewey and A. Bentley, Knowing And The Known, p. 122.
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psychological theories and of philosophical studies. By its very 
nature, the problem does not permit the author to tackle more than 
a small segment of the available literature.
The 'writer, being aware of the varying philosophical back­
grounds of the different psychological approaches to the problem of 
human behavior, can not but admit his own limitations in philo­
sophical outlook. Moreover, in assuming that the philosophical 
point of view is basic in dealing with and understanding psycho­
logical phenomena, no claim to complete objectivity is implied.
This, from the point of view of the writer is impracticable.^  Thus, 
in dealing with the theories of perception, the transactional 
approach as advanced by John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, with 
which the writer agrees in general, will occupy a central position 
in the study.
A General Outline of the Study
I. In the first chapter some relevant aspects of the history 
of psychology will be discussed from a philosophical point of view.
II. In the second chapter, a representative sample of the 
theories which are associated with the "Field Concept" and which
^  The writer believes that it is only because of a philo­
sophical point of view that such a problem has arisen. The present 
study aims to clarify some aspects of psychological theory in 
terms of a philosophical point of view and, at the same time, to 
reinterpret some aspects of philosophy in terms of psychological 
findings and understandings.
(■\See Knowing and the Known, The Beacon Press, Boston, 19U9»
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are sometimes called 'Cognitive Theories' will be examined. The 
theories to be examined are:
1. Gestalt theory.
2. Hebb's theory.
3. Brunswik’s theory.
lu Snyggand Comb's theory.
III. In the third chapter a representative sample of the 
theories which belong to the ’Association Family' will be presented 
in an expository style to serve as a frame of reference for the 
discussions that follow,
IV. The fourth chapter will be devoted to a critical 
examination of some differences and conflicting points of view 
between some cognitive theories and behavioristic theories, in an 
attempt to point out the inadequacies in each.
V* The fifth chapter will be devoted to a philosophical 
examination of the methods of inquiry in some natural and physical 
sciences from a historical perspective. The aim of this chapter 
is to suggest a more comprehensive frame of reference for the 
understanding of human behavior.
VI. In this chapter the 'Trans-actional' approach for the 
study of human behavior will be examined with special reference 
to Ames' work to show its implications and significance for the 
science of psychology.
VII. Some critical aspects of the transactional approach in 
psychology will be treated in this chapter.
CHAPTER I
THE EVOLUTION <F THE SCIENCE <F PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology as a natural science is relatively new* As a part 
of philosophy, however, it is as old as philosophical thought* This 
fact should not prove surprising, siace every philosophical system 
necessarily embraces a conception of man in harmony with and 
complimentary to the system itself* Thus psychology as part of 
philosophy goes back to Plato and Aristotle and, until recently, it 
remained subservient and secondary to whatever philosophical trend 
happened to be in vogue at any given period of time*
This state of affairs might be well illustrated by Descartes1 
dualistic philosophy in liiich he attempted to reconcile the two 
independent entities, mind and matter* To Descartes the ultimate 
criterion of existence was man's awareness of thought. The criterion 
of truth, therefore, lay in subjective clarity and distinctness* 
Descartes, in making the distinction between mind or soul on the 
one hand, and matter or body on the other, was forced to deal with 
each of the two categories independently* Under the impact of the 
physical and biological sciences which had already distinguished 
themselves as legitimate disciplines, chiefly under the leadership 
of Galileo aad Harvey, in their respective fields, Descartes adopted 
the new physics and spplied it to human and animal behavior*
1
Far Descartes, non alone possessed soul and consequently nan 
alone possessed the faculty of thinking or reasoning* Animal 
behavior was simple enough; with no soul to intervene, physics 
provided appropriate means to explain it* Animal behavior con­
sisted purely of physical motion*
Han, with his soul, caused Descartes a great deal of trouble* 
The problem, simply stated, was how to reconcile the two irreconcil­
able entities: the physical, the spatial and the tangible, on the
one hand, with the nonphysical, the non-spatial and the intangible, 
on the other* Descartes sought to settle the problem by locating 
the "Blind" in the brain. The pineal gland, which stood as a unique 
structure defying the over-all symmetry of the brain, was assigned 
the task of bringing peace and harmony to human behavior* It was 
said to be the center of interaction between body and mind*
Thus, although Descartes was by no means the first to formulate 
dualistic philosophy in terms of soul and matter, he was neverthe­
less the first to advance a concrete formulation of dualism in which 
he brought into focus the inherent problems of dualistic approaches 
to human thought and psychological inquiries* In this sense, 
Descartes1 system may provide us with an intelligible conceptual 
framework for examining and appraising different psychological 
systems, new and old.
Descartes' solution to the psychological problem was short 
lived, yet the struggle between the mind and body for supremacy
3in Tan man thought continued, with the advances in the physical aad 
biological sciences having their share in directing subsequent 
psychological theory. Thus, in the history of psychology we 
encounter a dualistic conception of body and mind, one which plans 
mind in a superior position to body and, consequently, defines 
human behavior essentially in terms of mental activities. But 
the effects of physical and bodily conditions on the working of 
the mind are often too evident to be ignored. The influence of 
drugs on mental activities is a case in point. The answer to this 
problem may be encountered in the philosophical thought which 
advanced a parallel!stic approach to mind and body, trying thereby 
to avoid the whole problem of interaction. But the problem was too 
complex to be solved by avoiding it. Monistic approaches, choosing 
one or the other horn of the dualistic dilemma— that is, either 
mind or body— seemed more promising. One approach chose the mental 
horn and thus reduced everything to mentality. A second approach, 
mechanistic in character, rejected the concept of mind or soul in 
toto, together with the concepts consciousness and conscious 
behavior, and defined behavior in purely physiological terms.
Religion has had its influence on such philosophical thinking. 
What interests us at this point is the concern the theologians 
showed concerning a priori knowledge or innate ideas which were 
necessary for the belief in the Diety around the Seventeenth
Carbary, especially in the face of the Baconian empiricism, Locke,
although a good Christian who wa3 anxious to argue on behalf of
the reasonableness of Christianity, did not accept apriorism* His
was an experiental philosophy, one which held that all our knowledge
corns through our senses from experience. At birth, he believed the
mind to be blank—*a "tabula rasa"— upon which sense impressions are
ingraved, thus leading to memory, with memory leading to ideas,
Locke argued that "there is nothing in the mind except what was
first in the senses."^ But Locke’s position cut both ways within
the frame work of dualism* There were those who argued that "since
only material things can affect our senses, we know nothing but
2
matter, and must accept a materialistic philosophy,” The status of 
mind was endangered by this conclusion* If mind is made up solely 
of sense impressions, matter must be the material out of which mind 
is made.
Bishop Berkeley rose to the occasion and argued that Locke's 
analysis did not prove that mind is matter but, on the contrary, 
that matter does not exist except as a form of mind. We cannot 
know matter, since our knowledge is derived merely from sensations. 
Our knowledge of anything is our sensations of it and is gained by 
an active force, or entity, which receives and acts upon these
1
Quoted from Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy* p. 256,
2
Durant, Ibid.* p, 256.
5sensations* Thus, at the hands of Berkeley, the status of mind as 
the kaover, was thus saved and rather exalted at the expense of 
matter. Says Berkeley,
Besides all that endless variety of ideas 
or objects of knowledge, there is likewise 
something which knows or perceives them, and 
exercises diverse operations— as willing, imagining, 
remembering— about them. This perceiving, active 
being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself.
By which words I do not denote anyone of my ideas, 
but a thing entirely distinct from them, ifeerein 
they exist or, which is the same thing, whereby they 
are perceived— for the existence of an idea consists 
of being perceived,3
The arguments that Berkeley utilized to destroy matter were
likewise utilized by Hume to destroy mind* Hume's argument was
essentially this: "The mind is not a substance, an organ that
has ideas, it is only an abstract name for the series of ideas;
the perceptions, memories and feelings are the mind; there is no
U
observable 'soul* behind the process of thought,” Hume seemed to 
have destroyed or completed the destruction of matter as well. He 
attempted to destroy science by destroying the concept of law. 
According to him we do not perceive laws or causes but only events 
and sequences and infer causation and necessity. Only mathematical 
formulae are inherently and unchangeably true; and this only because 
they are tautological. Thus science, according to Hume, must limit
3
Bishop George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 2,
U Quoted in Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, Ibid., p. 258.
itself to direct experiment since man cannot trust unverified 
deductions from Ians, and to mathematics since it is the only un­
changeable truth that we know of. Thus to Hums nothing is of 
value except direct experiment and mathematics.
When we run through libraries, persuaded of 
these principles, writes Hume, what havoc must we 
make I If we take in our hands any volume of school 
metaphysics, for instance, let U3 ask, 'Does it contain 
any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?
'Wo.* Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? 'No.*
Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain 
nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Here we find the epitome of skepticism and, at the botttoa, the 
eternal mind-matter controversy* The dilemma is beautifully 
illustrated by the wit who said, "No matter, never mind." and added, 
"No mind, never matter."
It needed a Bousseau to challenge the reasonableness of reason 
to escape from empiricism and to resort to feeling and instinct to 
save theism and morality. Rousseau may be considered the father 
of instinct psychology in its most modern forms. His inqpact may be 
felt at least indirectly, in the psychologic of trend, Jung, Adler 
and McDougal. The latter writer may illustrate the utmost specificity 
with respect to the taxonomy of instincts. McDougals classified 
instincts in fourteen and later seventeen entities to account for 
all modes of behavior. In comparison with McDougal, Freud was
vague with respect to the taxonomy of instincts.^ The fact of
^ See G. W. Allport, Becoming. Basic Considerations for a 
Psychology of Personality, pp. 1^-16.
the matter, however, is that Rousseau's reasoning finds m  echo in 
these different instinctive psychologies*
Kant attempted to restore to experience what belonged to it, 
leaving to "pure reason” that which belonged to it* By pure reason 
Kant meant knowledge that does not come through our senses, apriori 
knowledge that is independent of all sense experience and which 
belongs to us by virtue of the structure of our minds* Says Kant, 
"My question is, what we can hope to achieve with reason, when all 
the material and assistance of experience are taken away.”^  What 
is left of knowledge after all experience is taken away would per 
force be apriori knowledge, or transcendental knowledge* "I call 
knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so much with objects, 
as with our apriori concepts of objects.” Mathematics offered Kant 
the finest example of our advancement independent of all our 
experience. He said, "How far can we advance independently of all 
experience, in apriori knowledge, is shown by the brilliant example
Q
of mathematics* w
Mathematics represent absolute and necessaxy truths and they 
come not from experience, for experiences give us nothing but 
separate sensations and events. Kant's problem was then to show
 5--------—
Snanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Preface, p. xxiv.
7
Emanuel Kant, Ibid., p. 10*
8how the raw material of sensations is worked up into the finished 
product of thought. This process takes place on two levels* First, 
sensations are developed to percepts as the forms of perceptions 
(i* e, space aad tame) are applied to themj and, second, percep­
tions are developed to concepts by applying to them the forms of 
conceptions (i* e* categories of thought)*
It is of prime importance at this point to note the difference 
in the line of thought between the British empiricism represented 
by Locke and Hume aad the German idealism represented by Kant*
The difference lies mainly in this question* How do sensations 
group themselves into perceptions and then into conceptions and 
ideasj is this process automatic? British empiricists said nIes,tt 
but Kant said *Ho#tt For Kant, the forms of perceptions and the 
forms of conceptions, which do not depend on experience, do the 
trick.
The foregoing exposition of British empiricism versus German 
idealism as represented by Kant may be shown to bear upon the 
conflicts obtaining now between behaviorism and field theory* If 
we couple the laws of association as formulated by Aristotle, way 
back, with Locke and Hume's empiricism and then swing to the 
material horn of the dualistic dilemma, we will have in front of 
us a crude foxm of modem behaviorism. As a contrast we will have 
to elaborate on Kant's forms of perception and conception in terms
of the law of Pragnanz and its sub-laws; similarity, continuity, 
closure, etc. as formulated by Wertheimer and ve will end with a 
psychology pretty much like Gestalt.
The dualistic frame of reference seems thus far to assert 
itself sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. In other 
words, the nature of human behavior derives its chief significance 
from the conception of mind and its relation with bodyl^ Guthrie, 
a learning psychologist, who subscribes to a behavioristic theory, 
recognises the significance of the conception of mind in psychology 
but reduces it to learning as physical motion. Guthrie says, 11 The 
ability to learn, that is, to respond differently to the situation, 
is what distinguishes those living creatures which common sense 
endows with minds. This is the practical descriptive use of the 
tea
The dilemma revealed by the foregoing exposition of the relation
between philosophy and psychology will bear watching as we deal with
present-day psychology. The problem is not as simple as it may now
seem to some to be (Guthrie's statement above, for instance)# With
the advancement of the physical and biological science, concepts
and methods from these fields were borrowed by psychologists aad
adapted to suit their newly developing science. It was felt that 
-
For a detailed account of this problem see Boyd H. Bode,
How We learn, especially preface and first chapter.
10
E, R. Guthrie, The Psychology of Learning, p. 3.
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the controversies of the dualists could be left with the philosophers, 
who, argue though they might, could no longer be expected to throw 
light upon the study of behavior.
The extent to which scientific method and scientific concepts 
as developed in the physical and biological fields have been 
utilised in psychology varies from one psychological approach to 
the other* We find, for instance, that Titchener, without con­
cerning himself with the problem of whether psychology is a branch 
of biology or not, adopted the classification of the field of 
biology, into morphology, physiology and ontology and classified 
psychology accordingly. He regarded the study of morphology in 
the biological sciences, by necessity, to precede and not to follow 
physiology. The latter concerned itself with the study of the 
functions of the living organism and its organs. In psychology, 
by the same token, morphology— the aaalytbical study of the mind—  
should precede the study of function, else the science of psychology 
would regress to metaphysics. Says Titchener The morphological
study of the mind serves, as no other method of study can, to 
enforce and sustain the thesis that psychology is a science, and 
not a province of metaphysics.,,. "-*-*• He went further to assert 
that only after analytical psychology had advanced far enough
would its results ultimately "serve as a basis of function,"^
E. B. Titchener, "The Postulates of a Structural Psychology," 
in Readings in the History of Psychology, Wayne Dennes, editor, p.3o9.
E. B. Titchener, Loc. cit.
11
For Titchener, in other words, it was mandatory that the elements
of consciousness should first be identified and studied, in the
same manner plant organs and tissues are identified and studied in
morphology, as a prerequisite for the study of their functions.
Titchener defended his position, therefore, on the assumption
scientific development in biology should serve as an example for
psychology. He thus held the belief that the problems of psychology
should, to start with be studied, "as static rather than dynamic,
13structural rather than functional."
Functional psychology, however, adopted the concept "function" 
directly from biology and maintained, contrary to structuralism, 
that structure and function cannot be studied in isolation, one 
from the other. "This involves the identification of functional 
psychology with the effort to discern and portray the typical 
operations of consciousness under actual life conditions, as over 
against the attempt to analyze and describe its elementary and 
complex contents."^
The theory of evolution brought into focus a mass of problems 
which left their strong impact upon psychology as well as upon 
other biological and physical sciences. Herbert Spencer was perhaps 
the first thinker to write a psychology based directly on the
Ibid.
T. R. Angell, "The Province of Functional Psychology," in 
Readings in the History of Psychology. Ibid., p. UhO*
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biological theory of evolution. It is interesting to note that
Spencer1 s early writings on psychology were a vigorous defense of
materialism and determinism. That was how he understood the theory 
15of evolution. He presented different biological and psycho­
logical theories based on the theory of evolution. The origin of 
nerves was traced back to intercellular connective tissue; the 
origin of instincts to the confounding of reflexes and trans­
mission of acquired character; and the origin of consciousness 
and thought to the clash between the conflicting impulses. Mind, 
in other words, had its origin in the evolution of matter. In 
The Principles of Psychology (1873) we find him reverting somewhat 
to a mentalistic philosophy and hence to a mentalistic interpreta­
tion of psychology.
Can the oscillation of a molecule be represented 
in con sciousness side by side with a nervous shock, 
and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables 
us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has 
nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes 
more than ever manifest when we bring the two into 
juxtaposition. And the immediate verdict of con­
sciousness thus given, might be analytically 
justified for it might be shown that the con­
ception of an oscillating molecule is built out of 
many units of feeling.... Were we compelled to 
chose between the alternatives of translating mental 
phenomena into physical phenomena or of translating 
physical phenomena into mental phenomena, the latter _ ✓ 
alternative would seem the more acceptable of the two.
^  Spencer's earlier psychology (1855) coincided with Darwin's 
famous papers which were read before the Linnaean Society in 1858. 
His Development Hypothesis (1853)» however, antedated the above- 
mentioned papers.
H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, pp. U96<4i97.
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la this quotation we find Spencer interpreting our knowledge 
of matter in terms, "•••• of units of mind— sensations and memories 
and ideas. This is almost the languages of Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume, but not quite* For him n*«* although the objects of experience 
may very well be transfigured by perception; and be quite other 
than they seem, they have an existence which does not all depend 
upon perceiving them*tt^ ® He further believed in the evolution of 
mind from reflex to tropism to instinct through memory and imagina­
tion to intellect and reason. From all this it seems clear enough 
that Spencer, despite his materialistic start, was caught finally 
on the two horns of the dualistic dilemma*
It is significant that a theory of effect based on random 
movement which, if culminated by a satisfying state of affairs, 
may lead, through nervous energy discharges, to the fixation of 
the light connections, appeared in Spencer's psychology. The 
similarity between Spencer's formulation and contemporary laws of 
effect and reinforcement is really striking, kt bottom there is 
a hedonistic philosophy which has dominated human thought about 
behavior in one way or another since ancient Greek thought.
Plato saw in the pleasure-pain principle an important factor 
in the motivation of human action, especially with respect to the
17
Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, p. 37iw
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Loc. cit.
working class. Aristotle considered the pleasure-pain principle 
to be the basis of will. Hobbs' self-interest principle as the 
basis of social life revolved around the pleasure-pain principle.
And finally, under the influence of the theory of evolution, 
hedonism took definite shape. The pleasure^ain principles provided 
the basis for selection and the principle of association provided 
the mechanism of fixation.
The pleasure-pain principle, however, involves a mentalistic 
connotation. Thorndike's psychology, which was based explicitly 
on success and failure in its earlier formulation, suffered from 
this mentalistic connotation and was criticized accordingly.
Thorndike's later formulations consequently attempted to avoid 
such an implication by emphasizing physiological interpretations. 
Whether or not he succeeded in his effort is of no great moment 
at present. Thorndike's problem with the law of effect, illustrates 
the point. Says Postman, "In its approach to motivation, modern 
learning theory has deep roots in the philosophy of hedonism, and 
the development of the psychology of learning has been characterized 
by a stubborn defense of hedonistic principles on the one hand and a 
struggle for the emancipation from hedonism on the other."^
It is of some significance at this point to observe that the 
departure of different behavioristic learning theories from Thorndike's 
19 *
L, Postman, "The History and Present Status of the Law of 
Effect," Psych. Bui., 191+7, Vol. p. Ii90.
centers to a great extent on a reformulation of, or the complete
rejection of, the law of effect, Watson rejected the law of effect
on the basis that there is nothing in it that could not be accounted
for by the principles of recency and frequency* Guthrie followed
Watson's lead* Hull, Mower and Skinner, however, retained the
law of effect in their respective systems in some form or another*
This point will be discussed in some detail later on* All this is
not to say that other psychological theories have done away with
the hedonistic principles* The real problem is how a hedonistic
principle is applied* Gestalt and field psychological theories
deal with hedonism in the form of equilibria and disequilibria
and by the law of pragnanz* The principle of closure is evidently
a hedonistic principle; and the good Gestalt is by definition a
hedonistic concept* But the difference between behavioristic
learning theories and field or cognitive theories becomes apparent
20when we face the issue "reinforcement versus cognition*" Is 
reinforcement necessary for learning? Skinner, Hull and Mowrer 
say "Ies*tt Lewin and Tolman say "No," The latter say that re­
inforcement is necessary for performance but not for learning* The 
former insist that such a principle is essential for both learning 
and performance. The issue that centers around latent learning will
be discussed in detail later on*
20
By "reinforcement" here is meant primary need reduction*
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Gordon Allport stands in between. Though he maintains that 
some farm of the principle of reinforcement is applicable to animals 
and young children, he asserts that such a principle cannot in its 
simple form account for adult behavior. He insists that such a 
concept as the ego concept or a system of interests, which is 
autonomous in its function, should be substituted for the reinforce- 
ment principle for the explanation of adult behavior. A legitimate 
question at this point arises. Does Allport, by making the dis­
tinction between animal and child behavior, on the one hand, and 
adult human behavior, on the other, still follow the theory of 
evolution? The answer would seem to be that he does. He makes a 
significant distinction between phylogenetic development and 
ontogenetic development, however, and puts the emphasis on the 
latter in dealing with adult behavior. Cantril and Sherrif follow 
a similar approach to that of Allpart and they include the ego 
concept in their psychologies.
Thus we find that although the theory of evolution is accepted 
by almost all present-day psychologists, its implication and 
significance vary from one psychology to the other. The problems 
brought about as a direct result of the promulgation of the theory 
of evolution are many and far-reaching. Perhaps first and foremost 
is the realization that after all man does not stand in complete 
isolation from the rest of the animal kingdom. The problem of 
heredity versus environment gained momentum around the turn of the
century* But this new understanding meant different things to
different psychologists* On the one hand, we find those who took
their point of departure from the top of the evolutionary ladder
and attributed to lower animals such mental qualities as were
attributed to man alone* A host of articles and studies reported
the intelligence of lower animals* On the other hand, there were
those who took their point of departure from the bottom end of the
evolutionary scale* Han1 s status was gradually reduced* Under
the influences of the invention of the steam engine and the following
advent of the machine age, man became likened unto a machine*
Skinner, in his attempt to defend the proposition that man is a
machine, and that apparently spontaneous motion was and is the
factor that is responsible for the illusion that living creatures
are different from machines, reports that, ‘‘When Wordsworth and
Coleridge once passed a steam engine, Wordsworth observed that it
was scarcely possible to divest oneself of the impression that it
had life and volition* 'les* said Coleridge, *it is a giant with 
21
one idea** M Skinner, then goes on to say, “Since that time two
things have happened* Machines have become more lifelike and living
22organisms have been found to be more like machines**1
The study animal behavior consequently loomed large in the 
field of psychology by the turn of the century. The difference
----g ----*---
F* B. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, p* ii£*
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between man and lower animals came to be regarded merely as a 
matter of degree of complexity of the organism* s bodily structure.
The battle of man*s intelligence and intelligent behavior versus 
habit, that is, mechanical habit formation, was fought in the field 
of animal behavior. The case of behavior ism versus Gestalt psychology 
is too familiar to be recorded at this point.
Russian physiologists, chiefly Pavlov and Betcherev, added 
their contribution to the picture. Conditioning was hailed by 
early behaviorists as the key to all problems of behavior. The 
most complex behavior was explained as a matter of building up 
segments of conditioned responses. And, although the early formula­
tion is no more held in its simple form, conditioning remained the 
cornerstone on which the behaviorist theory in its modem formula­
tion was built. At the heart there is the deviation from the 
strict identification of behavior with known physiological facts. 
Hypothetical constructs and intervening variables, such as habit 
for instance, were postulated where the physiological carrolates 
could not be identified. The study of behavior was not regarded as 
a different discipline in any essential manner from physiology; 
although the known physiological facts were found to be too meager 
to account for the science of behavior. It is instructive to note 
at this point that most of the so-called intervening variables 
have their hypothetical roots in the peripheral nervous system.
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Concepts from the science of physics were equally instru­
mental in shqping the growing science of psychology. Some concepts 
were explicitly adopted and applied directly to psychology. The 
field concept, as it is utilized by Gestaltists and other field 
theorists, is a case in point. Along with the field concept, 
other allied concepts, such as force and energy, are also incorporated 
in such psychological theories. Newtonian mechanics are at least 
tactitly utilized by psychologists in terms of actions (stimuli), 
reactions (responses) and interaction between outside or inside 
stimuli and outside or inside reactions or responses.
Mathematics, considered in physical and to a lesser degree in 
biological sciences the tool for precision and prediction, led the 
psychologist to believe that quantification was equally important 
in his science. He felt that any science would be appraised by its 
advancement in the direction of quantification. This position seems 
to follow from the dictum ‘anything that exists, exists in some 
amount.1 Skinner undoubtedly holds some such belief. In commenting 
on Pavlovrs conditioning experiments Skinner said, uQnly a quantita­
tive description will make sure that there is no additional mental 
process in which the dog associates the tone with the idea of 
food."23
Hull similarly leans heavily towards such a belief and his 
mathematieo-deductive approach is consequently a highly quantitative
Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, pp. !?3-5>U*
20
one* Without, at this point, discussing this position it may be 
in order to note here again that different psychological approaches 
have adopted different mathematical concepts to fit their respec­
tive systems* Lewin, for instance, utilized vector and topo­
logical concepts to fit his field theory* Hull utilized the 
mathematico deductive system in parallel with Eucledian geometry 
for his system. Skinner, who compares his system with physical 
chemistry, follows a more or less similar approach to that used 
in physical chemistry to estimate behavioral constants, such as 
reflex, reserve, extinction, rate, etc* Egon Brunswik found the 
statistical approach, along a line comparable to Maxwell’s law of 
probability, most suited for explaining behavior. Brunswik in 
this respect is in harmony with all experimental psychologists, 
though his reasoning is rather unique* Says Brunswik,
In the natural environment of living being, 
cues, means or pathways to a goal are usually 
neither absolutely reliable nor absolutely wrong*
In most cases there is, objectively speaking, no 
perfect certainty that this or that will, or will 
not, lead to a certain end but. only a higher or 
lesser degree of probability* h
And so the story goes. Medicine, especially through psychiatry 
has had its role in the picture. But psychiatry, which made its 
start in treating the insane, followed two distinct lines of 
approaches: the somatic and the psychic* The two approaches,
 2E ” -------
E. Brunswik, "Probability as a Determiner of Rat Behavior," 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2£>, 1939, pp. 17!?«
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chiefly at the hands of Freud, have led to the development of
psychoanalysis with its wide ramifications* Thus, by the turn of
the century, we find some psychological approaches have distinguished
themselves as distinct schools* By and large, every one of these
schools has arisen as a revolt against some other school* Titchener
in referring to structural psychology, for instance, said, "We must
remember that experimental psychology arose by way of reaction
against the faculty psychology of the last century* B And Angell,
speaking about the province of functional psychology in contrast
with structural psychology, said, “It (referring to functional
psychology) gains its vitality primarily perhaps as a revolt
against the exclusive excellence of another starting point for the
26study of the mind,..." Gestalt psychology, as is well known, 
made its revolt against the elementalistic approach of other 
psychological systems, maintaining that ■wholes* "disclose properties 
and influences that are more than the sum of their parts* The 
revolt of early behaviorism against the study of consciousness or 
mental states is very well known. Watson, in his early writings 
asserted: "The time seems to have come when psychology must discard
 53---------
Titchener, The Postulates of a Structural Psychology, op* cit*,
p. 368.
26 Angell* The Province of Functional Psychology, op. cit*,
P. 195.
^  Kohler, "Physical Gestalten," Readings in the History of 
Psychology, p. 523*
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all reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself 
into thinking that it is making mental states the object of observa-
x- *28txon."
The foregoing citations suffice to illustrate the point that 
most new psychological movements have made their start as a revolt 
against pre-existing schools of psychology.
As this century entered its first years the following schools 
of psychology were known:
“FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY* Very old; wide in scope; not
sharply defined; named in 
America in 1898,
STRUCTURAL PSYCHOLOGY* German in origin; 1879 out­
standing date; named and 
sharpened in America in 1898.
ASSOCIATIONS* An old British school, taking
stimulus-response form in 
America in 1898, in Russia in 
3513.
PSYCHOANALYSIS* Originated in Austria about
1900.
PERSONALISTIC AND Originating in both Germany
CBGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGIES * and America about 1900,
FURPOSIVISM OR HORMIC Originating in Britain in
PSYCHOLOGY* 1908.
BEHAVIORISM: Originating in America in 1912.
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY: Originating in Germany in 1912.”2?
”28
Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” Readings 
in the History of Psychology, p. l*6l.
29 Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, Revised Ed,,
P. U*
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As for present day psychology, the time seems to have passed 
when schools of psychology stand in extreme isolation from each 
other* In fact we no more have schools of psychology as such, hut 
rather different points of view and different areas of inquiry.
With respect to perception versus learning theories, the concern 
of the present study, it is impossible to make a clear-cut 
distinction between categories within the contemporary points of 
view of psychology, Hilgard, in his Theories of learning, categorizes 
contemporary theories as belonging to one or the other of two 
families— association theories and field theories. He notes, 
however, that "The distinctions between the families are not always 
sharp, and there are agreements and disagreements which cut across 
lines,
Hilgard recognizes five main differences between the two 
categories of psychological families. These ares (1) environ­
mentalism versus nativismj (2) the nature of wholes and of parts;
(3) reaction and cognition} (U) mechanism versus dynamic equilibrium; 
and (5) historical versus contemporary causation. To this list we 
may add continuity versus discontinuity and blind trial and error 
versus insightful learning. Such a division , of course, is 
arbitrary; other forms of categorizations, which would call for some 
rearrangements in the above order, are possible. One possible 
alternative would be behaviorism versus Gestalt or field theory,
30
E, Hilgard, Theories of Learning, p. 9*
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On this basis we would not be able to locate either Tollman* s or 
Brunswik* 3 theory.
The main differences between the two families, association 
theory and field theory, follow,
1, ENVIRONMENTALISM VERSUS NATIVISM: Both families lean 
partly towards nativism and partly towards environmentalism. The 
difference is a matter of emphasis. Even Watson, who is con­
sidered an extreme environmentalist, recognized two innate reactions—  
that of fear and that of anger. But yet none of the contemporary 
association theories go so far as Watson did in leaning upon 
environmentalism. Suffice it here to refer to Hull*s third 
postulate which asserts that the responses activated by a given
need are not merely random but are essentially those which are 
most likely to terminate that need. When we shift to the field 
family we find that although most positions within it emphasize 
form perception as independent of past experiences, such concepts 
as the phenomenal field, life space or memory trace, undoubtedly 
recognize the importance of past experience,
2, THE NATURE OF WHOLES AND OF PARTS* This issue has been 
one of the hottest issues between the two families. In its 
simplest form it can be stated thus* Is the "whole” a mere summa­
tion of its parts or is it more than that? Association theories 
prefer the former alternative, while field theories prefer the 
latter. On each side of the fence, however, we find some recognition
of the significance of fora or organization of behavior* Thorndike * s 
relatively new concepts Tiiich he postulated in his Human Learning 
are akin to Gestalt thinking. These concepts are (a) belonging,
(b) identifiability, (c) availability, (d) trial, and (e) system*
The postulation of these concepts by Thorndike led Brown and Feder 
to conclude that Thorndike*s learning theory could be explained by 
Gestalt psychology and that Thorndike, so far as the above were 
concerned, was talking Gestalt* Hull* s neural interaction post­
ulate is a wholist concept and in it Hull sees the two families—  
field and associationism coming closer together* Gestaltists and 
field theorists do not completely neglect the significance of parts 
and their influence on the whole. The difference between the two 
families, no matter how serious it is, is a matter of emphasis*
3* REACTION AND COGNITION* The difference between the two 
families, with respect to this issue, has to do with the history 
of behaviorism* Associationism in its history was concerned with 
the association of ideas* In its modem version as behaviorism, 
it attempted to free itself from any introspectionistic or mentalistic 
tinge and, hence, followed the rejection of cognition* Discrimina­
tion or reaction is a better term far behaviorists than cognition 
because it refers to observable behavior and learning. Cognitive 
psychologists at the same time reject any mentalistic connotation 
in their use of the term “cognition." The extent to which they 
have succeeded will be left to later consideration. All this is
not to say, however, that the difference between the two families 
is merely a matter of terminology. But the issue cannot be 
exhausted in this brief review. It will be considered in a separate 
section of this study,
U. MECHANIC VERSOS DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUMS The difference between 
the two families with respect to this issue is a matter of pre­
ference of the physical model after which psychologists build iheir 
systems. The field theorists are influenced by the field concept 
in physics and hence include in their systems such concepts as 
field forces, dynamic equilibrium and the like. The association 
family, however, in their insistance upon observable behavior, 
prefer machine models which work in accordance with Newton1 s 
mechanics, that is, in terms of action and reaction as discrete 
happenings. But between these two extremes we find a number of 
theories which do not fall strictly within one of these two alterna­
tives but rather lean more towards one than the other.
S. HISTORICAL VERSUS CONTEMPORARY CAUSATION: This is also a 
matter of emphasis. Field theorists, without completely denying 
the influence of past experience, believe that it is more profit­
able to inquire into the immediate dynamic experience and its 
structure. They believe that the historical approach is complicated 
and the historical details of any event are rarely completely avail­
able for investigation, while tbs immediate situation contains all 
the factors that are relevant. Association theorist, however, in
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their emphasis upon reaction and the sequence of interaction in a 
mechanistic fashion, naturally emphasize past experience and, hence, 
the historical approach*
6. CONTINUITY VERSUS DISCONTINUITY OF LEARNING: Behavioristic 
theories, insofar as they emphasize reinforcement as ‘primary need 
reduction*,,consider learning— the acquisition of habit— as a 
monotonous function of reinforcement and, hence, make the continuity 
of learning a central consideration. Field theorists, however, in 
their emphasis upon equilibrium and restructuralization of the 
field, consider learning to take place essentially in one try and, 
hence, accept the notion of discontinuity* This position is clear 
and has caused a long controversy, especially between Tolman and 
his followers on the one hand, and Hull and his followers on the 
other, in connection with so-called latent learning* Field theorists 
assume that learning can take place cognitively without doing or 
performance; in Tolman*s words a rat in a maze learns what-leads- 
to-Jwhat even though he might not eat the food as he learns its 
position* Reinforcement psychologists, however, insist on learning 
by doing; the doing leads to reinforcement, whether primary or 
secondary. This issue is of serious philosophical importance and 
will, therefore, be discussed later on in connection with latent 
learning*
We must not, at this point, fail to observe that Guthrie, 
although an avowed behaviorist, does not stand in the association
28
camp so far as this issue is concerned. Guthrie believes that 
learning is completed in one try. He does not belong in the 
continuity group, therefore. His reasons differ from those of the 
cognition theorists, as will be seen later.
7. TRIAL AND ERROR VERSUS INSIGHTFUL LEARNING: This issue
follows from the difference between the two families on the issue 
of environmentalism versus nativism. Behaviorists believe that 
random movements in a motivated situation lead to habit formation, 
as the organism by chance makes the correct response. Such an 
understanding influences the structure of the experimental designs 
in behavioristic studies. These largely depend on maze experi­
ments and rote learning. Field theories, however, emphasize 
cognition or insightful behavior and their experimental designs 
usually emphasize meaningful relationships.
This effort to present a broad but brief outline of the 
history of contemporary movements in psychological theories was 
made to provide the ground against which the main interest of 
this study, an examination of cognitive aspects of behavior, may 
be pursued. Both families of psychological theories, associationist 
and field, will be examined. The next chapter will examine the 
field theory family, emphasizing its cognitive aspects.
CHAPTER II
FIELD THEORIES
Introduction
In the literature of field theories such terms as percept, 
sense organization, insight, wholeness, figure, ground, expectancy, 
purpose or purposive behavior and the like frequently occur. For 
this reason they are sometimes called the cognitive theories. In 
order to understand the main points of difference between theories 
which belong to this family and those which belong to the association- 
ist, or more precisely, the behaviorist group, we will have to 
note some points of emphasis of the field family as they attack 
behaviorism. Some psychologists believe that the differences 
between the S-R and cognitive theories is one of emphasis. They 
assume that while S-R theories focus on observables or inferred 
or hypothetical S-R connections, the cognitive theories focus on 
reported or inferred perceptual organizations as mediators between 
stimulus patterns and behavior. The difference, however, though 
a result of difference of emphasis, certainly goes deeper than 
that. Cognitive theorists see in the molar-molecular issue, the 
crux of the difference between the two groups.
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The Molar-Molecular Issue
Gestalt psychology, as was pointed out in the first chapter, 
arose as a revolt against elementarism or atomism in the study 
of behavior, mainly, as it related to perception. Perception from 
their point of view could not be described in terms of a mosaic 
of sensations held together by means of associations. Their 
criticism of introspectionist psychology was directed mainly 
against its atomistic nature. So also has been their criticism of 
behaviorism and all sorts of associationism. To them the whole is 
more than the sum of its parts and analysis of behavior phenomena, 
therefore, in terms of their ultimate parts is artificial and 
misleading. From their analysis of the molecular approach, the 
concept of the whole and the molar approach may be understood. The 
molecular approach, according to the field theorists, rests on the 
following biases.
The atomistic reductive bias: The attempt to explain
a complex interrelated 
whole in terms of its 
constituent elements with 
the underlying assumption 
that something small is 
more fundamental than some­
thing large.
The genetic bias: The belief that a phenomenon
which is genetically early is 
more fundamental than that 
which comes later.
Adapted from Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory," Handbook 
of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 93*
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Peripheralismi The assumption that complex
modes of behavior can 
ultimately be explained in 
terms of relatively simple 
nervous connections.
The reinforcement bias: The assumption that learning
occurs only as a result of 
the reduction of specific 
primary or derived drives.
From a molar point of view, however, behavior is dealt with 
in terms of interaction between the organism and its environment. 
The organism is considered as a unity or whole and not as a sum­
mation of specific sensory and molecular segments which are
insulated each from the other. Molar behavior, from Tolman's point 
of view, for instance, requires mutual interconnections between all 
parts of the organism. To identify a single behavior act it is 
required to reckon with a specific 'goal-object'. This goal 
object requires the selection of means to reach the object 'means- 
object'. This implies the selection of the shortest routes in 
the direction of the goal-object. Trial-and-error can be defined 
from this point of view as the persistence of the organism to 
reach the goal. The organism benefits from such tries in that it 
can select and retain the more efficient means to that end. In
this view, trial-and-error is not blind, neither is it mere
fumbling.
Cognition in Tolman's terms is defined as
The initial orientation towards a goal-object 
in terms of distance, direction and valence 
character and as the selection of means-object 
or path in terms of its suitability for reaching 
the goal. Cognition is further definable as the 
behavior change upon attaining the goal and is 
the variation of behavior if -the goal does not 
prove to have the initially perceived valence.
Purpose, by the same token, is objectively defined by Tolman as 
the "invarient terminal" with reference to which reactions may 
continuously differ. Tolman’s definition of these terms are 
operational, where cognition is identified with change in behavior 
and purpose is merely an invarient terminal. Such definitions 
of cognitive terms fall short of Hullfish’s assertion that 
cognitive behavior may be viewed as "trial and error become 
conscious of itself and thus escaping from the demand of the press­
ing situation for immediate action." Alternatives are examined, 
not merely acted upon one at a time. Thus, delayed reaction is a 
characteristic of cognitive behavior.
Tolman’s position shows, however, a marked difference from 
the orthodox behaviorist approach in that it reckons with an end 
in view. In other words, behavior does not converge to the 
terminal point by mere accident which is the position of behaviorism. 
Tolman, being a molor behaviorist does not deal with abstractions 
as Goldstein does. Goldstein believes that a cognitive theory 
must provide room for the representation of behavior in more
Martin Scheerer, Ibid., p. 9h»
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broad abstract terms not directly dependent upon concrete action 
goals; that is through concepts.
The Proximal Distal Issue
In philosophical terms the issue (the behavioristic) trial- 
and-error versus cognition falls within the realm of the ends- 
means category. From a psychological standpoint it is a proximal- 
distal issue. Spence points out that total concrete events are 
never repeated exactly, but only certain features of them. Thus 
he concludes that even the holist has to abstract and fractionate
3
in order to arrive at uniformities or laws. Now this argument
Ucuts both ways. Hullfish in his monograph inspects Thorndike's 
psychology and shows how the concept "dogness" is formed upon one 
experience with a dog. The concept "dog", for the little child, 
might include other furred animals such as rabbits. With further 
experience with dogs, however, and with other animals he builds- 
up the concept dog not by adding to or subtracting from the original 
concept bat by broadening his envisionment of 'dog1. Io this 
extent, it is true that total concrete events are never repeated 
exactly. The fact remains, however, that in each and every
 ^K. W. Spence, "The Postulates and Methods of Behaviorism," 
Psychology Review, 191*8, 55, PP* 67-78.
^ H. G. Hullfish, Aspects of Thorndike's Psychology in Their 
Relation to Educational Theory and Practice.
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situation the total object is presented to the perceiver and 
whatever features are accentuated, reinterpreted or omitted are 
being so dealt with in the context of a host of interrelated 
features and characteristics. It is the remaking of the original 
stimulus in the new situation that accounts for the modification of 
the concept. The dog can be described in terms of so many- 
character is tics that it is almost impossible to give a complete 
impirical definition for "dogness" which would fully describe or 
define all members of the genus canis familiaris. What feature 
or features can we isolate and pick out as representative of the 
concept "dogness”? Is it the texture of the fur, its color or 
pattern or is it the dog's size, its movements, length, or shape 
or movement of its tail, or its four limbs or claws, or is it its 
general attitude of friendliness or aggressiveness.
We could continue with countless other characteristics, each 
of which might be taken as a proximal stimulus determining the 
perception of the object. But actually they are all distally 
perceived. We agree with Scheerer, therefore, who says, "that not 
all proximal regularities are representative of the underlying 
organizational determinants." Kohler's critique of traditional 
introspective analysis, as Scheerer has pointed out, bears on this 
point. Kohler has noted that introspective analysis can destroy
^ M. Scheerer, Op. cit., p. 96.
the functional dependency of perceptual parts (for example, as
in the use of the reduction screen), "with the result that a certain
brightness or form is considered the "true" regularity of the
retinal image as a proximal event. In contrast to this isolating
procedure the holists attempt to determine the genuine parts of
wholes versus "fictituous" elements. Now this criterion does not
preclude the functional roles played by parts of the organized whole
or the function of proximal events. In fact, the writer agrees
with Bartlett who maintains that "there is no perceptual situation
in which some detail does not stand out and influence what is
6
perceived more than the rest." But this is also a distal not a 
proximal determinant. It is a fact that in our perceptual and 
cognitive behavior in general we deal with objects, not with local 
stimuli. The starting point for the study of behavior should, 
therefore, be with objects as distally represented. Dewey, in 
another connection, asserted that he was able to pursue his 
philosophical inquiry because he assumed that there were 'objects' 
of knowledge. The S~R theorists naturally face this same problem 
and attempt to account for it in terms of specific elementary or 
proximal stimulus-response determinants or S-R sequence in behavior# 
But did they succeed? Heider? shows how Skinner does in effect speak
-------- g ---------------
See W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology, p. 92.
7
F. Heider, "Environmental Determinants in Psychological 
Theories," Psyc. Rev., 1939, Vol. 1*6, pp. 383-1*10.
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about distal determination when he refers to proximal stimulus 
response determinants. Skinner finds that, in the case of the 
experiment in which the rat presses a lever, the number of dis­
tinguishable acts on the part of the rat that will give the 
required movement of the lever to be indefinite and large. Thus, 
instead of the intended proximal events Skinner speaks about "a 
class which is sufficiently well defined by the phrase ’’pressing 
a lever.”
The phrase clearly signifies not a proximal stimulus response 
but a distal determinant which is to press the lever. By the same 
token, Hill's habit family hierarchy, which provides a purely 
physical basis for the theory of knowledge, does in effect involve 
distal determinants of behavior. Hull tries to account for the 
fact that habits can vary in situations in which there is more 
than one action sequence that will lead to the attainment of a 
particular goal or sub-goal. His account rests on an assumed 
family hierarchy based on past learning of many different action 
sequences, for example, of different paths in different mazes.
What makes the different action sequences belong to one family and 
be interchangeable, therefore, according to Hull, is the fact 
that they possess a common element, namely the same goal reaction 
as a "fractional anticipatory goal reaction." Heider justifiably 
points out that from the position of the locomoting organism,
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e.g., a rat in a maze, each detour within the repertoire of the 
family hierarchy follows proximally different S-R action sequences. 
Proximally viewed, therefore, the end place of each detour in that 
repertoire cannot be identical with the end place in the current 
maze. The identical element is thus distally determined, although 
the theory is based on proximal S-R sequences.
Gestalt Theory
The issue ’proximal-distal1 representation of objects in the 
environment was originally introduced by the G'estaltists. We need 
to consider some basic tenets upon which the Gestalt theory rests. 
One of these is the tenet of distal representation. This, in 
contrast to the proximal conception of the behaviorists, creates 
a critical issue, the distal-proximal issue*
Gestaltists distinguish between distal and proximal stimuli.
To illustrate the point, Koffka says,
When I see a table, this table does not affect 
any senses at all; they are affected by processes 
which have their origin in the sun or an arti­
ficial source of light, and which are only 
modified by the table before they excite the rods 
and cones in our retinae. Therefore these pro­
cesses, the light waves, and not the geographical g
objects, are the direct causes of our perceptions...
® K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology, p. 80.
This illustration helps to show the distinction between the two
kinds of stimuli.
We see now that this word (stimuli) has two 
different meanings which must be clearly dis­
tinguished from each other; on the one hand 
the table in the geographical environment can 
be called a stimulus for our perception of a 
table, on the other hand the excitations to 
which the light rays coming from the table_give rise 
are called the stimuli for our perception.
Koffka calls the first distant stimulus, and the second proximal
stimuli. To answer the question, why do things look as they do,
Koffka goes on to refute the proposition that ”changes in the
proximal stimulation unaccompanied by changes of the distant
stimulus-objects should produce corresponding changes in the looks
of the behavioral object.” To support his views, he cites instances
of the constancy of size, shape and brightness. He concludes,
therefore, that, ”The constancy of real things is to a great extent
preserved in the constancy of the phenomenal things despite variation
in their proximal stimuli.”'*'0 Furthermore, although he accepts the
proposition that "any change in the distant object which produces
no effect in the proximal stimulation should leave the looks of
the behavioral object unchanged,” he rejects conversion of this
statement. He refers to reversible figures and puzzle pictures
9 ■
Ibid., p. 80.
^  ibid., p. 83.
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to bear witness to the fact that changes may occur in the looks
of things without corresponding changes in the proximal stimuli*
He further concludes that the looks of things do not depend only
on the proximal stimulation but also ‘'upon sets of other conditions
which must lie within the real organism."^ Here lies the corner-
12stone on which gestalt theory is based*
Past Experience
The gestaltists reject past experience as forming part of those 
conditions which lie within the real organism and affect the per­
ceptual process "or the looks of things.1' The constancy phenomenon, 
in other words, does not depend upon past experience* It is a given. 
They reject the proposition that interpretation based on past 
experience is an explanation of the constancy phenomenon. Koffka 
cites many experiments to support this point of view. His case may 
be briefly summed up by stating that size constancy has been shown 
to exist with young animals as, for instance, the three months old 
chicks which could not be expected to be able to utilize their past 
experiences for interpreting their perceptions. Human infants have
n
Ibid., p. 8iw
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Reference to this point will be made in Chapter Six of 
this s tudy.
also shown a remarkable constancy in responding to size. More­
over, human adults have shown constancy of size even when experimental 
changes in the object of perception were not consciously observable; 
a fact which eliminates 1 interpretation" as a cause for constancy, 
since awareness of the conditions which lead to the variation of 
the retinal image is essential for an interpretation hypothesis.
If size constancy depended on interpretation, gestaltists argue, 
the constancy of size should be exhibited regardless of distance 
provided there is awareness of conditions and their meanings. Some­
times even with the presence of conscious meaning of observable 
objects, size constancy ceases to work; that is, when the distance 
between the subject and the object of perception exceeds a certain 
limit as, for example, when an observer on the top of a skyscraper 
looks down to the streets and perceives pedestrians and cars as 
pedestrians and cars, although their sizes are perceived to be 
much smaller than they are in reality. Koffka concludes, therefore, 
"that constancy of size follows as a natural and original result."
By the same token, brightness-constancy has been proved to exist in 
infants, chimpanzees and chickens.
The distinctive features of the gestalt theory may be summarized 
in the following:
1. A distinction is made between the physical
objects (i.e. distal stimuli and the proximal 
stimuli— light rays, air particles, etc.) 
which impinge on our local receptors and are 
therefore the direct cause of perception.
Ui
2. The proximal stimuli belong to the medium 
which is interposed between the object 
(distal stimuli) and the sense organ.
3. Percepts, or phenomenal objects result from 
a process within the organism which may be 
called representation of the distal objects.
It is accounted for by the principle of 
isomorphism.
U. Perception is direct i.e., interpretation in 
terms of past experience is ruled out as a 
determinant of the phenomenal object in per­
ception.
The Dynamics of Perception
In order to understand the dynamics of perception from the 
gestalt point of view, it may help to summarize the sequence of 
events in the process. First, there is the distal stimulus (the 
physical object); then are the proximal stimuli which impinge on 
local receptors; sensory organization next occurs; and, finally, 
there is response to the product of organization. "The product 
of organization is the phenomenal unit formation which represents 
the distal object."-*-3 The concept of organization is introduced 
in order to distinguish between the phenomenal object which is 
considered to be the result of organization and local or proximal 
stimuli. Koffka says, "If we speak of pictures or images as 
stimuli we mistake the result of organization, a mistake that is
13
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being committed again and again."
This formulation helps the Gestaltists to do away with the 
elementarist's approach by deriving the characteristics of behavioral 
objects from the properties of local stimulation; that is, by 
assuming a one to one relationship between the behavioral objects 
and the local stimuli. Along this line, Kohler says, "The waves 
of light, ....do not as such contain the slightest indication of 
the fact that some are reflected by parts of one physical object 
and others by objects in its environment ....Thus in the reflected 
light no trace is left of the units which actually exist in the 
physical world."1^  He goes on to say that "so far as retinal 
stimulation is concerned, there is no organization, no segregation 
of specific units or groups."^ Organization must, therefore, 
occur on another level. This conclusion introduces us to Kohler's 
theory of Isomorphism to account for the organizational character 
of percepts.
Isomorphism
Kohler defines isomorphism as the, "Thesis that our experiences 
and the processes which underlie these experiences have the same
^  K. Koffka, Op. cit., p. 98.
^  W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology, p. l6l.
Ibid., pp. 161-162.
structure." In other words, Isomorphism assumes a formal corres­
pondence between brain-field patterns and phenomenal patterns.
The phenomenal patterns, in the last analysis, are derived from 
brain-field patterns. Kohler says, "whatever the process may be 
by which organization is believed to be introduced in the field
of vision, it cannot be imported without existing beforehand in the
17region in which it is said to have its origin." 1 The dynamic 
self-distribution of nervous excitations in the brain processes is 
merely triggered off by the local stimuli.
The Law of Pragnanz
The law of pragnanz is introduced in gestalt theory to account
for the assumed correspondence between the phenomenal and the
physical objects. In other words, the law of pragnanz and its
sub-laws describe the organization of local stimuli in such a way
as to correspond to the outside object. Kohler says in this
regard, "Although the local s timuli are mutally independent, they
"1 ftexhibit formulations such as those of proximity and similarity."
17 Ibid»j PP* 153-15H.
18 Ibid., p. 167.
By this means, the Gestalt psychologists are able to explain the
reason why "sensory organization tends to produce results which
19agree with the actual make-up of the given physical-situation."
The explanation is simply that "the stimuli copy corresponding
formal relations among the surface elements of the physical objects.
The formal relations in the physical objects are preserved as
corresponding relations among the stimuli and since organization
20depends upon the latter, it must also depend upon the former."
In Koffka's words, "The behavioral object is a dynamic map of the
distant stimulus object "when and in as much as the proximal
stimulus distribution possesses such geometrical characteristics
as will produce a psychophysical organization similar to the one
21of the distant stimulus object."
From the foregoing discussion we find that the cognitive 
significance of the Gestalt psychology is merely an outcome of a 
geometrical correspondence between a postulated brain field and the 
real world. The cognitive significance of the Gestalt principles, 
"may be summed up," says Scheerer, "in the proposition that pheno­
menal organization is a cohesive structured field and that the
units in this field represent distal objects of the geographic _
Ibid., p. 167.
20
Ibid., p. 167.
^  K. Koffka, Op. cit., p. 659*
22environment." The relation between the physical object or 
(the given physical situation) and the phenomenal object presents 
us with an interesting philosophical problem. TNhat is the physical 
object, if all we experience is a process within the organism 
which is "representation of the distal object?" The question is 
whether the phenomenal object is existentally apriori, perhaps 
dormant in the dynamics of the brain processes to be organized 
and then responded to under the impact of local stimuli. Kohler, 
as mentioned earlier, reminds us that the process by which organi­
zation is believed to be introduced into the field of vision must 
exist beforehand in the region in which it is believed to be 
introduced, "it cannot be imported without existing beforehand" in 
that region. This position does in effect assume a dichotomy between 
the real and the phenomenal worlds, with isomorphism a fortunate 
phenomenon which relates the two together. It is a sort of para­
llelism, philosophically speaking, which exists between the real 
and the phenomenal worlds. This is the case despite the fact 
that Gestaltists speak of a perceptual field in which the organism 
and its invironment are indissoluble components. Thus, Gestalt's 
theory does not draw upon past experience as a genuine factor in 
the preceptual process. Says Koffka,
22
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This correspondence between phenomenal and real 
things is, according to our theory, not primarily 
a matter of experience— although we do not deny 
that experience may influence thing properties—  
but the direct result of organization. Psycho- 
physically, the process distributions which 
correspond to perceived things must in several 
aspects be similar to physical things, and 
therefore we must, on the basis of isomorphism, 
conclude that behavioral things have autoeh- 
thonously characteristics similar to real things.
Here, as in so many other fields, a purely 
empiricistic theory is bound to run in a vicious
circle.23
It is true that Gestalt has successfully avoided elementarism 
and pure empiricism but it is difficult to understand how they 
avoid apriorism, even if we grant that they have done away with 
Kantian apriorism as Koffka maintains*Hie facts of the case 
seem to show that Gestalt psychology assumes the existence of 
things as objects with definable characteristics apart from human 
experience. Dealing with brightness constancy, for instance, the 
Gestaltists maintain that white surfaces which emits less light 
rays than black surfaces may continue to look white and the black 
to look black and this is so without the effect of past experience. 
The concept of invariance, which is the tendency of a given part 
of the field to be responded to in an invariant relation to the 
rest of the field, provides the gestalt answer to the phenomenon
23
K. Koffka, Op. cit., p. 303. (italics mine) 
Ibid., p. 305.
of perceptual constancy. The gestalt interpretation seems to 
overlook the fact that the color of a surface, of whatever shade, 
does not remain the same under different strengths of illumination. 
No doubt, from the point of view of physics, illumination makes a 
qualitative difference in the color of the object as a result of 
refraction and reflection. If, then, the surface of the object 
responded to is qualitatively different under different inten­
sities of light illumination, how is it that brightness constancy, 
for instance, is uninfluenced by past experience? The fact that 
a given part of the field is always responded to in relation to 
the rest of the field, does not exclude the possibility that 
perception of this relation (between a part and the remainder of 
the field) is a matter of past experience, and this is to say the 
least. Kilpatrick has pointed up this difficulty fully. His 
transactional approach has led him to the conclusion that "Gestalt 
psychology is hardly a theory of perception, at all, it is, in a 
sense, the modern nativism in which perception is a given based on 
a relatively determined isomorphic relationship between the 
properties of the thing perceived and the properties of a physio­
logical brain f i e l d . B y  the same token, the cognitive aspect 
of perception in gestalt psychology, as far as the active role 
of the perceiver is concerned, is unsatisfactory. Without going
Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Some Aspects of the Role of 
Assumption in Perception, p. 7*
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further at present, with the cognitive aspect of Gestalt, it might 
prove of value to consider other positions relevant to our problem 
which are derived either directly or indirectly from the Gestalt 
point of view.
It is interesting' to observe that Hull, whose system is based 
on proximal determinants of behavior in terms of S-R, has 
formulated a postulate which he calls "afferent neural interaction" 
to overcome the difficulties encountered by a one-to-one corres­
pondence between local stimuli and response. The postulate says 
in effect that concurrent afferent impulses interact with each 
other in such a manner as to produce something different from each 
separately taken. The postulate merely states that every com­
bination of afferent impulses is unique and that combination of 
stimuli may act differently from the separate stimuli of which 
they are composed. Thus the postulate does attempt to solve the 
problem by stating it* It at least implies the recognition of a 
distal determinant of behavior. It does not satisfactorily explain 
the organizational factor, however. Hilgard says, "The postulate
does not solve the problem, it takes the problem from the field
27of perception and buries it in the nervous system." As such,
,M 25 '
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study.
^  Hilgard, Op. cit., p. 82.
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cognition is still out of place in Hull's S-R system. This is 
an illustration of the impact that gestalt theory has had on other 
systems of psychology. What Hull says here is significant since 
his system is behavioristic through and through.
The impact of Gestalt psychology on many American systems 
has been remarkably greater than on that of Hull, however. The 
influence of Gestalt psychology on other systems varies from one 
system to the other. Reference has already been made to Tolman's. 
In general terms Gestalt psychology has introduced some new 
concepts or brought life to old concepts which were alien to 
American psychology as represented chiefly by Thorndike during the 
twenties and part of the thirties of the present century.
Perception is an important behavior phenomenon which was 
brought to focus after it was almost forgotten as a result of the 
rise of behaviorism in general. Insight was a relatively new 
concept introduced by Gestalt and brought faith once again in 
intelligence as a characteristic of man in his behavior. The molar 
concept has already been dealt with and although many a behaviorist 
claims that his is a molar system, yet to the extent that the molar 
concept is tied up as it really is in Gestalt theory— with the 
distal representation of objects in the environment, to this 
extent behaviorism cannot be considered molar from the point of 
view of field theory.*^  The distal representation of objects in 
26 The terms molar and molecular were introduced by Tolman, 
but they follow directly from the teachings of the gestalt group.
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the environment and the distinction between proximal and distal 
representation is another issue brought into focus as a result of 
gestalt theory* The physical object versus the phenomenal object, 
and more generally the geographical field versus the phenomenal 
field are distinctions which are also attributed to gestalt theory. 
Other concepts are the field concept, dynamic brain processes, 
etc.
The impact of gestalt theory on those systems which took after 
it naturally vary with the concepts those systems adopted and 
made use of in the interpretation of behavior. Hebbls theory 
for instance adopts the thesis of perception of what he calls 
primary forms independent upon past experience, but at the same 
time he does not throw past experience overboard as gestaltist's 
essentially do. We have seen that gestaltists have refused past 
experience as a causal factor in the constancy phenomenon chiefly 
because of the assumed one-to-one correspondence between stimuli 
and response which they refuse as elementaristic and atomistic.
One may wonder whether the gestalt interpretation is the only 
possible alternative. Het>b provides such an alternative. We will 
deal with this aspect of Hebb's theory, ^ebb advances a neuro­
logical theory to explain his thesis but it is beyond the scope 
of this study to deal with it.
Other systems represented by Snyggand Comb's theory adopted 
the phenomenal field approach and thus made subjectivity the
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essence of their system. The problem that such a system has to 
cope with is the fact that we live in an objective world. we shall 
consider chiefly this aspect when we consider Snyggand Comb's 
system.
Another system which we will consider in the following 
sections is that of Brunswik. His is a system which recognizes 
the importance of the distal representation of objects. He 
equally emphasizes past e:xperience. In fact, Brunswik’s theory 
can be called a reinforcement "theory. It is treated in this chapter 
because of its emphasis on cognition and cognitive aspects of 
behavior.
Hebb1s Theory: Primitive Unity and Form Discrimination
Hebb seems to take a middle of the road position between 
nativism in the case of "primitive unity" and learning and 
"nonsensory factors" for the discrimination of forms. With respect 
to primitive unity, Hebb says, "The primitive unity of a figure is 
defined here as referring to that unity and segregation from the 
background which seems to be a direct product of the pattern of 
sensory excitation and the inherited characteristics of the nervous 
system on which it acts."^ To this extent Hebb goes along with 
Gestalt psychology in granting phenomenal organization to what he
29 D. 0. Hebb, Organization of Behavior, p. 19.
assumes to be unlearned "primitive unity," as the distinctiveness 
of figure from background. To support his position, Hebb cites 
Senden's observations regarding the congenitally blind on the 
first occurence of vision following an operation for cataracts (and 
apparently, also, at first vision by the rat that has been reared 
in darkness). Says Hebb "The unity and distinctiveness of such 
figures from their background, then, is independent of experience, 
or ’primitive’.^ Now, without going into details with respect to 
experiments with the congenitally blind or with animals reared in 
darkness, it suffices here to mention that such experiments do not 
warrant the generalization Hebb seems to draw from them. On the 
one hand, cataract blindness is never complete, thus the influence 
of past experience is not completely ruled outj^l and, on the 
other hand, animals reared in the darkness do not develop their 
visual organs as do animals in normal conditions, so that conclusions 
drawn from their cases tend to be misleading.
Hebb, however, makes a distinction between unity and identity 
in perception. Unity may be primitive, as mentioned in the fore­
going, that is, it may be sensorily delimited, seen as one, unified 
and distinct from its surroundings. Identity, however, refers 
to the properties of association inherent in a perception, and thus
3° ^id., p. 20.
31 For further details see Michael Wertheimer, Hebb and Sender 
on l'The Role of Learning in Perception," American Journal of 
Psychology, 1951 j pp. 133-136.
by definition identity depends on non-sensory factors, such as
experience and learning, ^dentity seems to refer to recognizability
and distinguishability of a given object when it is seen for the
second time. Thus Hebb asserts that "unity may be innately
determined, an immediate property of sensory dynamics, whereas
32identity is dependent on a prolonged experience.11 He then goes 
on to say that "because these two things have not been separated 
in the past, it has appeared that perceptual organization is 
innate.""^
Experimental Evidence
Hebb attempts to prove the validity of his distinction between 
unity and identity by drawing upon Senden ’s experiments with 
congenitally blind human subjects, Reisen's experiments with 
chimpanzees reared in darkness and various other experiments. It 
was shown by Lashley, for instance, that the rat was found readily 
able to learn to discriminate between an erect and an inverted 
triangle, whereas he showed consistent difficulty with circles versus 
squares. The two discriminations are, as Hebb points out, equally 
easy from the human point of view. Chimpanzees were found by
32
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Gillerman to discriminate a black triangle on a white background 
after they had learned to discriminate a white triangle on a black 
background, i.e., they were able to generalize or transfer from 
the one case to the other. The rats were completely unable to 
recognize a black triangle, however, no matter how much training 
had occurred with the white triangle alone. Moreover, Gillerman 
and Lashley independently found out that perception of a triangle 
is not generalized by either rat or chimpanzee to include a 
triangle made up of small circles, whereas such generalization is 
made by two year old children.
Hebb concludes, therefore, that "the perception of identity 
is different in different mammals, the perception of primitive unity
*2 J
is practically the same."
If it is true that primitive unity is a given, and that it 
may be perceived without identity, we are entitled to ask what 
is perceived in such a case? Unity as such, is not by any means 
a satisfactory answer, for unity is a concept and has content. 
Without such "content" there is no perception. Thus to say that 
primitive unity can be perceived without identity is merely to say 
that primitive unity is perceived without perception. We may 
properly ask whether Hebb's conclusion with respect to the dis­
tinction between the independence of primitive unity perception
Ibid., p. 29.
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and identity perception is justified? Lashley gives an explanation 
for the rat's relative facility in discriminating between vertical
and inverted triangles and for his difficulty in learning to dis­
criminate between a square and a circle (cited above) by comparing 
the rat to a ski-jumper who does not pay attention in his jumps 
to non-essentials. In other words, the behavioral environment 
should make a difference in our interpretation of discrimination
or what Hebb calls identity perception. %ain we must ask, what
does an organism, whether human or animal, perceive when he 
perceives, say, a triangle? Geometrically speaking, a triangle 
is an area on a plane bounded by three intersecting sides. In 
actual experience, however, we find all sorts of triangles, varying 
in area, angles and color. So what is it that a young child per­
ceives, when he perceives a triangle "as identity" and how does 
this differ from the perception of a triangle as "primitive unity?"
The answer to this question is not provided by Hebb's 
analysis nor does his distinction between primitive unity and 
identity perception, as belonging to different orders qualitatively 
speaking, make it possible to provide an answer. Could this 
distinction then be a matter of degree of discrimination? ‘There 
seems to be no other alternative. Hebb himself says, "that perception 
of the congenitally blind after operation is almost completely 
lacking in identity." In other words, identity is not absolutely
_ 3
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lacking. Hebb, again drawing upon Senden's cases with the 
congenitally blind after an operation, reports cases in which 
there was an immediate perception of differences in two figures 
seen together (which implies identity), but he refers also to 
one case in which this was not possible. "Thus the patient some­
times saw the difference between a sphere and a cube and sometimes 
not." It is plausible, therefore, to assume that the distinctive­
ness of the figures vary in degree. The variation may enable a 
perceiver to see differences between a sphere and a cube or it may, 
indeed, be weaker and weaker, until the visual field fades into 
something corresponding to the "blooming, buzzing confusion" which 
confronts the infant.
If we allow for the experiential differences between the 
congenitally blind adult (after operation) and the normal, newly 
born baby, we are able to discern similarities between the processes 
both go through. On the one hand, the congenitally blind adult 
depends essentially on other senses than vision to perceive the 
world around him. His vision may not allow him to discriminate 
except between strong illumination and darkness. Following the 
operation his problem becomes, among other things, one of co­
ordination. This is evident from Sender's reports about his cases. 
In one such case cited by Hebb: "A patient was trained to dis­
criminate squares from triangles over a period of 13 days and had
35
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learned so little in this time that he could not report their form 
without counting corners one after another."8^  h^e normal, newly 
born baby, on the other hand, faces a "blooming, buzzing confusion" 
and so he looks, reaches, grabs, licks, sucks, listens and smells 
all at the same time. In other words, the newly born baby draws 
upon all his resources and gradually learns to perceive the things 
around him, and in so doing he not only learns to perceive what 
they are, but also what they are not (i.e. he learns to discrim­
inate between things). From this standpoint, we agree with Hebb 
that "activation of the motor system, overt or implicit... 
contributes essentially to the development of visual integration 
without being sufficient to it."-*® What is involved is a sensory 
motor co-ordination. As far as cognition is concerned, though his 
discussion is none too clear, Iiebb's theory seems to allow for 
distal representation, since it accepts configurational and central 
factors in perception and to this extent it is in contrast to 
peripheral connectionism.
Brunswik1s System
Brunswik subscribes to a molar approach which differs from 
gestalt psychology in that formalism is denounced. Moreover,
37
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mediation problems, in the gestalt psychological sense, are not 
considered important and the details of actual sensory, nervous 
or motor phenomena are deliberately disregarded. "One and the 
same means-object may be represented at different times by very 
different stimulus configurations. And one and the same goal may 
be reached equally well by very different kinds of movements and 
means-object manipulation."^
Brunswik sees in the formalism of gestalt theory as re­
presented, for instance, by the law of pragnanz, the revival of 
some aspects of Kantian formalism. He says, "The dynamic inter­
action in a closed brain field which is assumed to underlie the 
tendency towards pragnanz amounts to a kind of self-sufficient
Uo
encapsulation of the perceptual system."
Pistal Representation
Distal representation in Brunswik's system takes the form of 
patterned cues and sign gestalten. From this point of view Brunswik 
sees parallelism between his and Hull’s system. The habit-family 
hierarchy and in this parallelism Brunswik (speaking about himself) 
says that he "seems to have placed himself not only beyond, but in
la
opposition to established Gestalt Doctrine."
39 Egon Brunswik, (quoted by Scheerer, Oo. cit.) p. 125.
Egon Brunswik, "Remarks on Functionalism in Perception,"
£. Pers., 19h9t 18, p. 56•
Ibid., P» 58.
Faithful to his position, however, Brunswik objects against
atomism of any sort. "In the traditional micro-mediational
tracing of sensory neural transmission....one may easily lose sight
U2
of focal relationships." He objects also to concentration on 
pairs of variables far removed from each other in space and time, 
to the exclusion of mediation considerations, as represented 
sometimes by correlations between mental test scores and mental 
trait measures. Such an approach he believes to be atomistic in 
the sense that it stresses the focal arc with no regard to "the 
scope and intricacy of vicarious functioning through which relative 
stabilization is alone possible."^
Two features stand out in Brunswik’s system and may help 
clarify his position. First, is the recognition of a terminal 
reference "in behavior," or what he sometimes calls "stabilization 
of the end stage, which, in his system, is labeled terminal focus. 
The second feature is the diversity of preceding stages. This 
feature is exhibited in the ability of the organism to choose one 
means or the other until the goal or end is reached^  consequently, 
this feature stresses "the equivalence, intersubstitutability of 
certain activities, habits, sense departments, or bodily organs 
for one another in behavior. They form ’hierarchies’ either in
Egon Brunswik, "The Conceptual Framework of Psychology," 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 10, 
p. 27.
U3 Ibid., p. 28.
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the sense that some of the alternatives may be more useful than 
others (e.g. by possessing a greater probability of resulting in 
the end stage) and/or in the sense that some alternatives are 
better established in the organism than others, e.g., by more
hheffective learning." Hull’s system seems, as Brunswik points 
out, to focus on the latter alternative— i.e. on learned habit; 
on habit-family hierarchy.
Brunswik believes that "any organism has to cope with an 
environment full of uncertainties. Forced to react quickly or 
within reasonable limits of time, it must respond before direct 
contact with the relevant remote conditions in the environment such 
as foodstuffs or traps, friends or enemies, can be established."^ 
Thus the organism in his interaction with its environment or, 
as Brunswik calls it, gross organismie coming to terms with the 
environment, object-cue or means and relationships are never 
foolproofj but inherently probable in character. In order, there­
fore, that psychology may secure a measure of objectivity in 
behavior, Brunswik argues that measurement as observation of point- 
coincidences in space-time comes closest to fulfilling the require­
ment for objectivity, so far as methodological physicalism is 
concerned, e^ further observes that objectivity or stability of
 EC-------
Ibid., p. 22.
^  Ibid., p. 10 f.
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agreement of response decreases as we proceed from the observation 
of point-coincidences, to thing perceptions, images, tho&ghts, 
valuations and subjective feelings or moods. He contends that such 
continuity would help to eliminate any sharp distinction between the 
subjective and the objective, a distinction or dichotomy which may 
thus be removed, to use Comte's terminology, from the metaphysical 
to the scientific level, or to use Lewin's language, from the 
Aristotelian to the Galileian mode of approach.
From a psychological point of view, "test reliability," as 
this is used by psychological statisticians, is related to the 
concept of objectivity as defined in the foregoing. Following this 
line of thought, "objective, then is a class of responses yielding 
maximum reliability co-efficients within or between individuals 
facing a common geographic situation or situational elements."^ 
Placing Brunswik's definition of objectivity along with his under­
standing of the uncertainties in the environment with which the 
organism has to deal, it is easy to understand how, through his 
ecological studies of perceptual constancies, he was able to 
formulate his functional probabilistic approach to the gross 
organismic coming to terms with the environment. He says;
Since the establishment of veridical distal 
environment relations is contingent upon the 
trustworthiness, or statistical validity, of 
cue-to-object relationship, and since the
Ibid., p. 11.
6.2
’ecological' validity is in turn essentially 
limited by the erratic nature of the environ­
ment, attainment of distal variables can never 
be better than probable. Environmen1>-oriented 
objective functionalism thus is necessarily 
'probabilistic functionalism'.^
Brunswik spelled out his theory by presenting a lens model
of molar behavior. The distal stimulus is called the initial
focal variable and the accomplished result the terminal focal
variable. The initial focus, according to Brunswik, "is not
an event within the organism as is motivation, rather, it is an
U8 m
external variable.” The organism may in this regard be considered 
as stabilizer of events or relationships. The mediation between 
the two foci varies according to the circumstances and is, therefore, 
"multiple” or "vicarious" or "interchangeable," in terms of a 
family hierarchy of cues or habits. Cognition is treated as the 
functional achievement of attaining objects or final goal effects 
through perceptually guided behavior, and in view of the erratic 
nature of the environment, Brunswik achieves cognitive correctness, 
"mast be defined in psychology in the generic terms of over-all 
statistical correlation between variables as classes, rather
than in terms of single hits or misses of judgment or action."^
' "h l 7
Discussion: "Remarks on Functionalism in Perception,"
J. Pers., 19li9, 18, p. 56.
^  E. Brunswik, "The Conceptual Framework of Psychology,"
Op. cit., p. 18.
^  Ibid., p. 23.
63
Achievement may be defined as functional validity and be measured 
by a co-efficient of correlation this is a measure of the pro­
bability of an initial focal event to be followed by its terminal 
counterpart. The organism is here testing his environment by 
vicariously choosing the means or paths that will more likely lead 
to the end in vfew. Perception is quasi-rational.
Thus far Brunswik has been shown to be consistent within his 
frame of reference of an objective molar system, i^s approach is 
as close as any to the transactional approach, in the sense that 
he treats the organism and its environment as a unity. seems 
to deal with motivation, however, as separate from the organism's 
initial focus; the former being an event within the organism, 
while the latter is viewed as an external variable. As he puts it, 
"...in the field of cognitive processes, the initial focus is not
an event within the organism as is motivation, rather it is an
50
external variable."
It is true that sighs, or cues in Brunswik's terminology, 
are never absolutely certain; they are possibilities for action. 
The organism deals with probable things, therefore, but this does 
not mean that perception, as Brunswik maintains, is quasi-
51rational, especially from the perceiver's standpoint.
50
Ibid., p. 18.
51
See Ibid., p. 20.
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Snygg and Corn^ s Phenomenal Theory: Awareness of the Phenomenal
Field
Snygg and Combs advance a different approach to, or frame of 
reference for, behavior: It is based on a concept of the be­
havioral environment, which, unlike gestalt theory, coincides 
with conscious awareness— i.e., it is not an objective construct.
From the point of view of the behaver himself, 
behavior is caused, Tt is purposeful, Tt 
always has a reason. Sometimes the reasons 
are vague and confused, in which case the 
behavior is equally vague and uncertain; some­
times the reasons are extremely clear and 
definite, but everything we do seems to be 
reasonable and necessary at the time we are 
doing it.^
Consciousness or awareness varies in degree, so that at any moment 
in the field perceptions may exist at any and all levels of 
differentiation from vaguest to sharpest. Behavior may seem un­
reasonable to an outside observer but as far as the behaver himself 
is concerned, ,lIn any case he feels that his behavior is a
reasonable and a necessary result of the situation in which he 
53finds himself.” Thus, the phenomenal field is perceived by the 
perceiver at the moment; the objective or the physical situation 
is not the determinant of behavior. The individual or personal 
field is not identical with that of any other individual. An
IS
D. Snygg and A. W. Combs, Individual Behavior, p. 12.
L og • cx~b«
understanding of the behavioral field of the individual is, 
therefore, essential for predicting his behavior, and without 
this ’’understanding" prediction is well nigh impossible. "All 
behavior, without exception, is completely determined by and 
pertinent to the phenomenal field of the behaving organisms."
Prediction of Behavior
Prediction of behavior is possible, however, in spite of the 
privacy of different individuals' fields. Common experiences 
account for the existence of common parts in the behavioral fields 
of different individuals. This is what makes communication among 
different individuals possible. The phenomenal field and behavior 
have by postulation a one-to-one relationship. "Therefore, from 
a study of the individual's behavior, it is possible to reconstruct,
any individual is the product of a selection made to satisfy his 
needs in conformity with the existing organization of his 
phenomenal field. This selection is meaningful, that is, it 
implies awareness of the behavior that the object or the situation 
requires or enables the individual to make. "Indeed a meaningless 
object would not exist as part of the phenomenal field." le
by inference, his phenomenal field." The phenomenal field of
Ibid., p. 21.
^  Ibid., p. 23.
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are continuously engaged in a process of active search for new 
meanings in our environment, therefore, to enable us to satisfy 
our needs and reach our ends more effectively. Thus our fields 
change continuously.
The Phenomenal Self
Organization of the behavioral fields is in terms ox figure- 
ground relationships, a designation which resembles the focus-and- 
margin patterns of earlier psychologists. Selection and organi­
zation tend to differentiate the figure from the background, the 
latter being always meaningful even though its meaning may not 
be very clear and may be described merely as an undifferentiated 
object. The central concept of this system is the phenomenal self.
It forms the part of the behavioral field which is differentiated 
through the individual's life experience with persons and things 
and which constitutes the individual's understanding of himself 
and of his personal frame of reference. xhe role of cognition 
as Scheerer puts it, "is markedly tied to an egocentricism of 
perspective and is placed within a framework of cultural 
relativism."^
Criticisms
The suggestion that communication and understanding by different 
individuals of each other's behavior is based on common parts of
^  1. Scheerer, Op. cit., p. 101.
the respective phenomenal field is not very clear. If it is true 
that certain parts of the respective fields are common, then it 
follows that those common parts should be defined. They are not 
and we find ourselves, consequently, facing the problem of how 
these common parts influence other parts of the phenomenal fields 
and how they are influenced by them. The phenomenal field may be 
either completely private and inaccessible to the outside observer 
or else it may all be common to different individuals and hence 
fully accessible to outside observers. But no help is given on this 
score. The same problem appears also when Snygg and Combs speak
57about group structure and action in terms of normative principles.
Philips, discussing the treatment of these authors of normative 
principles, notes that either "the principles apply to all indi­
viduals in connection with group affiliation and action, differing 
only in degree from one person to another, which can be understood 
in terms of the larger framework, or they do not apply to all indi­
viduals, constituting a normative principle, which would make them
58inconsistent with the point of view presented by the authors.
It seems, therefore, that the finality of Snygg and Combs’ sub­
jective premises and their procedure of inferential construction are
D. Snygg, "The Phenomenal Field," Psychological Theory, 
Melvin Marx, Ed., p. 32U.
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E. Lakin Philips, Snygg, D. and Combs, A. W., "Individual 
Behavior: A New Frame of Reference for Psychology," Journal Gen. 
Psychology, 1950, U2, p. 169*
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not as sound as they may at first appear. The distinction between 
"mine" and "thine" is as much an objective phenomenon as it is a 
product of personal experience. There is not anything in the 
nature of psychology, as contrasted with natural sciences, which 
makes objectivity in that science impossible, i.e., in the sense 
that all reference to behavioral or even physical correlates 
to the phenomenal field should be rejected. Neither is objectivity 
in the physical sciences merely a matter of instruments which make 
accurate observations and which, in turn, make prediction possible, 
as Snygg seems to imply. Snygg says that "Accurate prediction is 
possible only when the casual entities are open to inspection."^ 
Objectivity does not depend merely on accurate observation of causal 
entities, neither is it established via a consensus reached through 
a nose counting of phenomenological fields. Final causal entities 
are never observed even in physical sciences. Objectivity, in 
whatever field, is built on working hypotheses or theories in 
terms of consequences. It is indeed true that, whether we are 
dealing with physical sciences or psychology, we always deal with 
them in the context of our experiences. But objectivity is possible 
in tie physical sciences because things bear meanings in terms of 
the use made of them in common experience and because these meanings
^  D. Snygg, "The Phenomenal Field," Op. cit., p. 32iu
are verified as a result of testing them within this experience.
It is not clear how it is possible for Snygg and Combs to 
rely completely on the phenomenal field, which they identify with 
awareness or consciousness, and at the same time escape intro- 
spectionism as they maintain they do. It is hard to understand 
how a counselor in a counseling situation could do without intro­
spection, if his therapeutic approach demands that he ask himself, 
Snygg and Combs suggest, "Under what circumstances would I have 
done that?"^ A further point relating to objectivity is their 
rejection of the usage of symbolic constructs. The phenomenal 
field of which Snygg and Combs speak seems to be an hypothetical 
construct itself. They say that: "it is possible to reconstruct,
by inference, (the individual's) phenomenal field by studying his 
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behavior." This hardly appears to be a simple descriptive act.
The psychological problem, as the foregoing makes clear is 
not a matter of choosing between the phenomenal field approach and 
the objective approach. "What is involved here is the bringing of 
these together, understanding each in terms of the other. A 
consideration of behavioristic approaches may help advance this 
conclusion, fhe next chapter will, therefore, be devoted to the
study of behaviorism.
60 p. Snygg and A. W. Combs, Op. cit., p. 21.
^  Ibid., p. 3U*
CHAPTER III
ASSOCIATION THEORIES ’BEHAVIORISM'
Introduction
In the current literature of behaviorism such terms as 
association bond formation, the law of effect, rewards and 
punishments, reinforcement, need tension, drives and derived drives, 
mazes and boxes of different kinds are predominant. Cognitive 
concepts, such as insight, foresight, thinking and the like, are not 
basic because they are not primary phenomena sofhr as behaviorism 
is concerned. Behaviorism, being reductionist in its approach, 
tends to seek the simplest terms by which behavior may be explained. 
"When cognitive concepts are dealt with in behavioristic literature 
they are considered merely as complex forms of simple genetic 
origin and are reduced to their simple origin, i.e., S-R bonds or 
connections, conditioning, reinforcement and so forth. Consequently, 
cognitive concepts in behaviorism do not have the significance they 
have in cognitive theories.
It is true that Watson, whose name is associated with the rise 
of modern behaviorism, did not flatly denounce cognitive concepts.
He merely claimed he could write a psychology without using them,
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nsticking strictly to observable phenomena. Ultimately, however, 
he, as well as those who followed in his footsteps, discarded 
cognition. Whenever it is referred to it is seen to be no more 
than physical or mechanical processes.
We cannot speak about behaviorism without mentioning Thorn­
dike, whose pioneer work, though not strictly behavioristic, 
revealed a tendency in this direction in the later stages of his 
career. Thorndike represents a transitory stage in the history 
of behaviorism, and consequently his early work had within it many 
mentalistic connotations. Hullfish, in his historic critique of 
Thorndike’s psychology, wrote:
It is evident that he (Thorndike) follows the 
descriptive method in psychology, that he makes 
an objective evaluation of behavior...and that 
he considers behavior always in terms of a 
stimulus, a connection or bond, and a response.
In so far forth he seems to lean decidedly towards 
the behavioristic movement in psychology. On the 
other hand, his admission of ideas (undefined) 
as potent factors in the S-R series places him, on 
the face of it, in direct relationship with the 
doctrines of Herbart and James. Satisfaction and 
annoyance are described as 'potent determiners' of 
behavior, and unless these be 'ideas' which are 
capable of causing physical activity, then their 
status as 'determiners' is a dubious one. But if 
they are 'ideas' we slip back once again towards 
Herbart and James, and too, we face the problem of 
explaining ideo-motor action— a phenomenon which 
Thorndike scoffs at as impossible.!
Conditioning bears a similarity to Thorndike's secondary 
principle of association shifting. Thorndike considered condition­
ing to be a specific case of this principle and did not believe 
that the development of the concept affected his system.
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The historic picture of behaviorism would not be complete 
without mention of Pavlov's famous work on conditioning. Pavlov 
was the first to introduce the term 'conditioned reflex'. This, 
in his terms, was a process of stimulus substitution, in which a 
previously neutral stimulus (unconditioned) acquires the power 
to elicit a response which was originally elicited by a different 
stimulus. The change occurs when the neutral stimulus is repeatedly 
followed or 'reinforced' by the original effective stimulus.
Pavlov also studied the conditions under which the effect of 
conditioning disappeared, whether under experimental conditions or 
otherwise. He called the Phenomenon "extinction."
Modern Behavioristic Theories
Watson, in his zeal to eliminate mentalism from his system, 
rejected Thorndike's law of effect because of the mentalistic 
connotations of the satisfiers and the annoyers. His system was 
based chiefly on frequency and recency. When Pavlov's work came to 
his notice he adopted the principle of conditioning and made it 
the cornerstone of his system. In order that he could remain within 
his framework of empirical positivism, he had to assume that 'think­
ing', for instance, was inner speech, merely the inner movement of 
the tongue and vocal organs. The concept of movement-produced 
stimuli became basic in the behavioristic system, as will be seen 
later.
Guthrie's system is also based on conditioning. He, too, 
rejected the law of effect in the sense that Thorndike used it. 
Although he uses the term reinforcement, he does not mean by it 
'need reduction', as does Hull or Mowrer, for instance, ^e also 
makes use of movement-produced stimuli. His basic principle is 
based on 'recency', since to him association between a stimulus 
and a response takes place in one try. The organism will do in 
the same situation in the future exactly what he did last in that 
situation.
Skinner's system is also based on conditioning and reinforce­
ment. Reinforcement, however, is defined operationally. It is 
defined in terms of the conditions which lead to the evocation 
of specific responses, without specifying their physiological 
correlates as Hull, for instance, does. Skinner, however, breaks 
away from conventional S-R theories by making the distinction 
between elicited responses and emitted responses. The former have 
identifiable stimuli; the latter do not. The stimulus in the 
latter case, that is, in emitted or operant responses, is the 
occasion for, not the cause of, emission of responses.
Hull's system is also based on conditioning and reinforcement. 
Reinforcement means primary need reduction, Hull differs in this 
respect from Pavlov. He considers the essential factor in 
conditioning to be the reduction in the drive-receptor impulse 
which accompanies the reduction of the need. Pavlov, in contrast,
%
considers the occurrence of the unconditioned stimulus the essential 
factor in conditioning. He often referred to the unconditioned 
stimulus as a sign. Hill tries to unify Thorndike's law of effect 
with Pavlov's conditioning principle. In the following pages a 
sample of behavioristic systems will be considered in the following 
order: Hall’s, Skinner's and Guthrie's.
Clark L. Hall
Hall presents a systematic approach which is highly mathe­
matical. He compares his system with Eacledian geometry and starts 
with postulates, or primary principles. From this basis, secondary 
principles, or theorems, are developed which serve (l) to aid in 
the prediction of behavior and (2) to test the original postalates 
or primary principles. Hall says, "A theory is a systematic 
derivation of the secondary principles of observable phenomena from 
a relatively small number of primary principles or postalates, mach 
as the secondary principles or theorems of geometry are ultimately
derived as a logical hierarchy from a few original definitions
2
and principles called axioms."
Hall's system is, in fact, mainly concerned with the inter­
relationships of intervening variables, between the original 
2 Clark L. Hull, Principles of Behavior, p. 2.
stimulus and the final response. These intervening variables, as 
will be seen later, are dealt with in terms of peripheral proximal 
boundary conditions. This is the case in spite ox the inclusion 
in the system of the postulate dealing with afferent neural inter­
action, a postulate which, as mentioned before, is relegated to the
3
peripheral nervous system. In other words, Hull's system 
suggests a straight chain of events that starts with the onset of 
a stimulus provided by the outside environment and ends with a 
response to the environment. All intervening processes lie 
exclusively within the organism. Even the two first postulates, 
especially the second, in Hull's system, which are closest to the 
molar approach, are in effect treated in terms of proximal stimuli 
and describe happenings exclusively within the organism.
The Pos tulates
The first of these postulates refers to the perseverative 
stimulus trace. This means that upon the impingement of a stimulus 
on a recepter the activity of the generated neural impulse con­
tinues in the central nervous system for some seconds before it 
fades away. The activity of the neural impulse, in other words,
continues after the cessation of the stimulus. Events inside 
_  .
See Chapter Two in this study.
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the nervous system, consequently, may associate together in time, 
despite their temperal seperation as far as the outside happenings 
are concerned. The second postulate deals -with afferent neural 
interaction. This enables Hull to derive the properties of 
patterned stimuli.
In order to see Hull's system more clearly it is necessary 
to follow the sequence of happenings after the onset of the
h
stimulus* The impingement of the outside stimulus on the re­
ceptor gives rise to afferent neural impulses which are pro­
pagated along connected fibrous branches of nerve cells in the 
general direction of the effector organs via the brain. Afferent 
neural impulses rise to a maximum of intensity and then fall and 
decay (postulate 1). At the same time concurrent neural impulses 
interact and each is changed to something partially different from 
the original (postulate 2). Among the forces that decide the 
direction or sequence of events, i.e., affect responses to 
stimuli, are the drives which operate in order to lead to need 
reduction. The stimulus has a drive value. According to the third 
postulate: "Organisms at birth possess receptor effector
connections...which render combined stimulation and drive..., have 
the potentiality of evoking responses.not at random, but those
 ^C. L. Hull, Ibid., p. 383.
£
C • Xj« Hull, Ibid., p. 66.
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6
"more likely to terminate the need..." Also, habits which have 
been built in the past on the basis of drives affect responses to 
stimuli in like manner. Postulate Jr deals with habit strength 
and reinforcement. This postulate states that whenever an 
effector activity and receptor activity occur in close temporal 
contiguity, and when these are consistently associated with a 
diminution of need (primary reinforcement) or are associated with 
a stimulus which is itself consistently associated with need 
reduction (secondary reinforcement), the result will be an increase 
of habit strength.
The sequence of events, it will be seen, starts with the 
representation of the stimulus in afferent neural processes, as 
represented by the first two postulates. The second step is a 
reinforcement which leads to increase in habit strength, i.e.,
S-R connections in accordance with their stimulus response 
proximity to need reduction (postulates 3 and it). The next phase 
deals with generalization as represented by postulate This 
postulate is derived from Pavlov's concept of generalization as a 
result of discrimination thresholds between s timuli. A habit may 
thus be aroused by a stimulus other than the one originally involved 
in conditioning. This will depend upon the similarity between 
both stimuli, in terms of units of discrimination thresholds.
6
Loc. cit.
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This postulate accounts partially for transfer of training.
It implies that learning is never completely specific to the 
situation in which it originally arose.
The next phase in the sequence is the reaction potential 
which depends on the interaction between the habit strength 
and the drive. Postulate 6 says that "Associated with every drive—
is a characteristic drive stimulus whose intensity is an increasing
7 r 1monotonic function of the drive in question." -4ie effective 
habit strength is sensitized into reaction potentiality by all 
primary drives acting at a given time (postulate 7). h^e next 
phase deals with the inhibitive factors that reduce the reaction 
potential as a result of a negative drive which is created and 
which has innate capacity to inhibit the reaction potentiality 
to that response, (postulate 8), At the same time, stimuli 
associated with the cessation of a certain response become con­
ditioned inhibitors (postulate 9). In other words, reaction 
potential may be reduced to effective reaction potential as a 
result of reactive inhibition'and conditioned (or learned) 
inhibition. ihe inhibition potential oscilates in amount from 
instant to instant according to the law of chance and the reaction 
potential oscilates accordingly (postulate 10).
7 ^id., p. 253.
7$
Thus far we have followed the sequence from the onset of 
the stimulus to the moment of response. The next phase in the 
sequence of events naturally deals with response evocation. Res­
ponses are evoked if the effective reaction potential exceeds 
the reaction threshold, (postulate 11). Such responses may be 
measured according to the probability of striated muscle reaction 
(postuhte 12); the latency of a stimulus working a striated musde 
reaction in an inverse proportion (postulate 13); resistence to 
extinction, depending on the strength of the effective reaction 
potential (postulate llj); or amplitude of responses mediated by 
the autonomic nervous system, which also depends on the strength 
of the effective reaction potential (postulate 15>)* And, finally, 
’when reaction potentials— to two or more incompatible reactions—  
occur in an organism at the same time, only the reaction whose 
momentary effective reaction potential is greatest will be
O
evoked (postulate 16)."
The Chain of Events
To recapitulate, the chain of events in behavior in general, 
starts with the impingement of stimuli on receptors. This starts 
neural processes in the nervous tissue. The reaction of the
------n----------
° C. L. Hull, Principles of Behavior, Ibid., p. 3U-W
organism depends on innate receptor-effector connections and habits 
formed in the past. The responses of the organism are not random. 
They are aroused under conditions of stimulation and drive and thus 
are more likely to terminate the need of the organism. Habit 
strength is a product of direct or generalized reinforcement 
(which terminate the need). rIhe reaction potential created there­
after is a positive function of habit strength and drive. The 
reaction potential oscilates in strength so that reaction potential 
oscilates accordingly, ^inally, evocation of responses depends 
on whether or not the reaction potential, that is, the momentary 
reaction potential, is above the threshold of reaction. In case 
two incompatible responses occur in an organism, the one with 
the greatest reaction potential will be evoked.
Gradient of Reinforcement and Goal Gradient
Hull's system enables him to deal with the concept of gradient 
of reinforcement, as well as with a goal gradient concept.
Gradient reinforcement in this system provides an advancement over 
classical conditioning theories which only took into account the 
separation between the stimulus and the response. Hull deliberately 
postponed the reward or goal object (in this case, obtaining food) 
which provides reinforcement and the act to be rewarded (in this 
case, running down an aisle, through a maze, or pushing a lever).
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Hall believes, as a result of his experiments with rats in lever
pressing boxes, that the basic gradient of reinforcement does not
o
exceed 30 seconds. Wolfe and Spragg, however, found that learning
on the part of white rats occurringdn a simple alley maze might
be effective with much longer delays of reward up to 20 minutes.
Such a gradient is what Hull calls goal gradient, as distinguished
from the above mentioned shorter gradients of reinforcement. Ihe
gradients of reinforcement, and not the goal gradients, are the
primary gradients, from which the longer goal gradients are formed.
But once the goal gradient is established, it serves its former
purposes in the explanation of more complex learning.^ Ihus
"responses nearer the goal would be more strongly conditioned than
those farther removed, so that short paths would be preferred to
longer ones, blinds near the goal would be eliminated more readily
than blinds farther away, longer blinds would be more readily
12
eliminated "than shorter ones, etc."
_
See Hull, Ibid., p. lJu2.
10
See C. L. Hull, Ibid., p. ll|2.
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E. Hilgard, Op. cit., p. 93*
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E. Hilgard, Ibid., p. 93*
The goal gradient concept is not one of the primary postu­
lates in Hull's system, therefore, but is conceived at an inter­
mediate level and is itself derived from more basic principles, 
chiefly postulate To this extent the goal gradient does
not represent a molar but a molecular approach. The means—  
end category in philosophy, seems to play an important role in 
this concept of goal gradient, although the means are treated as 
primary and the end as a rather mechanical achievement through 
a path of primary reinforcement gradients via secondary rein­
forcements.
lUHabit-Family-Hlerarchy
Another derived principle is the ’habit-family’ or ’habit- 
family-hierarchy'. This is also a principle "which is at an 
intermediate level. Hull recognizes that there are multiple routes 
to every goal position "which lead: to need satisfaction. The 
different alternative routes, which may get integrated into a 
family ”by way of a common fractional anticipatory goal reaction, 
present as each alternative is a c t i v e . A n d the fractional
13
See page 78 of this chapter.
For a critical evaluation of the concept ’habit-family- 
hierarchy’ in terms of the ’distal-proximal issue’ see Chapter Two 
in this study.
1^
E. Hilgard, Ibid., p. 9U*
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anticipatory goal reaction provides a stimulus to which all overt 
responses get conditioned in a differential manner in the sense 
that responses of longer routes are less reinforced than those of 
shorter routes. A hierarchy is formed, within which the shortest 
routes (or more favored) are usually chosen unless they are blocked 
and then longer routes may be taken instead. Moreover, when a 
member of the family is reinforced in a new situation, the other 
members at once show a tendency to be evoked as reactions in that 
situation.
Cognitive Concepts
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Bill attempted to 
explain cognitive processes in purely physical terms. "Knowledge,"
16
he said, "is mediated by several fairly distinct habit mechanisms."
To start with, a chain of stimuli elicits a chain of responses, 
until the end result is reached by the elicitation of the final 
response. During the process, however, each response produces 
an internal stimulus, '■'•he internal stimuli are called pure 
stimulus acts because their sole function is to serve as stimuli 
for other acts in the chain. This ability of the pure stimulus 
act to elicit the following response in the chain of events is
l5
C. L. Hull, "Knowledge and Purpose as Habit Mechanisms," 
Psychol. Rev., 1930, 37, p. 11.
supposed to be brought about by a redintegrative process which 
brings together, in a dynamic stimulus complex, the outside 
stimulus and the internal stimulus act produced by the previous 
response. Once this has been well established, i.e., once the 
stimuli complexes have been well redintegrated, a habit is formed. 
The impingement of the external chain of stimuli in the original 
sequence is no longer needed for the elicitation of the final 
response, since the pure stimulus acts will be able to elicit the 
corresponding responses once the chain of reactions has been 
started by any one outside stimulus along the chain. "Henceforth 
the organism will carry about continuously a kind of replica of 
this world segment. In this very intimate and biologically signi­
ficant sense the organism may be said to know the world.
Foresight is explained on the same basis. Once the stimuli 
complexes have been established, the organism can respond to the 
situation without going through the original chain. In other
4
words, the organism is seen to respond in advance as, for example,
in emergency situations. What adds to the efficiency of the
organism's defense reaction in such emergency situations is the fact
that "the tempo of the acquired subjective parallel to the outer
18
world sequence is not limited to that of the latter." Hull goes 
17 C. L. ftxll, Ibid., p. $2k.
Ibid., p.
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on then to say that there is evidence that the tempo of the acquired 
subjective parallel to run at a higher speed than that of the world 
sequence which it parallels. This explains foresight.
Purposive behavior, in like manner, is explained in terms of 
pure stimulus acts. An internal stimulus drive, e.g., the hunger 
drive, is added to the original chain of events and persists 
throughout. This stimulus drive, once the chain is completed, tends 
on later occasions to elicit anticipatory goal reactions along 
the chain. These anticipatory goal reactions tend to be the 
strongest nearest to the goal* Another kind of internal stimuli, 
the fractional goal stimuli, are henceforth elicited by the anti­
cipatory goal reactions. The stimulus complex will then include 
four kinds of stimuli: the outside stimulus, proprioceptor stimulus,
the drive stimulus and the fractional goal stimulus. -*-t is the 
persisting drive stimulus component which is the main characteristic 
mechanism of purposive behavior. The fractional anticipatory goal 
reaction, the resulting excitatory potentials being stronger 
nearer the goal, enable the final act of the original series to 
be evoked earlier than it would be if the original series were 
followed in full, "thus producing what is rather inappropriately
19
called short circuiting' The final act of the original series 
may thus be evoked at once and with success, after the first act of 
19
C. L. Hull, Ibid., p. 52U-525.
the series. Bat the organism may not be able to do this, as when
a rat in a maze has to move through the routes of the maze before
it reaches the goal. The immature invasions of anticipatory goal
reactions are, however, manifested by the rat's turning towards
the goal before it is actually reached. This phenomenon is also
exhibited by young children and naive adults.
Ideas are thus conceived in purely physical terms. As
Hull puts it: "fractional anticipatory goal reaction is the
actual basis of what has long been known as ideomotor reaction....
this means that ideomotor acts are not caused by ideas. On the
contrary they are themselves ideas ."^ Hull then goes on to say
that pure stimulus acts are the physical substance of ideas. And
in terms of anticipatory goal reaction he defines "the physical
basis of the some-what ill-defined but important concept of purpose, 
21
desire or wish."
On the basis of the pure stimulus act Hull was able to explain
22insightful learning in an experiment carried out by Maier.
Hull’s explanation centers on the building up, or conditioning of 
habits, in connection with a drive stimulus. The experiment
or,
C. f. Hull, "Goal Attraction and Directive Ideas,"
Psych. Rev., 38, 1931, p. !?0E>.
21
C. L. Hull, Loc. cit.
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See C. L. Hull, "The Mechanism of the Assembly of Behavior 
Segments In Novel Combinations Suitable for Problem Solution," 
Psychol. Rev., Vol. Ij2, 1933*, PP» 219-2hi?.
constituted a -white rat running in a maze. The maze is represented
diagramatically as follows
The starting point is box R. Food is found only in box X, Boxes 
H and U provide water. The rat learns to go from R to H, from 
R to X, from R to U and from U to X, but never from R to X via 
U. But when the route R-X was blocked at B, the hungry rat was 
found to choose route R-U which leads to X more often than R-H*
The frequency of the choice of RU, rather than, RH, was found to 
exceed chance by a significant margin, Maier* s explanation was 
in terms of a gestalten formed by the combination of routes RU 
and UX to lead to food, whereas routes RH and UX do not fuse,
Hull refuses this explanation because it naively begs the question, 
since to him the deduction of this fusion from more basic principles
23
is the essence of the problem, Hull's explanation is this: of
the two competing routes, when the hungry rat is at R, HQ has 
more excitatory tendencies than its competitor, RH, At botton, 
in short, there is the excitatory potential towards U which is
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elicited by the responses to the external stimulus at box R in 
the route RU and also by the drive stimulus (in this case, hunger) 
at the first reaction in the chain of route UX. The excitatory 
potential at R favors the rat’s following route RU rather than 
RH. It is significant to note that in his system Hull is able to 
explain insightful behavior when, and only when, fragments of 
behavior have been at least separately learned or conditioned 
into habits. Insightful behavior is merely a matter of the 
assembly of behavior segments, as is evident from the title of 
the article discussed above, Kohler’s experiment with Sultan, 
an ape that was able to utilize two relatively short sticks to 
reach for a banana after he had fitted them end to end apparently 
by chance, cannot be explained in terms of Hull's system, Hull 
contends that unless the chimpanzee had previously formed the 
habit of fitting the two sticks together, a fact which was neither 
asserted nor refuted by Kohler, the solution of the problem could 
not be explained In terms of his system. In other words, genuine 
insight, or creativity, has no place in Hull's system.
General criticisms
Hull's system is undoubtedly the most elaborate, and currently 
the most acclaimed of all behavioristic theories. This does not 
mean, however, that it is above criticism, even by fellow behaviorists. 
Skinner, for instance, criticizes it on more than one score. He
89
rejects the'neural interaction' postulate on the grounds that it
obviates the empirical rigor characteristic of the advanced
sciences. Moreover, Skinner does not seem to think that the
time is ripe for the elaborate quantification of the science of
psychology characteristic of Hull's system. He points out that
Hull, in his concern, to achieve quantification, has neglected
precision and accuracy. One third of the curves in Hull's
Principles of Behavior represent hypothetical cases. Moreover,
Skinner has pointed out that Hull has taken too much freedom
in formulating his laws. In one esse, for instance, three
constants were postulated to determine three variables.^
Other criticisms of Hull's system come from different quarters.
Leeper, for instance, criticized Hull of choosing non-representative
2f>samples to fit his curves and equations. And from a molar— 
molecular standpoint Hull is criticized by field theorists to 
be moleculer, although he claims to be molar in his approach. We 
have seen how in his system the chain of events in a given act 
starts with outside independent stimuli, each on e following the 
other and each eliciting a response, with each response in its 
turn illiciting an internal stimulus, which again illicits an 
internal goal reaction and so on. The chain of events is given
See P. B. Skinner, "Principles of Behavior", Am, J. of 
Psychol., 19UU^ PP* 276-81,
25
Some other aspects of Leeper's criticisms will be discussed 
in Chapter IV. of this study.
90
coherence by a common persistent or drive stimulus and by a 
redentegrative process. Erom this standpoint Hull's system is not 
only molecular but also mechanistic, or, philosophically speaking,
*interactionistic.*
B, F. Skinner 
Introduction
Skinner subscribes to a behavioristic system. His view, 
however, breaks away from conventional behaviorism, since 
responses are considered to belong to two different classes.
The conventional concept of a response is that it is necessarily 
elicited by a prior stimulus. This may or may not be the case 
in Skinner's system. Responses which are elicited by known 
stimuli, as in the case of simple reflexes (e.g., the knee jerk 
or pupillary constriction, to light) are called respondent responses. 
Respondent responses are distinguished from responses designated 
"operants." These are not correlated with any known stimuli.
By and large, according to Skinner, human behavior is operant 
rather than respondent in character.
Respondent and Operant Behavior
To point up this distinction between the two kinds of behavior,
we need to consider the organism in its interaction with its 
 ,  ------
This point will be treated in Chapters V, VI, and VII of
this study.
environment. "The environment,fl says Skinner, nis so constructed 
that certain, things tend to happen together."^ Behavior changes 
when the organism gets in contact with that environment. Tbs 
change is called conditioning. nThere are three principal cases.
(1) Certain events— like the color and taste of xipe fruit—  
tend to occur together. Respondent conditioning i s the corres­
ponding effect upon behavior. (2) Cetrain activities of the 
organism effect certain changes in the environment. Operant 
behavior is the corresponding effect upon behavior. (3) Certain 
events are the occasions upon which certain actions effect
certain chgnges in the environment. Operant discrimination is
28
the corresponding effect upon behavior."
Conditioning
In case (l) "respondent" conditioning is supposed to 
strengthen the magnitude of the response elicited by the condi­
tioned stimulus and shorten the time which elapses between 
stimulus and response. In cases (2) and (3) the operant is 
conditioned by making the response more probable or more frequent. 
These two forms of conditioning exhaust the possibilities. Skinner 
holds that "an organism is conditioned when a reinforcer (l)
27 ‘
B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, p. 125.
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accompanies another stimulus or (2) follows upon the organism’s
own behavior. Any event which does neither has no effect in
29
changing a probability of response." In operant conditioning, 
which is by far the more important of the two types, the environ­
ment builds the basic repertoire or reserve with which we are 
able to behave appropriately. It is thus that the efficiency of 
our behavior is improved and maintained in strength.
The difference in conditioning of the two types of behavior 
lies in the fact that a reinforcer is paired with a stimulus 
in respondent behavior; whereas, in operant behavior, a reinforcer 
is contingent upon a response. Moreover, in respondent behavior, 
conditioning simply increases the magnitude of the response 
elicited by the conditioned stimulus and shortens the tim® which 
elapsed between stimulus and response. In operant conditioning, 
on the other hand, an operant is strengthened in the sense that 
a response is made more probable or more frequent» The operant, 
in shcrt, does not require a stimulus for its elicitation; the 
stimulus, however, may be described as the occasion for the 
elicitation. "This dependence upon the posterior reinforcing 
stimulus gives the term operant its significance— The operant—  
becomes significant for behavior and takes on an identifiable 
form when it acts upon the environment in such a way that a re­
inforcing stimulus is produced."^® In this sense, the organism 
_  —
Ibid., p. 65.
^  B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms, p. 22,
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is treated as active from the very beginning and, in accordance 
■with this view, Skinner's system is mainly concerned with situa­
tions in which the response of the organism produces the reinforcing 
agent.
Experimental designs are so planned as to measure the strength 
of a reflex (a term Skinner applies to operant behavior, also) in 
terms of reinforcement., Reinforcement, such as the delivery of 
a pellet of food, is supposed to bring about an increased reservoir 
of responses, which remain to be emitted,. Reflex strength, 
therefore, is in be estimated in terms of the rate of response, 
and this is relative 'to the size of the reserve. But the 
momentary rate of responding may vary in proportion to reinforce­
ment and motivation and other conditions of the organism. It 
is important, therefore, to find out how large reserves are 
built up. One way is that of reinforcement at standard intervals 
of time. In other words a pellet of food is delivered (to the 
rat in the box) after certain intervals of time, "The most
efficient means of building a reserve with a given number of re-
31
inforcesjentis in administer them periodically." Another way
of building up high reserves is to deliver the reinforcer (the 
pellet of food) after a standard number of responses.
In experiments with reinforcement at standard intervals (of 
3, 6, 9 and 12 minutes) Skinner found that the more frequent the 
reinforcement, the more rapid the rate of responding, although 
31 p. 137.
9h
32each rate is relatively uniform. Experiments dealing with 
reinforcement at a fixed ratio (reinforcement per 8, 96 and 192 
responses respectively) showed that, although very high rates of 
responding develops, the highest rate was found with the lowest 
frequency of reinforcement, with, that is, 192 responses per 
one reinforcemait as compared with i|8 or 96 responses. The 
high rate of responding in general is interpreted by Skinner as 
a result of the secondary reinforcement of each response (such 
as lever pressing) by a discriminating stimulus in the early 
part of a run. The responses are made not "because they produce 
food, but because they bring the production of food nearer."^
The discrepancy in the rate of responding or the delay after 
each reinforcement is explained in a twofold way. First, there 
is a negative factor associated with reinforcements which are 
separated in time. It looks as if the rat discriminates the time 
relationship and says to himself, "I've j]ust been fed; there's
31i
no use working since nothing will be forthcoming for a while." 
Second, the reserve is weakened by the "strain" imposed upon it 
by the preceding run. The whole picture will seem like this: 
response accompanied by reinforcement; the reinforcement creates
a negative factor and the reserve is weakened as a result of
32
See B. F. Skinner, Loc. cit.
33 Ibid*, P. 300.
31* Ibid** p. 297.
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strain; hence, delay in response occurs until the negative factor 
is decreased and the strain is overcome. With the increase in 
the secondary reinforcing factors, the next reinforcement is 
approached and the preceding one is left far behind; then, a
35
positive acceleration is shown.
It is of significance here to note that Skinner recognizes 
the complex relationship between habit strength and reinforcement. 
Habit strength is not merely dependent upon the number of re­
inforcements but also upon the pattern of the distribution of 
primary and secondary reinforcements and non-reinforcements, the 
number of previous conditionings, extinctions and so forth.
Heeds aid Drives
Skinner rejects the concept of need in common usage when 
it refers to an inner cause. In fact, a need is either inferred 
from behavior itself, as when we observe some one drinking large 
quantities of water and assert without hesitation that he possesses 
a great thirst, or it may be inferred from the operation respon­
sible foe thirst, as when we say that someone who has had nothing 
to drink for several days must be thirsty and probably will drink. 
The teims want, wish, desire, and the like are objected to for
the same reason. He denies a status to such inner causes. The 
35 This is comparable to Hull's goal gradiaits,
5^ B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, p. lij.3.
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term drive, hcwever, has a certain advantage. It has fewer
connotations. A drive, as Skinner uses the term, refers neither
to a mental or a physiological concept. "The term is simply a
convenient way of referring to the effects of deprivation and
satisfaction and of other operations which alter the probability
37of behavior in more or less the same way." A drive is not a
s t i m u l u s . 3 ®  "Thus we cannot identify the hunger drive with the
hunger pangs of an empty stomach as a stimulus..., such stimula-
39tlon is not closely correlated with the probability of eating."-" 
Ordinarily, we neither wait to eat until hunger pangs are felt, 
nor do we stop eating right after the first mouthfuls of food 
have stopped whatever pangs may have occurred. A drive is not a 
physicological state. Knowledge of the physiological state, 
Skinner asserts, even if it were possible to arrive at it, is 
not likely to be available at the time it is needed to control 
the behavior of the organism. The weight of the organism is 
sometimes controlled in laboratory experiments to give an index 
of food deprivation. But since we change weight by changing the 
history (hours of deprivation) we cannot dispense with the history 
in practical control. In like manner, drive is not identified 
with a psychic state," since deprivation affects behavior whether 
or not anything is 'felt,' the feeling is not a secure basis for 
37 Ibid., p. 1IU.
3^  Notice the difference between Hull's Drive Stimulus and
this,
39 Ibid., p. lUU.
prediction,"^® Lastly, drive is not simply a state of strength; 
the probability of response may be due to many different kinds of 
variables, vhsre deprivation plays a minor role.
In order that the term drive may be understood more clearly, 
the relationships between drive, reinforcement, reflex reserve, 
and reflex strength will be considered. Reinforcement, as noted 
before, affects both strength (rate of response) and reserve.
Drive affects strength, only. If an animal Is pre-fed before an 
extinction series (weak drive) strength (rate of response) will 
be slow at the beginning of the series but would tend to catch 
up (with a hungry rat) by the end of an hour's run, or until the 
reserve is exhausted. The relation is not this simple, of course. 
With hungrier rats (stronger drives) the reconditioning effect 
of a single reinforcement increases and the reserve is replenished 
more quickly. "The net result of reinforcement is not simply to 
strengthen behavior but to strengthen it in a given state of 
deprivation.
Emotions
Emotion as a psychic cause of behavior is also rejected in 
this view. So also,is the James-Lange theory of emotions rejected. 
In other words, emotion (as with motivation) "is not to be
k° ra-d., p. ms.
identified with physiological or psychic conditions.11^  In fact, 
Skinner sees emotion and motivation as v e r y  close to each other.
U3"They may, indeed overlap." Emotion is defined in terms of a 
special response related to the history of the organism. It is 
a "conceptual state, in -which a special response is a function of 
circumstances in the life history of the organism."^ - As pre­
disposition, amotion shows an increased probability of the indivi­
dual behaving (responding) in a certain manner. Responses thus 
vary together in emotion. Some emotions involve the whole 
repertoire, as in exciting or depressing emotions; others still 
probably involve the whole repertoire, as in fear or anger, but 
specific features of the environment become especially affected, 
such as the objects of fear or anger. Still other milder emotions,
such as embarrassment, sympathy and amusement, may be localized
)X
more narrowly in small subdivisions of a repertoire. In any 
case, there appears to be no over-all classification which will 
be applicable to specific forms of emotions. "Depending upon a 
variety of circumstances, the result may be close to fear or rage 
or sorrow.”^  Even with respect to a single emotion, the emotion 
Ibid., p. 163.
^  Ibid., p. 16?.
^  Ibid., p. 162.
(anger) produced, by one circumstance, therefore, may differ from 
that produced by another circumstance. Conditioning is at least 
partially responsible for the grouping of responses which define an 
emotion, such as anger. Behavior which brings, say, damage to 
the object of anger may be reinforced and thus come under the 
control of the conditions which control the emotional state. But 
apparently some <£ the behavior involved in an emotion is un­
conditioned. The explanation of the grouping of responses in 
this latter case is to be sought in the evolutionary process.
Punishment
Punishment is explained by Skinner either as withdrawing a 
positive reinforcer or presenting a negative one. This is 
exemplified, by taking candy from a baby or spanking him. When we 
present a negative stimulus, such as seveveLy pinching the child 
to stop him from giggling in the church, the negative stimulus 
(pinching) elicits responses, some of which often are emotional. 
These are incompatible with laughing and are powerful enough to 
suppress it. But since this situation does not exhaust the 
reverse, ihe effect is only temporary. It may happen, however, 
that "as a second effect of punishment, behavior has consistently 
been punished because of the source of conditioned stimuli which 
evoke incompatible behavior."^ The child's own behavior (the
start of giggling in the above example) may supply conditioned 
stimuli which evoke opposed emotional responses* Furthermore,
"any behavior which reduces this conditioned aversive stimulation
I18
will be reinfcrced," The most effective means of punishment, 
then, is to establish aversive conditions which may be avoided by 
doing something else. But if the punishment is repeatedly 
avoided, the conditioned reinforcer undergoes extinction] and, 
since punishment in the social sense depends on the behavior of 
other people, it is likely to be intermittent and veiy rare 
actions that are consistently punished. Skinner is in agreement 
with Thorndike, therefore, in not considering punishment a sound 
or effective tool for learning or for the control of behavior.
In fact, he believes that punishment, insofar as it evokes 
emotional behavior which may conflict with the operant to be 
punished, may do more harm than good. He offers some other 
alternatives to punishment, such as extinction techniques, 
forgetting by lapse of time, and conditioning incompatible 
behavior through positive rather than negative reinforcement, 
Skinner’s system, especially in terms of(operant behavior,’ 
which is at least an implicit recognition of the active role the 
organism plays in his environment, advances in the right direction. 
Unfortunately, Skinner does not go far enough. Instead, he focuses
101
his ■whole attention on the study of behavior constants, such as 
reflex reserve, extinction rate, etc. He compares his own 
system with physical chemistry, contrasting it with Hull's, which 
he compares with Newtonian mechanics.
Because Skinner bases his system mainly upon the operant 
mode of behavior and thus recognizes the role of the consequences 
of action instead of the pull and push of external stimuli upon 
further action it could be elaborated in terms of a cognitive 
theory. Skinner, however, insists upon a mechanistic system. In 
this connection, Hilgard. says, "Because of the correlation between 
responses and their consequences, it would not be hard to impose 
a cognitive interpretation upon operant behavior, but Skinner does 
not do so,”^
In treating human behavior, Skinner brings in the tools he 
elaborated in his studies of rats in the box named after him.
One may wonder with what success this is done. One citation 
from his writing may be suggestive. In speaking about abstraction 
as discrimination and reinforcement, he offers the following 
illustration:
The word 'change' for example, comes from a 
word which referred to the fall of a die cr coin.
A conspicuous feature of such an event is the 
indeterminacy of the result, which is similar to 
the indeterminacy of other events in which nothing 
falls-for example, of the suit of a card drawn from
 £5--------
E. Hilgard, Theories of Learning, Ojo. cat,, p, lii2.
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a deck. The metaphorical transfer of the term for 
falling, on the basis of indeterminancy, is the first 
step in isolating this important property. The referent 
of tie term is further refined-perhaps through centuries 
of changing practices in a verbal community-until in the 
hands of the modern mathematician the term comes under the 
control of a very special property of nature, the modern 
referent of the word 1 chance,'50
We are supposed to believe that cognition does not enter into the 
picture,
E. R. Guthrie
Introduction
Here we find a system of psychology designed to interpret 
behavior in terms of sheer bodily movements. All behavioral 
phenomena are ultimately reduced to movement. Guthrie is not 
interested, therefore, in end products or achievements, as such.
His is an interest, rather, in the movements which produce the 
end products. Consequently, movement produced stimuli, i, e,, 
internal stimuli are basic for the system. They are the true 
conditioners in Guthrie's approach.
The Law of Association
Guthrie's fundamental law of learning is the law of associa­
tion. It states that "a combination of stimuli which has accompanied 
a movement will on its reoccurrance tend to be followed by that
51movement," Association, in this sense, refers to a stimulus
^  F. B. Skinner, Science aid Human Behavior, cit., p. 136. 
^  E. R. Guthrie, The Psychology of Learning, p, 26,
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and a response. The stimulation thus becomes the occasion for 
the response. A colollary of this law of association is the 
thesis that "we leam only what we do."^
Reinforcement
Guthrie believes in a reinforcement principle, though he 
differs from both Hull and Skinner. In his view reinforcement 
does not work in terms cf primary need reduction. He considers 
the concept of need reduction unscientific. "If needs explained 
or caused their own satisfaction the world would be a place very 
different from what it is."^ Reinforcement, in Guthrie's 
terms, does not add to his principle of association. Only the 
mechanical arrangement of a situation, for instance, is altered 
as a result of reward. To understand his position, fully, with 
respect to reinforcement, we need to understand the difference 
between his and Hull's system on the matter of the effect of 
repetition. Hull, as we have seen, believes that habit strength 
is a cumulative function of reinforcement, whether the latter is 
primary or secondary. For Guthrie, however, "A stimulus pattern 
gains its full associative strength on the occasion of its 
first pairing with a response."-^ The function of reward, therefore,
is to remove the animal from the situation and, hence, to leave
E. R. Guthrie, "Conditioning: A Theory of Learning in 
Terms of Stimulus, Response and AssociatLon," IfLst Yearbook, Part 
n, p. 2k.
^  Ibid«* p*
Ibid., p. 30.
tbs product of association intact, ready to reoccur when the 
organism is confronted with the same situation in the future*
In other words, the organism will do precisely the same thing it 
did last in the situation, so long as nothing interferes with 
the association already established.
The Effect of Practice
If Guthrie believes, as he does, in a single trial learning, 
how does he account, one may ask, for the improvement of per­
formance by repetition or practice? Guthrie acknowledges the 
effect of repetition but maintains that "The effects of practice 
do not depend on mere repetition, but on the conditions of repeti­
tion, and these conditions vary enormously in different learning 
situations.In the acquisition of a given skill, no single 
stimulus is associated with a given response; rather, virtually 
thousands of stimuli are associated with thousands of responses 
or movements. A skill is not aie act bub many. Thus, the effec­
tiveness of practice is contingent upon the association of the 
correct responses with the cues or stimuli in a variety of 
situations. The slightest change in the stimulating situation 
will alter the response. Practice is needed, therefore, for 
ascertaining that all required movements will be associated with 
the stimuli inherent in the situation. Strictly speaking, then,
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there is no transfer of training as an outcome of learning3 
there is only the repetition of prior behavior in exactly the same 
stimulus situation. ’’Effective practice," according to Guthrie, 
"is conducted in the general situation in which we desire the
56future performance to be given."
Forgetting and Associative Inhibition
Guthrie's interpretation of forgetting is simple enough. 
Forgetting is a matter of associative inhibition. By associa­
tive inhibition Guthrie means the interference of new responses 
which get associated with the old cues or stimuli. When the 
old situation reoccurs, therefore, the animal responds in terms 
of the newly formed association, not with the older form. Hence, 
the way to protect a habit from inhibition is to remove the 
organism quickly from the situation in which it responds; 
otherwise, the cues may get associated with other responses.
There is no evidence, Guthrie holds, that thus protected, a habit 
will ever be forgotten. Forgetting does not occur simply by 
lapse of time, but by associative inhibition. Recovery from 
extinction of responses inhibited by animals, when brought back 
to the laboratory, is a case in point.
An understanding of the foregoing principle of associative 
inhibition serves not only to provide insight into how a habit
 56--------
Ibid., p. 32,
may be protected and maintained intact, but also into how undesir­
able habits may be broken. One way is to present the cue along 
with the stimuli for inhibitory responses, ’The dog that has 
pursued and eaten chickens has often been cured by tieing the 
corpse of a chicken about his neck.”-^  Another way is to repeat 
the stimulus until, with the coming of fatigue, the response 
ceases to occur. A new response will then be associated with the 
cue or signal. A third way is to introduce the stimulus associated 
with the response in such a faint degree that it will not elicit 
the response. By gradually increasing the magnitude of the 
stimulus, the organism will eventually learn to do something other 
than what was associated with the stimulus.
Motives
Motives are not taken seriously by Guthrie. They enter 
into learning theory only because they determine the vigor of 
the movements which may enter into association with cues. The 
significance of rewards has been referred to above. They are 
viewed merely as factors which affect -the mechanical arrangement 
of the situation. The organism will likewise do what it last did 
on the reoccurence of the same situation, whether rewarded or not. 
Guthrie does not seem to note the host of experimental data which 
shows that reward enhances learning situations as compared with
107
non-reward.-^  Neither does he give consideration to the essential 
difference between reward and punishment. His simple formula 
that the organism will do the last thing it did in the situation 
does not explain the effect of punishment. It is reasonable and 
logical enough to say, as Guthrie does, that the effect of punish­
ment depends upon what the organism will do in the punishing 
situation. But to stop at that and consider that the effect of 
reward and non-reward is essentially the same is hardly adequate. 
It is that which the organism does in a punishing situation that 
needs to be explained.
Cognition
With respect to cognition, Guthrie has nothing more to offer 
than his law of association. Purposes and intentions are dealt 
with in terms of patterned movements as a result of past experiences.
The essence of an intention is a body of main­
taining stimuli which may or may not include sources of 
unrest like thirst or hunger but always includes action, 
tendencies conditions during and past experience—  
a readiness to speak, a readiness to go and readiness to 
read and in each case a readiness not only for the act 
but also for the previously rehearsed consequences of the 
act. These readiness are not complete acts but they 
consist in tensions of the muscles that will take part 
in the couplete act.??
See J. P. Seward, "An Experimental Study of Guthrie's 
Theory of Reinforcement," Journal of Exp, Psychol,, Vol. 30, 19^ 2, 
pp. 2U7-256.
^  E. R. Guthrie, The Psychology of Learning, Loc. cit. ,pp.20j?-
206.
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The main distinctive features of this position are the reliance 
on the assumed tension in the muscles. Although Guthrie insists 
upon dealing only -with observable behavior, the fact remains that 
these assumed muscle tensions are merely a matter of conjecture 
and speculation. They are not demonstrable. On this score, 
Guthrie is at one "with other behaviorists. By the same token, 
goal directed activities are treated as patterned movements 
associated with external and internal stimuli. "Goals do not 
determine activity but stimuli may incite activity because the 
stimuli remain associated with the movements that ended in the 
good attainment."^
Guthrie's experimental work is reported in GATS IN A PUZZLE 
BOX.^l This was a series of experiments which were conducted 
in which cats were led to enter a puzzle box from which they 
could escape by merely touching a small pole in the middle of a 
glass covered cage which had exit doors in its fronts The move­
ments of the cats were recorded in detail on film by a camera 
set for this purpose. The filmed records of the cats' movements 
tend to support Guthrie's theoretical explanations. Guthrie 
and Horton state,
“go
E. R. Guthrie, "Conditioning: A Theory of Learning in 
Terms of Stimulus, Response and Association, " Og. cit., p. £2.
^  Ibid., p. 360
10 9
It has been our conclusion from our observation of 
this series of experiments that the prediction of what 
any animal would do at any moment is most securely 
based on a record of what the animal was observed to do 
in that situation at its last occurence. This is 
obviously prediction in terms of association.^
In other words, Guthrie and Horton seem to have demonstrated the 
sterotype of the behavior of cats in a particular kind of maze. 
The question is whether we are warranted to generalize from this 
study to provide an explanation far the behavior of cats, or of 
other organisms, including humans, in different situations. 
Guthrie seems to believe that association by continuity, as 
represented by this experiment, is common in learning of all 
organisms, though what is learned may differ. Human beings, 
of course, have the advantage of symbolic learning; but even so, 
his law of association is assumed to account for such learning, 
too.
General Evaluation of the System
The above experiment has limitations. These were prescribed 
by the structure of the puzzle box. Although limitation of 
this character is a common feature of no matter Miat kind of puzzle 
box or maze is used in learning experiments, the fact that the 
experimental structure involves its own limits should warn us against 
misleading generalizations. In the above experiment, the puzzle
_ T 2 --:---
Ibid., p. Ii2.
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box was so structured as to render escape very easy. At the same 
time, the clue to the release from the box was not clear. There 
were no serious tries in the face of difficulties or failures; 
the pole, the key to escape, was set in such a position that the 
cat in the box was sure to touch it. From a cognitive standpoint, 
there was nothing in the situation to prompt the cat to change its 
behavior in the next try, once it had succeeded in escaping from 
the box by a certain pattern of movements. It is significant 
here to note that Guthrie meant to obscure the goal so that 
apparent purposive action would not interfere with his orthodox 
associationism, This was, in effect, a criticism of those 
psychologists who speak of goal-directed behavior, often suggesting 
that the goal is a cause, when, in fact, the goal may not exist 
until it is produced by the activity. "The confusion arises," 
according to Guthrie, "because there are so many instances in 
which the sight of the goal to be reached is one of the incentives 
to, and directors of, action.Thus, in his experiment, Guthrie 
concealed the due to the solution so that the goal would not be 
observed and remain unseen. The earlier question remains, however. 
Are we warranted to generalize from an experiment of this character, 
to all other forms of behavior?
One final remark is in order about Guthrie’s contiguous 
conditioning. This feature of his position is not unlike an
53
E. R. Guthrie, "Conditioning: A Theory of Learning in
Terns of Stimulus, Response and Association," Og, cit., p. 5>2.
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emphasis placed by Hull and Skinner. It is of seme philosophical 
interest. Both Hull and Skinner believe in the importance of the 
time interval between the conditioned stimulus and unconditioned 
response. The measurement of that time interval which suggests 
a gradient is very important in their positions. As was mentioned 
in the first chapter, Skinner noted that Pavlov had to measure 
the time interval in order to rule out mentalistic elements as 
explanatory factors. In other words, without measuring precisely 
the time interval between the conditioned stimulus and the un­
conditioned response, there would be room for mentalistic inter­
pretations in terms of the organism’s awareness of the significance 
or meaning of the new stimulud. Guthrie, in keeping with both 
his own distinction formulations and a strict behavioristic view, 
has eliminated the ’time interval’ altogether: He substitutes
for it simultaneous contiguity between the stimulus and the 
response. This leaves no possible opportunity for any mentalistic 
elements to interfere.
CHAPTER IV
KEIMFOBCEMENT VERSUS COGHITIOH
The concept of reinforcement is one of the most, if not indeed 
the most, controversial issue in behavior theory today. Pield 
theories and cognitive theories in general, as was pointed out in the 
second chapter, rely upon the distal representation of objects in the 
environment in terms of cognitive concepts such as perception, reor­
ganizing and structuring the behavioral field, expectancy and the like. 
Consequently, cognitive psychologists differ from reinforcement theor­
ists in their rejection of fumbling or random movement as the chief 
directive of behavior. Reinforcement theorists, however, in their in­
sistence upon extreme objectivity in terms of observables, do away 
with in fact, cognitive concepts altogether. When they do speak in 
terms of cognitive concepts or ideas, it is only after they have re­
duced them to their assumed physical or physiological correlates. As 
such, foresight, intension, purposive behavior and the like, when 
used by behaviorists, are terms that refer to mechanical habits built 
upon hypothetical physical or physiological entities.
The issue can be set by this question: What is the most typical
mode of behavior from which other modes of behavior can be derived? 
Cognitive theorists, especially field theorists, find such a concept
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in perception. Behavior!ats seem to agree that movement —  random 
movement, that ie —  provides not only the most typical hut, also —  
and this is of special significance —  the simplest mode of behavior 
upon which to build a behavior theory.
Cognitive theorists, by taking perception as their starting point, 
try to explain other modes of behavior in terms of the same principles 
by which they explain perception. Edna Heidbreder expresses this point 
of view with respect to human cognitive behavior. She says, "To say 
that the perception of concrete objects is the typical reaction in 
human cognition is to say that human beings in all their other cogni­
tive processes are in some measure doing what they do in perceiving 
1
objects...." learning is, generally speaking, explained in terms of 
the principles that govern the process of perception. Gestalt psychol­
ogists, as will be remembered, explain learning in terms of the law of 
pragnanz, which was itself originally a law of perception.
When we turn to reinforcement theories, we find that "perception" 
disappears from the foreground and in its stead learning takes the 
lead. This is for two main reasons. First, is the mentalistic conno­
tation of perception. Says Berlyne, "Sometimes perception is looked
at askance because it has been regarded in the past as an aspect of
2
conscious behavior." And second, is the impression, sometimes given by 
gestaltists, that perception defies analysis. This impression is at 
-
Edna Herdbreder, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of Cognition," Psychol. 
Review, Vol. 52, 19^5* p* 2.
2
D. E. Berlyne, "Attention, Perception and Behavior Theory," 
Psychol. Review, Vol, 58, 1951* P» 39*
llit-
least implicit in the gestaltist's contention that the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts and that the parts derive their properties 
from the whole* Behavior!sts, in their enthusiasm for the rigor of 
analysis* which characterizes the more advanced physical sciences, 
found themselves going beyond the phenomenon called perception to what 
they considered as the ultimate units or elements of behavior. Percep­
tion served no essential function for them* therefore. This was espe­
cially true during the early days of behaviorism. The Battle of
Behaviorism, that famous debate between McDougal and Vat son, illus- 
3
trates the point. McDougal charged that Vatson1s behaviorism would be
impoverished by excluding from the start the study of such phenomena as
perception* imagination and the like. The charge was Justified in view 
of the mechanistic and atomistic approach of Vatson.
Behaviorism did not stop at the simple level of Watson's formula­
tion, however. As it came to grips with more and more complex modes of 
behavior* many problems akin to field and cognitive psychologies had to 
be brought under scrutiny by it. Hull, in his later writings, expresses 
the need for tackling the phenomenon of perception in terms of his own 
system. Similarly Berlyne* in the article quoted above, expressed the 
same need and examined the possibilities of applying Hull's system to 
problems of perception.
3
See V. McDougall and J. B. Vatson. The Battle of nm.
New Tork: V. V. Norton and Co.
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In Chapter 3 we saw how behavioristic or associationistic learning 
theories try to explain behavior without reference to the distal repre­
sentation of objects in the environment. The problems which they have 
to cope with in consequence can be summarised as follows:
1. To establish a system based on local stimulation 
of receptors independent of the distal environ­
mental determinants.
2. To account for the fact that behavior thus conceived 
does correspond in some way or another to the distal 
environmental stimuli.
3. To show that this correspondence is not caused by 
any cognitive factor or cognitive commerce with the 
environment. In other words, to show how from among 
countless stimuli and cues besetting the organism 
stimuli or cues are favored for fixation, association 
or conditioning.
Since the organism has no cognitive commerce with objects of the 
environment, fumbling and random movement should be shown, by some 
means or other, to account for behavior. Thorndike was undoubtedly 
a pioneer in this field. Eis experiments with animals have provided 
him with a lot of data to substantiate his ideas about trial and 
error learning. He was criticized, though, on more than one ground. 
First, was the challenge that his findings from the field of animal 
behavior did not warrant the use of his generalizations to encompass 
human behavior as well. Second, and this came mainly from the gestalt 
camp, was the challenge that his experimental designs limited the ex­
perimenter to the observation of only apparent fumbling s. In other
£
See M. Sherer, Op. cit.. p. 96.
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words, this second criticism said* in effect* that Thorndike read into 
his experiments what had been pat in them to start with.
It is suggestive to note that when Thorndike applied his princi­
ples to human behavior, he found rote learning to he the most promising 
field for investigation. This is so, apparently, because of the facil­
ity with which such experimentation could be carried on without allowing 
the older already established habits to interfere in the results. But 
we may observe that such a state of affairs does not eliminate the ob­
jection raised concerning the limiting factors of the experimental sit­
uation. The objection, however, could not be taken seriously by 
Thorndike. His concern, from his own premises, was chiefly the discov­
ery of the conditions under which connections between specific stimuli 
and specific reactions took place. Cognition, therefore, was dismissed 
as a significant factor even before experimentation took place. Tet in 
all fairness to Thorndike one must say that he did attempt to show that 
learning took place according to his principles without the interven­
tion of cognitive factors, i.e., without awareness. In an experiment 
in which he collaborated with Rock, the attempt was to show whether or 
not the subjects would discover the underlying principle. The experi­
ment was designed especially for this purpose, the assumption being 
that if learning depended on awareness, the subjects would jump to 
100 per cent success.
If the subject became aware of the principle accord­
ing to which the rewards and punishments were Plotted or 
of the two classes of connections, he would, after a 
little experimentation, change from a moderate percentage 
of successes to nearly 100$. If the subject increases his 
percentage of responses that manifest the one tendency
H 7
gradually* it is evidence that the tendency is strength­
ened without his being aware that there is any such ten- 
dency.5
the results of these experiments were gradual improvement of learn­
ing under conditions of reward* There was no abrupt or insightful leap 
ahead. Thorndike and Bock took their results as evidence that learning 
is a result of reward without awareness. A close examination of the 
conditions of the experiment, however, would show that the results did 
not warrant this conclusion. To say that the subjects did not understand 
the principle underlying the problem to be learned is to assume that a 
principle was present. An examination of the so-called principle reveals 
the presence of more than one principle and a situation so complicated 
that a single principle could exist only in the minds of the experi­
menters. The fact that the subjects learned gradually as a result of 
reward does not exclude the possibility of awareness of certain princi­
ples, even though they may not have been fully articulated by the sub­
jects. It is possible that awareness may function at a low level. It 
is quite possible that rewards, therefore, do not act merely in a 
mechanical fashion, but may be used instrumentally by the subjects for 
extracting information about the problems, especially in the ease of 
human subjects who possess the capability of symbolization. Moreover,
"...positive evidence has been offered for the importance of awareness
6
of knowledge of results for successful learning." The logic of the
5
E. L. Thorndike and Robert T. Rock, Jr., "Learning Without 
Awareness," J. Exp. Psychol.. 17, 193^ , P» 3»
6
L. Postman, "The History and Present Status of the Law of Effect", 
Op. pi,ft,.. p. 506.
118
experiment and the argument Is clear enou^ i. The problem situation 
was too complicated and vague. A rapid or sudden solution was impossi­
ble and the inevitable outcome was the gradual improvement of learning. 
Given these conditions the outcome is naturally taken to support the 
view that learning starts by fumbling, proximal stimulation of receptor 
organs and building up the habits through the association of stimuli 
and responses. Thus we come back to the problems of how fumbliig, 
proximal stimulation without the intervention of cognition, can account 
for behavior. What makes for the coherence of behavior or habit as a 
result of learning? In other words, what factor or factors account for 
the fixation of the right movements and the combination of the relevant 
stimuli with the successful reactions or responses?
The key to the problem, seen by Thorndike and as was indicated in
the preceding chapter, lies in the principle of reinforcement and its
ancestor —  the law of effect. The law of effect simply means that
success stamps in or strengthens, and failure weakens or stamps out,
connections. But success and failure, or satisfaction and annoyance,
as mentioned before, carry mentalistic connotations. Allport says
"...That satisfaction, being both subjective and physical, cannot
legitimately intervene as a causal factor in refashioning neural 
7
states." To avoid such connotations, Thorndike put the physiological 
correlates of success and failure squarely in the neurones. But as a 
mechanistic principle, the law of effect faced a serious problem. How 
can an effect work on a connection which has already passed?
7
Gordon Allport, "Effect: A Secondary Principle of Learning", 
Psychol. Rev. 19h6, Vol. 53* P* 3^ 3*
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The Retroactive Act!on of the haw of Effect
This problem, besides the subjectivity implied in the law, has
beea the main classical objection raised against the law of effect.
This objection states "that effect is a complete anachronism, since
the attainment of satisfaction or pleasure follows after the crucial
series of activities, and therefore cannot well work backward in time
especially when a long interval of time intervenes between act and 
8
effect," Thorndike’s answer to this objection was that the physio­
logical correlates of the connection do not vanish instantaneously 
but continue to be present when the consequence (reward or punishment) 
occurs. This postulation implies self-action on the part of the neurons 
as they exhibit satisfaction or dissatisfaction and determine, so to 
speak, the period of time when this state of affairs will or will not 
favor association. Let us observe here in passing, that such an 
assumption is on the speculative rather than on the demonstrative level. 
The objection, however, still holds, especially when the time interval 
between act and effect is long enougi. Some intervening variables have 
to be postulated to bridge the gap, which was what Hull did.
Hull's first postulate (the perservative stimulus trace) is a 
physiological one and is intended to provide an answer similar to that 
of Thorndike. But before giving Hull's answer to the problem let us 
consider his principle of reinforcement (primary reinforcement), which
8
Ibid.. p. 343.
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corresponds in. a rough way to Thorndike's law of effect. This princi­
ple states:
Whenever an effector activity occurs in temporal 
contiguity with the afferent impulse or the perserva- 
tive trace of such an impulse, resulting from the im­
pact of a stimulus energy upon a receptor, and this 
conjunction is closely associated in time with diminu­
tion in the receptor discharge characteristic of a need, 
there will result an increment to the tendency for that 
stimulus on subsequent occasions to evoke that reaction.
Here we find that a specific efferent impulse and a specific re­
action (or efficient discharges) associated in time and contingent 
upon the need reduction at a given moment will get associated in the 
same situation in the future. A beginning of a habit is born. Hull 
considers the postulate of the perservative stimulus trace to be of 
biological importance. It provides an explanation of the influence 
of events of the recent past on the present of the organism and this 
is a matter of importance for survival. In other words, Hull's postu­
late makes the recent past (physiologically speaking) present in the 
immediate situation, in a sense; hence, the benefit from the feedback 
of the consequence of behavior in a given event. "This perservative 
stimulus trace is biologically important because it brings the effector 
organ in rapport not only with environmental events which are occuring
at the time but with events which have occurred in the recent past, a
10
matter frequently crucial for survival♦" The gap is further bridged 
by the principle of secondary reinforcement, as was shown in Chapter 3.
9
C. L. Hull, Principles of Behavior, Op. cit., p. 80.
10
Ibid., p. 385*
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The principle of secondary reinforcement reads: "The power of 
reinforcement may he transmitted to any stimulus situation hy the con­
sistent and repeated association of such stimulus with the primary re-
11
inforcement which is characteristic of need reduction." In this 
reference to secondary reinforcement Hull speaks of the "stimulus situ- 
ation," not in terms of afferent impulses. There is no reasont however, 
to doubt that Hull considers the stimulus situation to be effective as 
a secondary reinforcer, to be no different in any essential manner from 
the stimuli considered as primary reinforcers. The only seeming differ­
ence lies in the fact that the former depends on the presence of the 
latter. In fact, however, we do not expect primary reinforcers to be 
directly effective in all phases of behavior or in the execution of 
established habits. Secondary reinforcers have acquired their rein­
forcing characteristic in previous conditioning and act instrumentally 
in controlling the execution or performance of the habit. The princi­
ple of secondary reinforcement thus carries a heavy load in Hull's sys­
tem, since only final stage of a given act (as in case of a rat running 
a maze) will be reinforced as a direct result of primary need reduction. 
Again we must repeat that such physiological explanations are definitely 
speculative in character. They are far removed from the rigor of exper­
imental verification, at least, on the level at which experimental ver­
ification is now possible. This of course is not objected to as such; 
the point is, other explanations are feasible.
Cognitive psychologists enter the stage at this point. They argue 
—
Ibid., p. 97.
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that the feedback is not a matter of movements associated
mechanically by a certain effect. "The burned child shuns the fire
not because the pain did anything to his movements, but because
since that pain, the stimulus has changed, it is now flame plus
12
fear, no longer flame plus curiosity." The change is a change 
in the stimulus, as well as in the organism, for the stimulus 
after the first act is no longer the same stimulus. This explana­
tion is in terms of distal representation of the object in relation 
to the organism in the environment. It is the same argument that 
Carr puts forth. As he has said, "Those consequences do not
influence the portion of the act that preceded them.... they do
13affect the subsequent functioning of the act." Here again the 
argument is in terms of distal representation of the environmental 
stimuli. It is instructive that such mode of reasoning follows 
from James' child-candle instance. This is interpreted in Dewey's 
reflex arc concept and in Hullfish's treatment of concept formation. 
The underlying principle is sensori-motor co-ordination. Here we 
find that there isoommon agreement regarding the fact that a given 
act will alter future behavior in some way, but that there is 
disagreement with respect to the how and the why. It is neurones 
and connections between discrete neurones influenced by discrete 
stimuli from the outside; or is it a sort of transaction in which
t n
H. L. Hollingworth, Psychology: Its Facts and Principles, 
pp. 218-219. (Italics mine.j
13 h . A. Carr, Psychology: A Study of Mental Activity, p. 96.
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the "outside” and the "inside” are in a dynamic co-ordination, 
separable only for the sake of analysis? This is a philosophical 
question of prime importance and will be considered in the next 
chapters Thorndike has said: "How the after-effect of a connection
strengthens or weakens the corresponding connection may well be a 
matter for dispute but that it often does so seems to me as sure as 
the fact of learning itself
Nature of Satisfiers and Reinforcers
Thorndike’s conception of a satisfier is equivalent, in a sense, 
to a driving force whereby the animal strives to attain behavior 
pattern and preserve it. "By a satisfying state of affairs is meant 
roughly one which the animal does nothing to avoid, often doing such 
things as attain and preserve it."■*"'* The hedonistic principle is 
here turned into a driving force. This definition does not say 
whether the satisfier can be located inside or outside the organism. 
It only says that the animal often does something to attain and 
preserve "a satisfying state of affairs." Nor does the designation 
of neurones as the physical correlate of satisfaction help. Hull 
sensed this danger and considered that Thorndike had confused the
^ E. L. Thorndike, The Fundamentals of Learning, p. 172.
15 Ibid., p. 176.
criterion, 'effect or reinforcement,' with 'the striving,' making
the striving primary without explicitly saying so. Hull then
asked, "But is the 'criterion' the active or essential factor, or
is it a mere convenient indication of the active factor? And which
of the two variables.••• is the 'criterion' The distinction
Hull makes here is between two variables, motivation or striving,
on the one hand, and learning, in the sense of strengthening or
conditioning, on the other. The two variables, Hull believes,
are positively correlated, but he insists that a distinction between
them must be made in order to decide which is primary and which is
secondary or dependent and derivable from the other variable. Hull
is inclined to consider that the 'conditioning' or strengthening
is primary. By this is meant that striving can probably be derived
17from the principles of conditioning as basic assumption." ' He 
further makes himself clear by saying that "States of affairs which 
organisms will strive to attain are reinforcing agents, not because 
they will evoke striving, but they evoke striving now because at 
some time in the past they were potent reinforcing agents, thereby 
joining stimuli and responses which constitute striving."-1-®
A brief review, 0f the position of other behavior theorists
needs to be made before the concept of reinforcement is examined.
15 1
See Clark L. Hull, "Special Review, Thorndike's Funda­
mentals of Learning," Psychol. Bull, 1935, Vol. 32, p. 819.
17 Ibid., p. 821.
18 Ibid., p. 822.
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Skinner’s position, for instance, is similar to that of Hull and 
the gap is bridged by the principle of secondary reinforcement*
His principle of secondary reinforcement states, as did Hull’s, 
that any receptor activity which consistently precedes a primary 
reinforcement will itself become a reinforcing agent. We need not 
consider Guthrie’s position at this point. It adds nothing to the 
picture and offers no solution to the present problem of the 
retroactive effect of reinforcement. The question remains— is 
this distinction between the striving and reinforcing valid and does 
it help solve the problem? Apparently not. It rather makes it 
more difficult . We have to deal with successive neural events, 
the link between which is contingent upon reinforcement, yet 
reinforcement itself is inferred only from the establishment of 
such a link, In any learning situation there are a multitude of 
stimuli and reactions irrelevant to the task being learned. Hull 
realises this and says, "every reinforcement mediates connections 
between a very great number of receptors and effector processes
19in addition to those involved in the reinforcement process...."
Reinforcement of right connections becomes a matter of
selection based on the frequent occurence of the relevant stimuli
and reactions and the elimination of the others. This seems logical
but on further scrutiny one does not find it as sound as it first 
_
Hull, Principles of Behavior, 0£. cit«, p. 83.
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appears. The problem is why the irrelevant reactions tend to
disappear or decrease in frequency* The answer is that the
permanent features of the physical situation are those that
inevitably present themselves consistently* This may seem to give an
answer to the problem of the determinations the organism will have
to make in terms of corresponding stimuli. But it does notj when
the situation is one of choice among alternatives presented by the
physical features of the situation. Such formulation, for
instance, cannot explain why the rat in a maze learns to pass
through the allqy and skip blind ends. As Leeper has pointed out,
as stimuli blind alleys are more similar to the end**box
than is the true pathway. Of course, an entrance in a blind
alley is not followed by any primary need reduction. But neither
20is the passage down a segment of the true path." Thus, by
strictly following the principle of reinforcement, we find
nothing that will account for learning other than a negative
aspect of reward— need reduction that is some decrease of impulse
from som e drive stimulus. This seans more basic than any positive
value of the reward. But common sense shows that the positive
value of the reward is often instrumental in learning. A taste of
ice cream may make the child who has never tasted it before like it
and ask for more. The taste of ice cream, then, creates a need,
_
Robert Leeper, "Dr. Hull’s Principles of Behavior," Genet 
Psycho*, 19Wi, Vol. 65, p. 58*
127
it does not reduce one. Yet the child has learned. We may say 
that the single taste creates a new stimulus situation that 
demands need-reduction, but this is to play with words.
Mechanistic formulations do not provide an answer to our
problem. Spencer seems to sense this difficulty and offers a
solution by suggesting that it is the particular ‘stimulus pattern*
a,t the time of reward which acquires reinforcing properties.
Spencer thus attempts to avoid the difficulty of the retroactive
effect of reinforcement by a claim that the reinforcing power is
generalized to preceding stimulus patterns, according to a
temportal gradient. Spence explicitly attributes the difficulty
of learning theory to account for the backward effect to the
emphasis behavior theorists put on reducing their explanation to
neurophysiological mechanisms as mediating behavior. He says
that “More recently psychologists have come to realize that
explanation of behavioral events does not necessarily involve
21reduction to its physiological determinants." Such an attempt 
is a marked deviation from the mechanistic and atomistic trends 
prevalent in behavior theory.^2 The reinforcement principle, 
however, still plays the dominent role. Egon Brunswik makes a 
genuine attempt, as we have seen, to recognize the role played
21
K. Spence, "Role of Secondary Reinforcement," Psychol.
Rev. 19h7, Vol. 5k, p. 1. (italics in original)
22 The emphasis Spence puts on the word ‘necessarily1 is 
suggestive. It seems to indicate that Spence is ready to deviate 
from reductionism when and only when reductionism fails to explain 
the facts.
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by the organism in terms of probability. His is still a reinforce­
ment theory, he conceives the organism as making choices of means, 
from among various ambiguous means, to a certain end. His assump­
tion as was mentioned before, is that cues, means or pathways to 
a goal are usually neither absolutely reliable nor absolutely wrong. 
His experiments are designed in accordance with this position. In 
one of his experiments, "Rats were used as subjects. A single 
choice situation was given. In a series of experimental conditions 
the relative frequency of degree of 'probability1 of reward on 
the two sides was varied*"^ It is a wholesome approach in which 
the organism is not merely viewed as passive, subject to the out­
side influence of stimuli, but is assumed to be able to diagnose 
its environment and choose from the multitude cues or signs provided 
by the situation. That which the organism chooses to do and does 
in the situation is what defines its behavior.
Brunswik found that "Discrimination increases with the 
difference of probabilities of success on the two sides, a further 
influence being superimposed due to the ratio of probabilities...."^- 
To treat the organism as part of the total situation, and stimuli 
as cues that bear upon its actions, is a recognition of the
transactional nature of behavior.
—
Egon Brunswik, "Probability as a Determiner of Rat Behavior," 
J. Exp. Psychol., 1939, Vol. 1+7, p. 17b.
2i| p. 196.
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In Thorndike's earlier writings, punishment was considered
as equally effective in behavior— though in the opposite direction—
as reward. But Thorndike reconsidered his position in view of some
of his findings later on and concluded that punishment had little,
if any, effect on the connections. In The Fundamentals of Learning
Thorndike reaffirmed the effect of reward in strengthening the
connections, but went on to assert that "There is not a particle
of evidence that the announcement of wrong (punishment) weakened
these connections enough to counterbalance the strength they gained
25from just occuring." This conclusion naturally does not agree 
with Hull's principle of reinforcement which is based on need 
reduction. Hull pointed out that Thorndike's conclusion was not 
valid statistically. Thorndike reported that the assumed negative 
effects of punishment did not exceed mere chance, statistically 
speaking. Hull contended, however, that this result rather 
affired the effect of punishment, since the connections were 
already established, and hence to find out that the occurence of 
the punished responses were lowered to 50 percent, accounted for 
the effect of punishment.
Hull's position here can be understood in terms of his principle 
of reinforcement, Need-reduction implies both reward and punish­
ment, since it is a negative statement. It means in both instances
E. L* Thorndike, Fundamentals of Learning, Op. cit., p, 7*
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getting away from the state of tension. Thus, the behavior that
is conditioned is that which leads to relief from hunger (reward)
or from pain, as in the case of an electric shock (punishment).
There is no basic difference psychologically speaking between
26
reward and punishment. The definitions of punishment and
reward in Hull's system are questionable. He imples that the
behavior which leads to cessation of punishment and, hence, to
need reduction, is reinforced when punishment ends. In other
words, if punishment does not end, no reinforcement occurs* We
know, however, that need reduction may not occur when punishment
ends. The effect of a bum does not end with the withdrawal of
the burned organ from the flame. It may increase, with the
26organism learning, nonetheless, not to contact the flame.
With respect to the effect of reward, Leeper observes 
that the emphasis on the negative aspect of reward, that is, 
need-reduction to the exclusion of its positive value, is not 
warranted. A taste of ice cream may lead a child engaged in an 
otherwise vital activity to ask for more ice cream. Of course, 
Hull may answer this by maintaining that the taste has created 
a need to be reduced. Again, however, this will be but a play 
on words.
Skinner's position in this connection, as we have seen, falls 
more or less between those of Thorndike and Hull. On the one hand,
 25----------
Consideration of Dewey's treatment of the chiM-candle
instance will be given in Chapter Six.
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he recognizes the effect of punishment. Its effect is to lower
the extinction rate, that is, the punished response will diminish
temporarily, so long as the punishing situation exists. The
reflex reserve remains intact, however, and emission of responses
will start again when the punishing situation ceases. Does this
imply cognition, one may ask? Does the organism get the meaning
of the situation and act accordingly? . Skinner’s system, as we
noted in the preceding chapter, leaves a suggestion of cognitive
interpretation, though Skinner himself does not allow for it.
Guthrie’s position, as noted earlier, is unique. Neither
reward nor punishment are taken seriously in his system. Only
the final act in the situation determines what the organism will
do next in the same situation. Guthrie disregards, as Hilgard
has pointed out, that there is evidence to show that rewards
do enhance learning. Guthrie’s position, to say the least,
leaves the door in this respect open for speculation.
Mowrer’s view is similar to Hull’s. Mowrer says, "....it
is meaningless to say that one type of learning is through 'reward'
and another type is through ’punishment'j each is an essential
aspect of a dynamic process."^ In other words, Mowrer asserts
that learning is a function of reinforcement, which itself is
either the result of need reduction, such as hunger, or of
tension induced by punishment,
2? —
0. H. Mowrer, "The Law of Effect and Ego Psychology," 
Psychology Review, 19U6, Vol. 53, p. k2b»
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Cognitive psychologists naturally differ in their inter­
pretations from the behaviorists. Tolman, Hall and Bren tall con­
ducted an experiment to investigate the effect of punishment-
electric shock— and came out with a conclusion which to them was
28a disproof of the law of effect. They found that to add a 
shock to an auditory signal for right responses did not slow up 
learning significantly, while the addition of a shock to an 
auditory signal for wrong responses not only did not speed up 
learning (of the right response) but, in fact, slowed it down.
They concluded that neither the auditory stimulus nor the electric 
shock stamped in or stamped out connections and that learning is 
a function of perceptual organization or cognition. Any relatively 
violent shock may have a disruptive effect and may counterbalance 
the effect of emphasis (of the signal).
Performance Versus Habit Formation
Hull makes no rigid distinction between performance and habit 
formation. The distinction is a matter of degree. Repetition 
of the act strengthens the habit through continual reinforcements, 
until the habit is well established. Motivation is a prerequisite 
in each case, that is, whether habit formation or performance is 
involved.
----pH-------
See E. C. Tolman, C. S, Hall and E, P. Brentell, "A Dis­
proof of the Law of Effect and a Substitution of the Law of 
Emphasis, Motivation and Disruption,” J. Exp. Psychol., 1932, Vol. 
1$, PP* 601»6lli»
133
Cognitive psychologists, however, make a clear distinction.
For both Tolman and Lewin a rigorous distinction is made between 
the acquisition and utilization of habits. The acquisition of 
habits depends, in Tolman's terms, on the formation of cognitive 
patterns. For Lewin acquisition depends on structuralization and 
restructurization. of the phenomenal field or life space* Tolman 
describes the cognitive patterns as 'sign Gestalt expectations.
The important point here is that motivation is not considered a 
factor in learning or the acquisition of habit, though it is 
thought to be essential for performance or utilization of habit.
We cannot help but observe that cognitive psychologists, as 
represented by Tolman and Lewin, fall unawaringly into the 
entanglement of the dichotomy between the emotional or motiva­
tional aspect of behavior, on the one hand, and the cognitive 
aspect, on the other. This fallacy is especially dramatized 
in the case of Lewin, who insists that the laws of motivation 
and the laws of cognition should be studied separately, in order 
to determine the role of each type of factor in different learning 
situations,^
It is significant to note, however, that Tolman in his later
writings introduced a general motivational factor, which he_ _
See E. C. Tolman, "Gestalt and Sign. Gestalt," Psychol. Rev. 
1933, Vol. UO, pp. 391-UH ^d Kurt Lewin, "Field Theory and 
Learning,"
Leo Postman, N.S.S.E., [(.1st Yearbook, Part II, "The Law 
of Effect: Its History and Present Status," Ojo. cit., p. £3U.
called the "exploratory drive," to account for both habit for na­
tion and performance. This exploratory need is associated with 
all other forms of needs and activates them, while at the same 
time it accounts for learning without the identification of 
specific needs,^ It seems that this relatively new approach by 
Tolman is significant. The problem of behaviorists, stems among 
other things, not from a law of effect or a reinforcement principle 
as such, taut rather from the insistence on specifying certain 
pressure needs and attributing all observable behavior to that one 
need. Tolman's position in his ’Psychological Model' recognizes 
the significance of motivation not only for performance but also 
for the acquisition of habits and learning. He thus avoids the 
dichotomy between motivation and cognition referred to above. The 
exploratory need, moreover, avoids the limitations of behaviorists 
in specifying a specific need in their experimental research.
His exploratory need is a general, ubiquitous need. It is, we 
believe, a movement in the right direction. It is reminiscent 
of the postulation of the ether in physics, which solved some 
problems but failed with many others. This point will be dealt 
with in the next chapter.
Latent Learning;
The latent learnin g issue is tied up with the controversy
between cognitive and reinforcement theories over motivation
31
See E. E. Tolman, "A Psychological Model," Toward a General 
Theory of Action, pp. 277-361.
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versus cognition, as discussed above. It is a significant issue, 
since it illustrates the philosophical orientation of each group 
and the influence of this orientation on their experimental work 
and theorizing.
The problem can be stated simply as follows: If it can be
shown that learning may take place without primary need reduction, 
then the principle of reinforcement as the primary or the only 
determiner of learning falls. Naturally we would expect the 
cognitive theorists to cariy the burden in this regard. This, 
they did. A great number of experiments were conducted in support 
of 'latent learning,' chiefly under the leadership of Tolman.
Blodget in 1929 conducted the following experiment.-^
Rats were allowed to run in a six: unit T maze provided with gates 
to prevent retracing. Blodget ran the rats from the entrance to 
the goal box which was empty (with no food reward) in the first 
tries. The rats were kept in the goal box for two minutes for 
exploration and were th«i taken to another box (not their 
original home box) and not fed until after one hour had elapsed. 
This was also a precaution taken to avoid the possibility of re­
inforcement. Then, after seven tries, food was introduced in 
the goal box and the rate of learning of the experimental group 
of rats was then compared with that of a control group which did 
not have the chance of exploration. Two marked effects were
 ^ See H. C. Bodgett, "The Effect of Introduction of Reward 
Upon the Maze Performance of Rats," Univ„ Calif. Publ. Psychol.,
1.9 2 9, Vole h, pp. 113-1314.
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observed. First, the experimental group learned to some degree 
to reach the goal box in the early tries •without reward. Second, 
the learning curve dropped rapidly after food was introduced.
These results seem to indicate that learning (latent) does 
occur without rewards, i.e., as a result of exploration; and that 
learning is enhanced with the introduction of food reward, i. e., 
as a result of performance. This seems to support the cognitive 
position. The reinforcement group, however, have their reserva­
tions. They argue that the transference of the rat to a box in 
which it received food might have functioned as a secondary re­
inforcer. When the cognitive group deny this possibility, since 
the food was not introduced until one hour had elapsed, a fact 
which makes reinforcement improbable; the reinforcement group 
would still insist, however, that the very fact that the experi­
menter handled the rats when he took them from the goal box may 
have been reinforcing. Rats like to be handled, quite as do 
young children. Moreover, learning, so the reinforcement theorists 
argue, may occur as a result of the reduction of an exploratory 
drive; hence, reinforcement is still valid. But here the cogni­
tive group replies that if this is so, then, according to the 
reinforcement theory, what is reinforced should be a habit 
connected with exploration and not with food or the hunger drive.
It is well to remember that in Tolraan’s system an exploratory need
is general, whereas in reinforcement theories needs are specific.
So the argument goes. On the one hand, we find an argument in favor 
of reinforcement. Even when it fails to account for the facts,
it must be working somehow in some form or other. 137
So the argument goes. On the other hand, we find cognition and 
a general exploratory drive which accounts for everything. This 
is not the whole story, however.
In 19h$ Reynolds repeated Blodgett’s experimental but arrived 
at different conclusions.-^ The experimental group of rats 
learned to some degree to reach the goal box in the unrewarded 
tries, but there was no drop in the learning curve after the 
introduction of food. In treating the results of this experiment 
we will have -bo recall essentially the same arguments reported in 
connection with the first experiment,
Meehl and MacCorquodale repeated the same experiment and
3harrived at conclusions similar to those of Reynolds. Their 
argument was mainly that taking the rats from the maze and placing 
them in a cage may have been slightly rewarding. The case could 
be considered that of a secondary reinforcement, since the place 
where the rats were taken to was the same where food was obtained 
one hour later.
Tolman and Honzic conducted a more complicated experiment 
on a similar basis. The maze was more complex and offered more 
opportunity for exploration. Instead of one control group they 
had two. One control group found food in the goal box on every
try, while the other found no food at all. Then the two control
33
See B. Reynolds, "A Repetition of the Blodgett Experiment 
on ’Latent Learning1," £, Exp. Psychol., 19U5, Vol. 35, pp. h05~hh6.
See E. C. Tolman and C, H. Honsik, "Degrees of Hunger, 
Reward and Non-Reward and Maze Learning in Rats," Calif. Univ.
Pub. Psychol., 1930, Vol. U, pp. 211-275*
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groups were interchanged, so that the group that did not obtain 
food at first found food with every try, and vice versa. The 
results of this experiment, in general terms, tend to show that 
the rats learned to run the maze slightly without a food reward, 
but learned much more effectively with a food reward.
Buxton conducted another experiment in which he allowed the 
rats to explore the maze for a long period of time (72 hours) 
without food reward,3% a special effort was made to prevent any 
form of reward. The rats were taken out of the maze from different 
spots at different times. They received food only in their home 
cages at night and spent the morning in the maze which was a 
large twelve unit T maze. The results support the latent learning
theory. That learning may occur and be latent and show up when
there is need for performance.
An interesting experiment was conducted by Seward in which he
used a single T maze. The two goal objects were different from
one another. This was to accentuate perceptual cues. One was
white, while the other black; one maze had a rough floor, while
the other had smooth one. He gave the experimental group of rats
an exploration period of three hours to locate the two boxes.
The rats were then deprived of food. He then gave the hungry
rats a few bites of food in one of the boxes and then took them
 35-------- -
See C. E. Buxton, "Latent Learning and the Goal Gradient 
Hypothesis," Cont. Psychol. Theory, 19U1, Vol. 2, No. 6.
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immediately to the mtrance of the maze to see whether they could 
find their way to the right box. Twenty-eight out of thirty-two 
were able to do so successfully. The significance of this
experiment lies in the emphasis put on the experimental structure 
and perceptual or cognitive cues or signs. This naturally is of 
more concern to the cognitive groups than to the reinforcement 
group, whose concern is primarily, if not completely, with per­
formance as overt movement.
Tolman and Oleitman conducted an experiment in which an 
electric shock was received in one?, end box, whereas food (reinforce­
ment) was received at both ends. The result was that 22 rats out 
of 25 turned away from the side of the goal in which they had 
been shocked.
Many other experiments were conducted to affirm or disprove 
latent learning. Rats were .satiated either with food and deprived 
of water (in the exploratory periods) or satiated with water and 
deprived of food or satiated with both water and food. The results 
vary from one experiment to the other but, in general, the fact 
seems to be that the rats seem to learn something as a result of 
exploration. But what this something is in terns of either theory, 
it is hard to tell. The reinforcement group justifiably insist
that learning and performance go together and that both equally
"_r"
See J. P. Seward, "An Experimental Analysis of Latent 
Learning," Journ. Exp. Psychol.,19h9j Vol. 39, pp. 177-186.
depend upon motivation. Their shortcoming' seems "bo be in their 
exclusive emphasis upon observable movements of the organism, 
to the extent that they neglect or, rather, undermine the role 
of the structure of the environment or field in which behavior 
takes place. The cognitive (field) psychologists, in contrast, 
emphasize the structure of the field (the experimental set-up) 
but their tendency is to make a distinction between perception 
(as structurization of the field or restructurization of the 
field), which does not depend upon motivation, and performance. 
This leaves us with an ambiguous mentalistic connotation of 
their cognitive concepts. To illustrate this point we shall 
have to refer to a controversy between Leeper (cognitive) and 
Hull (reinforcement). This controversy is based on an experimental 
study by each. It did not originate in the domain of latent 
learning, yet it bears upon it.
In Hull1 s experiment"^  rats were trained in. a simple maze 
with two goal chambers. The rats were trained to traverse one 
arm of the maze when hungry; to the goal chamber to find food, 
and to traverse the other arm to the other goal chamber to find 
water, when thirsty. In case a rat made a wrong move its run 
led to a door whichbLocked access to the single end box. The
3 7
See C. L. Hull, "Differential Habituation to Internal 
Stimuli in the Albino Rat," Comp. Psychol., 1933, Vol. 16, 
pp. 25#-273.
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resalt of the experiment was that the rats improved gradually 
and acquired 80 percent correct choices on first runs, after 
25 periods of training of eight days each.
Leeper's experiment was similar to Hull’s in all essential 
points, with the exception that the maze had the two end boxes 
open for the rats to enter, even if they chose the wrong arm.
Food was always found in one end box and water in the other. If 
the rat made a wrong choice and entered the end box containing 
the reward material not needed at that time, it was kept there 
for about half a minute before its next run. By keeping the rat 
in the aid box perceptual patterning was assumed to take place.
The result c£ this experiment was that only one eight-day training 
period was required before the rats reached 83 percent correct 
choices on first runs. Hull in a rebuttal suggested that the 
rats, when allowed to enter the wrong box, may have been slightly 
rewarded by touching or licking the reward not needed at the 
moment. Leeper asserted ".... on the incorrect runs the rats
00
almost never touched the undesired goal material." It is
significant at this point to observe that Hull, as Leeper has
noted, had made use of his own experiment in his Principles of
Behavior, without any reference to Leeper and their different
results.
 ---------
Robert Leeper, "Dr. Hull's Principles of Behavior,"
J. Genet. Psychol., 19hk3 Vola 65, p. 232.
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In order to accentuate the perceptual conditions, Leeper 
conducted another experiment essentially on the basis of the 
above, with some modifications to allow more opportunity for latent 
learning. He found that his rats were able to reach 100 percent 
scores on first trials within five days with hunger-thirst 
alternations. Leeper concluded
.... it seems quite safe to say that it was exceedingly 
hampering to the rats in Hull’s maze to meet a door blocking 
access to the one-end-box, and that it was definitely 
helpful to the rats, in the other mazes to come into an 
end box and find there the goal material not wanted at 
that time. This suggests that learning is produced at 
least partly, not by reinforcement, but merely by an 
opportunity to perceive ’what leads to what consequence’ ,”39
Leeper further asserts that if it were true, as reinforcement
theorists answered, that the exploratory need was rewarding and,
hence, that reinforcement was the factor producing latent learning,
then we would have expected that ’wondering leisurely into blind
alleys, washing themselves and sniffing at cracks, etc! would be
reinforced and not merely reaching the goal box* This seems to
be a sound conclusion since Hull's fourth postulate^® tells us
that reinforcement establishes connections between receptor
activities and the reactions shown in the learning situations
So much for the latent learning issue. Another problem, also
illustrates the differences between the two groups— cognitive
39
Loc, cit.
^  See Chapter 3 of this study.
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and reinforcement. This is the 'continuity-discontinuity* issue.
The Continuity -Discontinuity Issue in Learning
Discontinuity theorists are those who interpret learning in 
terms of a single trial. Such Is the position of the Gestalt 
and field theory group, on the one hand, and Guthrie, on the other. 
It should be recalled at this point, however, that Guthrie belongs 
in this category not because of, but dispite of his basic principles 
which are, as shown before, associationistic through and through,^ 
C-uthrie, as we saw in Chapter HI, believes that the associa­
tion between a stimulus and response takes place in one try.
To this extent he belongs to the discontinuity group. The 
continuity of learning curves do not cause him any trouble. He 
accounts for this by the assumption that new associations between 
stimuli and new reactions, each at one try, are continually formed. 
In. contrast, cognitive theorists tend by and large to advocate 
discontinuity in learning because of the structurization of the 
behavior field or the patterning of sign (Gestalt), Insight, in 
terns of Gestalt psychology, falls within the discontinuity camp, 
for the same reason.
In contrast, continuity theorists interpret learning as a
positive growth function of reinforcement, Representatives of
I 0
this group are Hull, and Spence, Skinner would belong here, too,
' ^  See Chapter 3 in this study.
^  C.f, Hull's fourth postulate. (Chapter Three in this study).
mTo take Hull as an example, he has said:
The postulated relationship of habit strength to 
the number of reinforcements is that each reinforcement 
results in the addition of an increment to the habit strength—  
which is a constant function (F) of the difference between 
the physiological maximum of habit strength and the habit 
strength immediately preceding the reinforcement ,b3
The results of experimental work, however, fail to support one 
or the other group consistently. Sometimes learning seerns to 
occur after one try, as would be expected by the discontinuity 
theories  ^and, at other times, it seems to be gradual.
The core of the issue lies in the fact that cognitive 
theorists assert that subjects selectively abstract or attend to 
particular* aspects of the situation and only those aspects attended 
to are differentially affected by reinforcement or non-reinfctrce­
ment. In other words, the development of discrimination Is not 
a continuous process but is contingent upon the subjects 
attention to relevant clues. Once he has attended, then, and 
only then, does the reinforcement principle show its effect.
The reinforcement group, however, asserts that development in­
discrimination is a monotonous function of reinforcement and 
is, hence, continuous.
One of the experiments often quoted in support of the dis­
continuity theory is that of Kohler*s hen which was sho>m to 
respond to the darker of two gray boxes rather than to absolute
 53--------
C, 1. Hull, Principles of Behavior, Op. cit., p. 119.
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brightness* This seems to show that the hen was attending to a 
relational aspect of the situation and was not merely passively 
subjected to the amount of reinforcement*
Lashley, in one of his experiments, trained rats to discriminate 
between the circles Varying in size and to respond only to the 
larger one. He then substituted for the larger circle a
triangle(of size equal to that larger circle.) The rats responded 
to the triangle. Lashley concluded that the rats had reacted 
to size all along. He then trained the rats to react to the 
large triangle aid not to the small circle (reaction to the 
triangle was positively rewarded*) He then introduced a triangle 
and. a circle of equal sizes to see whether or not, having made 
the size constant, the rats would react to triangularity. The 
rats reacted equally to both without discrimination. Lashley*s 
interpretation was that the rats were equally reinforced with 
respect to circularity and triangularity and that they seemed to 
have reacted to size alone.
In another experiment Lashley and Wade trained rats to dis­
criminate between a white circle and a black card. They were 
then trained to discriminate between two white circles of varying 
sizes. One of the circles was the one reinforced in the first 
experiment. The results showed that the previous reinforcement 
(of the white circle against the black card) made no difference
^  See K. 5. Lashley, ’The Examination of the 'Continuity 
Theory' as Applied to Discriminative Learning,!t J. Jen. Psychol*, 
19U2, Vol. 26, pp. 2U1-265.
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in the discrimination in the second case. In fact, there was 
an indication (in all cases), though statistically insignificant, 
that the new discrimination was formed more rapidly, when the 
previous reinforcement was extinguished. These results seem to 
contradict the expectations of the continuity theory, since 
discrimination (according to Hull and Spence) should have been 
continuous with the first reinforcement. These experiments do 
not tell the whole story, however.
Spence trained the control group of rats on each of the 
contrasted objects (black and white discrimination) 50 percent 
of the time. The experimental group was trained on the same 
discrimination throughout. When the reinforced cues were reversed, 
that is, when the reinforced cue was non-reinforced and vice 
versa, it was found that the discrimination of the control group 
was much faster than that of the experimental group. And since 
the control group had been reinforced equally with respect to 
both cues, this was taken to be a continuation of reinforcement 
of the first phase of the experiment and hence to support the 
continuity theory.
Many other experiments were conducted along lines similar to
the ones cited above. Some seem to favor continuity; others to
favor d is-continuity. Where do we stand, then, we may ask?
   -
K. Wo Spence, "An Experimental Test of the Continuity 
and Non-Continuity Theories of Discrimination Learning," J. Exp. 
Psychol., 19ii5, Vol. 35, pp. 253-266.
The remarkable thing is that almost invariably those who favor 
discontinuity (cognition), such as Lashley, come out with results 
which support their point of view. Slight deviations from their 
expectations are always accounted for in terms of their theory.
The same applies to the continuity (or reinforcement) group. 
Moreover, each group seems to favor one type of experiment a], 
design. Osgood observes that wIt is significant with respect to 
methodology in psychological experimentation that, almost without 
exception, the studies supporting the Lashley view have used 
the jumping stand while those supporting the continuity view have 
used the Yerkes-type discrimination box«n^
General Comments
We have surveyed in this chapter some of the controversial 
issues in psychological theories. We have found disagreements 
concerning crucial issues in understanding human behavior. Most 
of the experimental work has been done on lower animals, with 
generalizations drawn to apply to man. The task of choosing among 
the views is really difficult, if not impossible. The disagreements 
are sometimes so serious that no choice can be made on the basis of 
empirical evidence. Moreover, the structural differences between 
the human organism and lower animals do not seem to be given due 
consideration. It is known, for instance, that stereoscopic
Charles E. Osgood, Method and Theory in Experimental 
Psychology, p. i|5l.
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vision probably does not exist below the primates in the evolu­
tionary scale. Does this make a significant difference in under­
standing human behavior? We are not sure. We do know one thing, 
that most experimental work in psychology has been done with rats* 
Harlow properly asks, "Can anyone seriously believe that the 
insatiable curiosity-investigatory motivation of the child is 
a second-order or derived drive conditioned upon hunger or sex 
or any other internal drive?"^  ^ He goes on to show that psycho­
logists do not sincerely believe that such principles which, they 
derive from their experimentations with rats apply to their own 
children. He observes that psychologists "After describing their 
children's behavior, often with a surprising enthusiasm and 
frequently with the support of photographic records, then trudge
off to their laboratories to study, under conditions of solitary
1 ft
confinement, the intellectual process of the rodents."
The problem of psychological theory evidently goes beyond 
exiting empirical data. It is a problem of methodology and, as 
such, it is essentially a philosophical problem. In the next 
chapter, therefore, we shall consider certain trends of human 
thought in an attempt to find out their bearings upon the study 
of behavior.
~ ~ ~ T i
H. F. Harlow,"Mice, Monkeys, Man and Motives," Psychol. 
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CHAPTER V
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AS TRANSACTION
Psychologists today show great concern about their own mode
and logic of thinking. It is a far cry from the time when they
1
conceived of their task as merely fact findingl This new concern 
is exhibited in the many articles dealing with the logic of 
scientific and empirical methods in relation to psychology; which 
appear in the psychological periodicals and by the tendency of all 
textbooks on psychology in recent years to present at the beginning 
a chapter or more on the scientific method. Psychology may be said 
to be turning back to its source, philosophy, after having with­
drawn almost completely from it. It is becoming more and more 
conscious of its own logic.
The difficulty with the early scientific movements in 
psychology was their domination by a sterile philosophy. Both
1
A monograph by H. Gordon Hullfish was published by The Ohio 
State University in 1926, titled Aspects of Thorndike »s Psychology 
in Their Relationship to Education Theory and Practice. This writing 
opened a movement of criticism against the structures of behaviorism, 
as a stimulus-response bond interpretation of human action, for an 
education appropriate for a democratic world. Following the publica­
tion of this monograph Professor Edward L. Thorndike wrote to 
Hullfish (Nov. 18, 1926) and, after saying that he was "proud to 
have been chosen as the subject of your analysis and criticism," 
added, "We are now carrying on experiments which, I hope, will 
make the factual implications of my associationist account of 
learning clearer. What its philosophical presuppositions or 
implications are I have never had time to consider. Perhaps I 
should have taken the time from other duties." Thorndike indicated 
that he would not reply; he suggested that "some philosopher devoted 
to a sort of naturalism would probably do it better."
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their subject matter and method were dictated by dualistic and 
mentalistic systems of thought. These proved inadequate with 
respect to other physical sciences. Psychology then turned its 
face towards the newly developing and promising scientific 
disciplines. In so doing, however, it cut itself at both ends*
With respect to subject matter, there was nothing or almost nothing 
in the way of subject matter in those physical and natural sciences 
from which the new ambitious science could borrow. Even physiology, 
the discipline most akin to psychology, could not in its occupation 
with reactions of bodily tissues, lend a helping hand to psychology 
at the beginning. Psychologists such as Wundt and Titchner, for 
instance, who were among the first to work out a scientific psycho­
logy, contended themselves with bringing their old subject matter, 
that is consciousness, to the scientific field of investigation.
But this state of affairs did not last for long. The new methods 
ultimately forced a change in the subject matter itself. The 
problem of methodology was really baffling at the beginning. The 
reason is not hard to discover. What methods or techniques could 
psychologists adopt and apply to their field in view of the many 
and varied methods and techniques which were at work in ghe natural 
sciences? We saw in the first chapter how different concepts and 
different techniques were preferred by differing psychologists, a 
fact that led to conflict between the different schools of 
psychology at the beginning of the present century.
It may prove helpful at this point to investigate the evolu­
tion of human thought, in gross terms at least, to note the 
implications of the newly developing understandings in scientific 
inquiries for the new science of psychology* The assumption is 
made here that all sciences are made of one piece and that the 
advancement in one scientific area of human inquiry affects all 
others. It is impossible to trace the channels of human thought 
fully in a study of this nature. Fortunately, however, we can 
follow the logic of human thinking in terms of those gross concepts 
which are fairly well accepted by many modern thinkers. These 
concepts are: self-action, inter-action and trans-action.
Self-Action
toe thing at least is certain about human beings as distinct 
from the rest of the animal kingdom. This is their power of 
intellectualization. In facing theirevery day problems, prompted 
by their daily needs and curiosity to reach for the unknown, man 
is known always to have engaged in theorizing about the natural 
phenomena besetting his life. Observations of young children and 
their endless questions, once they have developed the rudiments of 
language, illustrate the point. Children's questions are often 
a cause of bother to their parents, since it is frequently hard to 
keep up with their continuing curiosity. There is, however, one 
feature of these questionings psychologists tell us should bear
notice. Children are not interested in the deep logic their 
parents tend to use in answering their questions or in the completed- 
ness of the information they are tempted to provide. Many questions 
of young children are baffling, indeed, yet the children seek but 
a simple answer, so to speak. They want nothing more than assurance 
that the problem makes sense, and this relative to their level of 
maturity. The concept of a ••simple answer’1 is not a characteristic 
of young children alone, however. Cantril, in his The Psychology 
of Social Movements, views the need for a simple answer as one 
of the important factors in social movements. In a general sense, 
we can say that the same concept applies to human inquiry in 
general. When confronted with a problem, particularly one difficult 
to handle, we tend to reduce it to its simplest terms and to start 
from there. Indeed, it is appropriate and fruitful in scientific 
inquiries to formulate laws with an eye on economy. A sound law 
is one which accounts for the facts in its simplest terms, following 
the principle known as "Occam’s Razor."
Animism
Primitive man, confronted with problems relatively too difficult 
for him to handle, reduced them to their simplest terms. Con­
sequently, primitive man envisioned his world as composed of discrete 
events and happenings, each of which was explainable in isolation 
from everything else. He could not envision the interdependent
1!?3
character of his world. He saw only separate items, unrelated.
His limited experiental background, did not permit him to under­
stand the interrelatedness of the phenomena of nature he inquired 
into. This reminds us again of young children, who see different 
items of their environment as complete in themselves. Some per­
ceptual experiments in which children were asked to describe a given 
picture, show that they merely enumerated the different objects 
comprising the picture with little, if any, concern about the 
relationships occuring between the different objects in the 
picture.
Animism was a logical outcome of this sort of reasoning.
Since every happening or event was conceived as complete unto
itself, something within it— a spirit or soul— had to account for
it. It is small wonder that primitive man worshipped so many
Gods. All natural phenomena which proved stronger than man could
control, and which seemed to exhibit a controlling effect upon
his life and destiny, was viewed as a God. Primitive man thus
worshipped fire, thunder, torrents, winds, rivers, the sun and so
forth. There was a *deus ex machina* for every object and event.
Explanation of natural phenomena was simple, therefore* Man had
only to name a spirit or soul residing in a given event or object
to account for its happening. This is what we call self-action,
2"where things are viewed as acting under their own power."
2
John Dewey and A. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 108.
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Self-actional interpretations of natural phenomena pre­
vailed in human thinking in the past and, moreover, they are still 
held in disguise here and there. Aristotle's philosophy, with its 
discrete forms, was self-actional.
Aristotle's philosophy was a great achievement in 
its time, but it was built around 'substances'. Down 
to Galileo, men of learning, almost universally held, 
following Aristotle, that there exist things that 
completely, inherently and hence necessarily possess 
Being; that these continue eternally in action 
(movement) under their own power, continue, indeed, 
in some particular action essential to them in which 
they are engaged. The fixed stars, under this view, 
with their eternal fixed movements, were instances.••#3
Causation, therefore, was the influence of one discrete entity 
upon another. It was this notion of self-action that led to the 
conception of the element or the atom which was destined to 
dominate human thought for centuries. Everywhere we turn we find, 
at the back of human thought substances, elements, cells, forces, 
spirits and so on to account for different natural phenomena.
Nowhere, perhaps, is the atomistic notion more sharp and 
dramatic than in the following quotation by Democritus written 
twenty-three centuries ago.
By convention sweet is sweet; by convention bitter 
is bitter; by convention hot is hot; by convention cold 
is cold; by convention color is color. But in reality 
there are atoms and the void. That is, the objects of 
the same are supposed to be real and it is customary 
to regard then as such, but they are not. Only the 
atoms and the void are real.^
3 Ibid*. P* HO.
^ Quoted from Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolu­
tion of Physics, p. 56.
The problem of self-actional concepts does not lie so much 
in naming or specifying a certain phenomenon or event, but in 
assuming, after it is so named or specified, that the item signify 
ascertained truth and, hence, that the known stands distinct from 
the nature within which it is named or specified, and thus known, 
and independent from the knower, as truth shining by its own light. 
It is legitimate, of course, to name an atom, a cell, personality 
and so on as designating uniqueness and individuality. But, to 
the extent that such concepts are not meaningful in isolation 
from a given context, to this extend they, as self-actional 
concepts, tend to mislead scientific inquiry.
Inter-actionism
With the development of human society, man’s thought developed 
correspondingly and he came to envision his experiences in a 
wider context, noting that things were explained better when their 
relationships to each other were understood. Man thus entered a 
second and richer stage of his mental development. He still con­
ceived of environmental events and happenings as distinct and 
discrete but he was led, as a result of his wider scope and vision, 
to see relationships between the items constituting his environ­
ment. ’For many generations, beginning with Galileo after his 
break with the Aristotelian tradition and continuing 
until past the days of Comte, the stress in physical inquiry lay 
upon locating units or elements of action and determing their mode
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of interaction*"-’ It may be of some interest at this point to 
say a few words about Galileo's discovery of the law of the 
falling bodies* The older physics, being self-actional, attributed 
to the things in nature such powers as would make the very question,
"How do things move?," an absurd one. "Heavy bodies tend toward
£
their home, the earth," The moral is that heavy bodies fall 
down when let go of, because they tend to fall down. There is 
no problem here; everyday experience bears this out. The problem 
with Galileo was that he envisioned the problem of the falling bodies 
in a wider context,the contextof motion in general. He observed, a 
fact well known before him, namely, that a falling body acquired 
speed or positive acceleration as it approached the earth. He 
started to make further observations and experiments in connection 
with the spped of moving bodies. He studied the acceleration of 
bodies falling from an inclined plane and found that the accelera­
tion decreased consistently with the angle of acceleration, i. e«, 
as the angle of inclination diminished from 90°. This was just 
half the picture and Galileo went beyond, coupling his findings 
with the case of a body thrown upwards in the air. Upward motion 
was thus conceived in a wide framework or a continuum depending 
upon the size of the angle of inclination. His experiments bore 
this out. The case of a falling body was thus shown to be the
 5----------
John Dewey and A. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, Op. cit.,
p. 105.
^ Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking, p. 161*
opposite case of a body thrown upwards. The first was a case of 
positive acceleration, while the latter was a case of negative 
acceleration. Both cases were aspects of a common phenomenon, 
the acceleration of motion, which depended on the angle of 
inclination. The case of motion on a horizontal plane then became 
easily explainable. It became the case of motion when the angle 
of inclination is zero. With the angle of acceleration equaling 
zero, acceleration should be zero and hence a moving body on a 
horizontal plane should continue its motion at constant velocity 
if nothing interered with its motion. This was contrary to the 
pre-existing axiom— namely, that a moving body on a horizontal 
plane would gradually decrease in velocity until it came to a 
standstill. Galileo's law was called the law of inertia. It 
reads: a mass once in motion continues in motion in a straight
line, if not int erf erred with by other moving masses This con­
clusion represented a drastic change in human thought and its 
importance was far-reaching.
Most important perhaps was the stiift it marked from self- 
explanatory methods, based on self-actional concepts, to 
experimentation and observation in a wide context. In other words, 
within self-actional reasoning one isolated case or event sufficed 
to explain the force, spirit or power responsible for a given
activity, with the same force taken for granted as the responsible
7
The old axiom was: "the moving body sooner or later comes
to a standstill if the force which is pushing it no longer acts." 
See Max Wertheimer, Ibid., p. 161.
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agent in different situations. In the new approach a single isolated 
instance no longer sufficed. It was recognized that interpretation 
of natural phenomena was contingent upon the situation inquired 
into. Galileo’s law contradicted, of course, common sense notions 
and everyday observations, since then, as now, it was a self- 
evident fact to the naive person that heavy bodies fall to the 
ground when not supported and moving bodies sooner or later cease 
to move when an outside force has ceased to act. These everyday 
experiential understandings represent isolated cases and, although 
they may suffice in their narrow and limited scope, they fail to offer 
any help when applied in a different situation or in a wider con­
text. This raises the problem of knowledge said epistemology, but 
we will defer this until we have considered the transactional 
approach.
We need only to say here that this law of Galileo was destined
to start a new era in the physical sciences. It is on the basis of
this law that Newton was able to formulate his famous laws of
mechanics. We may note in passing that, "♦... the new view was
transactional with respect to the situation of its appearance:
what, namely, had been an incident or result of something else was
8now taken up into direct report as event." In other words, 
motion as caused by an outside actor was now dealt with as an
event, a happening which did not demand an outside being to cause
 8---------
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p. 111.
it. This thus became an occasion for further inquiry. In its wider 
application, however, as an approach— only the concept of force 
acting between discrete entities was comprehended and applied to 
other natural phenomena.
Galileo*s law set the stage for Newton to perfect the inter­
actional approach. This approach not only influenced inquiry in 
physics but transcended physics to almost every area of human 
inquiry. It may be well at this point to review Newton’s laws of 
mechanics to examine its wider implications for human thought in 
general.
The first law was taken directly from Galileo’s formulation
of the law of inertia. It stated, ”A particle left to itself
9
will maintain its velocity unchanged.” The second law dealt 
with acceleration and the direction of motion. It read: ’’The 
acceleration is directly proportional to the resultant force 
acting on the particle, is inversely proportional to the mass of the 
particle and has the same direction as the resultant f o r c e . T h e  
third law dealt with the interaction between different moving 
particles. It noted that ”to every action there is an equal and 
opposite reaction.”'1^'
George Shortley and Dudley Williams, Elements of Physics,
19$h, P. 85.
The philosophical implications of this position are clear*
Its effect on human thought and inquiry was dramatic. Thinkers
in whatever field set themselves to discover the atoms or elements
which constituted any phenomenon in nature as a prerequisite for
the discovery of its reactions and interaction. "Throughout two
hundred years of scientific research force and matter were the
12underlying concepts in all endeavors to understand nature."
The mechanistic concept in its simple form was a matter of force 
between two distinct particles. Since the particles were con­
ceived as unchangeable, the force between them depended merely on 
the distance between them. Such force could either be atractlon 
or repulsion and nothing more. The success of this simple formula­
tion in the realm of mechanics in all its branches led to the 
belief that all natural phenomena could be described and under­
stood in terms of simple forces between unalterable objects. 
Kelmholz’s position in this regards is illustrative and for our 
purpose is especially significant. It is illustrative because he 
lived when mechanistic physics was in vogue. It is significant 
because of his undebated influence on the science of psychology. 
Helmholtz said, "Finally, therefore, we discover the problem of 
physical material science to be to refer natural phenomena back 
to unchangeable attractive and repulsive forces whose intensity 
depends wholely upon distance. The solubility of this problem is 
15
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13the condition of the complete comprehensibility of nature.”
Every physical phenomenon was thus reduced to particular 
substances and forces determinable by the distance between the 
particles. The kinetic theory of gases, which originated in the 
phenomenon of Brownian movement, was directly derived from such a 
formulation and fitted it nicely. The whole problem was inter­
preted in terms of the bombardment of particles with each other 
and with the walls of the container. The phenomena of static 
electricity was also reduced to a mechanical interpretation.
ELectric fluids of two kinds, one positive and the other negative, 
were assumed to exist in any condenser that exhibited the static 
electricity phenomena. This mechanistic approach was adhered to 
even in the face of many apparent difficulties. Heat particles, 
as well as light particles, were found to possess no weight and 
thus they were considered weightless substances. ELectric fluid 
was also added to the list of weightless substances.
Volta*s invention of the electric battery added to the 
problems that had to be overcome by the mechanistic theory. The 
difficulty arose from the fact that the potential difference 
between the Copper and zinc plates (when immersed in sulphuric 
acid) did not vanish as the plates were connected, a fact to be 
expected according to the mechanistic theory. wIn an attempt to 
save the fluid theory,” according to Einstein and Infeld," we 
33
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may assume that some constant force acts to generate the potential
1U
difference and causes the flow of electric fluid*" This is an 
advancement over the earlier formulation, since now the medium, 
that is sulphuric acid, had to be taken into consideration*
There is, however, more to the problem. Heat energy was seen to 
be created in the wire connecting the two plates. Again the 
solution was sought in the liquid medium; chemical energy was 
considered to be the source of the heat energy detected in the 
wire. The final blow to the mechanistic theory, however, came 
from Oersted’s (and later from Rowland’s experiments in which it 
was shown that the current passing in a wire connecting two plates 
with different electric potentials deflects a magnetic needle 
placed underneath the wire in a perpendicular position to the 
plane of the circuit. The mechanistic approach definitely failed 
to account for the relation between magnetism and the electric 
current. Besides, according to the mechanistic view, it could not 
explain the relation of the magnetic needle in a perpendicular posi­
tion to the particles of flowing electric fluid in the wire and 
the magnetic dipoles. According to the mechanistic concept the 
forces responsible for such deflection act along the line joining 
the two attracting or repelling bodies. Furthemore, the intensity 
of the force, Rowland’s experiment proved, depended on the velocity 
of the charge. Certainly there must be something more than
“  TH
Ibid., p. 89.
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particles and forces "which depend merely on the distance. The 
problem with the mechanistic approach, as will be recalled, was 
that it reduced all physical phenomena to unchangeable particles 
and forces which depended merely on the distance between the 
particles*
The mechanistic principle faced similar difficulties in 
dealing with optic phenomena. Newton, it will be recalled, 
faithful to his mechanistic principle, adhered to it with respect 
to light phenomena. He thus rejected Huygens' wave theory of 
light in favor of the corpuscular theory. Norton's description 
of the light spectrum is well known* In fact, the corpuscular 
theory of light worked fine in its time, although as Einstein and 
Infeld say, *the necessity for introducing as many substances as 
colors may make us uneasy."^ But, following the mechanistic 
theory, men were accustomed to adding one or more substances to 
the existing list of substances whenever confronted with a problem 
which could not be accounted for by the substances already named* 
The final blow to the corpuscular theory of light, however, came 
as a result of its failure to account for the phenomena of 
defraction and polarization of light rays.
It is important, of course, not to exaggerate the progress 
attained in physics when the corpuscular theory was replaced hy 
the wave theory. The accompanying mental attitude did not change
Ibid., p* 102*.
greatly from that appropriate to the earlier corpuscular or atomic 
concepts. A substance as a medium for the waves to pass through 
still had to be postulated. This substance was referred as "the 
ether." Physics, thus,.continued to depend on mechanical concepts. 
The sole difference was that the different particles assumed to 
represent different light colors were replaced by one substance, 
the ether and different wave lengths. "The result was merely the 
concentration of all the difficulties in a few essential points, 
such as ether in the case of optical phenomena."*^ But the 
construction of the ether as a substance confronted men with a 
new insoluble problem. In order to account for the fact that the 
speed of light differs according to the medium it passes through, 
men had to assume that ether particles and matter particles inter­
acted in some way. But they found at the same time that inter­
stellar space did not resist the motion of material bodies. How 
was it, then, that ether, which according to the wave theory of 
light should occupy all space, interacted with particles in 
optic phenomena and not in mechanical phenomena? This para­
doxical situation really shook the validity of the mechanistic 
view. At bottom there was the artificiality of the mechanistic 
assumptions and, hence, the "necessity for introducing so many 
of them, all quite independent of each other, was enough to shatter
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the belief in the mechanical point of view,”-^
We may recapitulate here by saying that the fall of the 
mechanical view came as a result of the many problems it could 
not solve* It was discovered in electrical phenomena that when 
an electric current acted upon a magnetic needle, two unrelated 
phenomena from a mechanical point of view, the force depended 
not merely on distance but also upon the velocity of the charge 
and that the effect was neither repelling nor attracting but per­
pendicular to the line connecting the needle and the charge*
In the field of optics the assumption of ether as a substance 
remained without validity so long as the mechanical properties 
of that substance could not be determined. nBut the difficulties 
in solving this problem are so great that we have to give it up
T o
and thus give up the mechanical view as well*”
The Trans-Actional Approach
We have, so far, reviewed the conditions that led to the 
gradual collapse of the mechanistic view, not that it was in­
effective in its domain nor that it fails today to account for 
certain phenomena with marked efficiency and accuracy. Its main 
difficulty lay in Its growing complexity as it came to grips with
17
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problems of wider scope than the relatively simple ones on which 
it was built. Furthermore, it faced some problems of its own 
making. The many independent entities or substances it had to 
postulate as it went along proved to be irreconcilable. The 
mechanistic theory finally fell in its own trap, so to speak.
A more effective theory had to replace it, one more effective in 
the sense of being more encompassing of natural phenomena and 
built on simpler basic assumptions.
The new theory had its start in the electric phenomena 
referred to in the foregoing exposition, especially in the relation­
ship between electric aid magnetic phenomena revealed by Oersted's 
and Rowland's experiments. Faraday later discovered the induced 
currents which firmly established the relationship between the 
magnetic and the electric phenomena. Without going into detail 
here, it suffices to say that Faraday's discovery simply led 
him to the conclusion that the electric current was not contained 
in the condenser box nor confined to the connecting wire. Maxwell 
treated Faraday's findings mathematically and arrived at his 
mathematical equations by which those findings could be expressed. 
The field concept was thus born.
This new concept led to the understanding that it is not 
the changes nor the particles but the field in the space between 
the charges and the particles which is essential for the description 
of physical phenomena. Maxwell's law was instrumental in enabling 
men to envisage electrical and the magnetic phenomena (their
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relationships were a sort of nuisance from the mechanistic point 
of view) in a new light. A new concept was formulated— namely, 
the electromagnetic field, which accounted for the two aspects, 
the electric and the magnetic, and for optical phenomena. The 
significance and the far-reaching implications of Maxwell's work 
for human thought may be seen in his own writing.
Physical science, which up to the end of the 
eighteenth century had been fully occupied in forming 
a conception of natural phenomena as the result of 
forces acting between one body and another, has now 
fairly entered in the next stage of progress— that in 
which energy of a material system is conceived as 
determined by the configuration and motion of that 
system, and in which the ideas of configuration, motion 
and force are generalized to the extent warranted by 
their physical definitions.^
Dewey and Bentley observe that Maxwell not only saw the 
significance of the new mode of thinking, i. e., the trans­
actional, for the advancement of physical sciences more than one 
hundred years ago but that he even used the very word 'transaction.' 
Maxwell said:
If we confine our attention to one of the portions 
of matter, we see, as it were, only one side of the 
transaction— namely, that which affects the portion 
of matter under our consideration— and we call this 
aspect of the phenomenon, with reference to its effect, 
an External Farce acting on-that portion of matter, and 
with reference to its cause we call it the Action of the 
other portion of matter. The opposite aspect of the 
stress is called the Reaction on the other portion of
matter.21
Loc. cit.
21 Ibid»« P° lo6°
mDewey and Bentley further observe that Maxwell used the term 
aspect in the same sense they use it in connection with the trans­
actional approach they describe.
At Einstein's hands, the field concept was so formulated as
to encompass wider and wider physical phenomena in terms of the
theory of relativity. We need not here say more about the
relativity theory than that it brought the time-space continuum
under investigation. We have so far witnessed the beginning
effectiveness of this theory and we still have a long way to go.
Einstein still believes that the relativity theory has not, as
yet, broadened the field concept far enough to encompass all
physical phenomena. "The theory of relativity stresses the
importance of the field concept in physics. But we have not yet
succeeded inf ormulating a pure field theory. For the present we
22must still assume the existence of both field and matter."
At this point it is proper to ask what is the significance 
of the theory of relativity for human thought aid action? In 
general, we may say that the theory of relativity has effectively 
destroyed the absolutistic feature of Newtonian mechanics, Dewey 
and Bentley put it this way: .."Newton's mechanics rose to credal 
strength in the shelter of its glorified absolutes. Then at the 
hands of Faraday, Clark Maxwell and Einstein it lost its absolutes, 
lost its credal claims and emerged chastened and improved. It 
thus gained the high rating of a magnifleant approximation as
op
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23compared with its earlier self-rating of eternal certainty."
As physical phenomena were dealt xtfith in a wider framework the
atomistic and absolutistic conceptions declined. "The concepts
of substances, so essential to the mechanical point of view were
more and mere suppressed."^ As an instance, say Einstein and
Infeld, "The progress of science has destroyed the older concept
of heat as a substance. We try to create a new substance,
25energy, with heat as one of its form." In other words, physical 
phenomena are treated transactionally, with mass aid energy 
representing different aspects of the same phenomenon. Thus,
"Mass is energy and energy has mass. The two conservation laws 
of mass and energy are combined by the relativity theory into
p
one, the conservation law of mass-energy."
Further citations from the theory of relativity would point 
up the effect c£ the new transactional theory on progress in the 
physical sciences. The more important issue here, however, is 
the position of the scientist with respect to physical reality 
or, in other words, to the knower with respect to his position 
and to the known. Before turning to this problem, however, we 
23
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shall note briefly how other branches of the physical and natural 
sciences have followed, in their progress, more or less the same 
pattern physics has followed, i. e., from the self-actional to 
the interactional and finally to the transactional approach. We 
shall start with chemistry.
The self-actional concept can be traced back to ancient 
Greek thought, when the universe was conceived as composed of 
entities such as water, fire, air and earth. All other forms of 
matter were looked upon as a matter of the transformation of these 
basic elements. Just how those assumed transformations took place 
was not clear. The second step is usually associated with Dalton's 
atomic theory. This theory is too well known to be reported here. 
What is of interest is that Dalton's theory, following strictly 
a mechanistic or inter-actional approach, dealt with atoms as 
mechanical entities which were considered unchangeable. Chemical 
reactions were interpreted in terms of an affinity between un­
changeable ,atoms. The third or transactional stage came gradually 
as a result of Volta's discovery (referred to previously) that 
chemical reactions may produce electric currents. In 1923 G. N. 
Lewis and J. N« Bronsted independently set forth the electronic 
theory of chemical reactions, referred to as the proton theory.
The interaction between chemical compound ions cr groups has been 
found to be influenced by various factors, such as the concentra­
tion of the solution, the type of solvent, the structural formula 
of the compound and so on. The term reaction or interaction, in
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chemistry today refers, in fact, to a transaction whereby the 
constituents in any given system of reactions are electrically 
interdependentLe Chatelier's law of mass action illustrates 
the point. The stress on configuration was further enhanced by 
the advent of the quantum theory and the reinterpretation of 
Mondelif's periodic system in the light of the electronic theory. 
Accordingly, chemical reactions are treated in terms of uncompleted
pQ
orbitals in different chemical systems.
In biology the movement from the self-actional approach, as
represented by the "vital principle," to the interactional and,
then, to the transactional approaches has been relatively slow.
This, in general, has been the observed trend as ws approach areas
which directly bear upon human life and human concerns. Our store
of archaic self-actional concepts find asylum and free play in
these areas-. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the
'vital principle' in biology survived until very recently. As
far as the interactional approach is concerned, this gradually
gained status as a result of Schleiden and Schwann systematizing
the scattered discoveries about the cell. The cell was then
considered to be the basic unit of life. The interaction of cells
in tissues and organs was and still is, to a great degree, the
major occupation of the biologist. The study of unicellular 
—
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animals and plants was considered as basic to the understanding of 
the basic unit of life in higher crganism--the cell. The tide 
has changed, however, albeit very slightly. There are no more 
unicellur animals as such but acellular and multicelluler animals. 
Organismic concepts are gradually being worked out. The study 
of cells or of tissue interactions are legitimate, of course, but 
the trans-actional approach demands the investigation together of 
what belongs together. What is legitimate for study in isola­
tion may be so studied, as long as such investigation returns to 
the broader field of relationships. Thus in the study of the cell 
the tissue interactions may be legitimate objects of scrutiny 
if what is discovered is related back to and broadens our under­
standing concerning the organism as a whole. The direct study of 
the organism as a whole may not prove possible. This is not a 
defect in the transactional approach; it is related, rather, to
the sterility of the concept of the whole, especially when it is
29thought to embrace some self-actional elements in disguise.
In other words, the cell may be investigated as a cell but in an
environment of tissue; tissue interactions may be investigated
but as related to the vital organism; and the organism as a whole
may be investigated as a unit but in an environment.
The formulation of Mendel's laws of heredity, followed by the
identification of the gene, marked a new era in the investigation 
—
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of the phenomena of heredity. The gene was hailed as the carrier 
of the secrets of life. True to the self-acticnal concepts, 
geneticists regarded the gene as the unchangeable entity which 
goes on unchangeable from generation to generation. The facts 
of life, however, did not bear out this simple formulation. It 
is well known that the characteristics of living organisms change 
from one generation to the other. But the s elf-actional concept 
of the gene almost blinded the early geneticists to this fact.
The second or inter-actional stage in genetics may be 
illustrated by the emphasis geneticists put upon the connection 
of many factors or genes combining in various ways in the chrono- 
somes to determine biological traits. The third stage, that is, 
the transactional stage, is still in its infancy . Geneticists 
are now developing the integrated field stage, in which scientists 
do not pay so much attention to the genes as predetermined traits. 
Julian Huxley shows how the genes are no longer considered un­
changeable entities which independently determine the biological 
characteristics of the organism. Genetics has already started 
to emphasize the importance of the medium and the configuration 
of all the genes. Says Huxley, l!The environment of the gene 
must include many, perhaps all other genes, in all the chromosomes. 
In fact, the discreteness of the genes as such is doubtful.
Huxley believes that "The discreteness of the genes may prove to
30
Julian Huxley, Evolution, The Modem. Synthesis, New York, 
19U2, p. 65.
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be notMng more than the presence of predetermined zones of 
breakage at srna.il and more or less regular distances along the 
chromosomes. "31 More important perhaps is the fact that the 
advancement of physiology has rendered the gene concept almost 
fruitless.
A brief notation about the evolution of psychology -will 
suffice at this point. We shall return to psychology later.
The first stage is an old one, indeed, in which an imponderable, 
non-spatial entity was assumed to encompass psychic phenomena.
This entity was called variously the mind, the self or the 
soul.^
The first stage merged into the second in early philosophical 
systems, and in prescj.enti.fic psychology in one farm or another, 
depending on the kind of entity assumed to cany the load, or to 
be the center, of psychic phenomena. The tendency for mentalistic 
entities to crop out is greater in psychological doctrines, than 
in other natural sciences; and, in fact, long after such mental 
entities had become submerged in the sedimentary layers of natural 
science they held their place in psychology. The story of mental 
and bodily interaction is long and a painful one. The wavering 
of psychological thought between sensations and mental states 
as products of interaction between external and internal factors
31 "
Ibid., p. U8.
32 See Chapter I for a discussion of this phase of psycho­
logies!. development.
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is a long story too well known to be discussed again here. But
interaction took still mere different forms. It took the shape
of statistical formulae indicating the relation between the mental—
for example, sensation-—and the magnitude of the stimulus cr
physiological excitata.cn. Still another fom of interaction may
be illustrated by behavioristic doctrines, especially in their
early formulations, where units such as the reflexes were assumed
to interact with outside stimuli and thus fom the basis of all
modes of behavior.
The third stage that is the transactional stage is hardly
in evidence. Many psychologists, such as E. Brunswik and G. L.
Hull, are showing more and more concern about treating behavior
in terms of organism-environment in inseparable unity. This new
understanding, let us remember, was stressed by Dewey in an
33article 'The Reflex Arc Concept,' almost sixty years ago.
Another transactional approach, so named, which may prove 
promising, started as a result of the perceptual experimental 
work at the Hanover Institute under the direction of Ames. The 
recognition of the significance and importance of this new 
approach is evidenced by the duplication of this work in other 
universities and research centers, of which The Ohio State 
University Demonstration Laboratory is one example. We shall 
focus our attention on this new approach in the next chapter.
"33
See John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concent In Psychology,"
Vol. 3, 18^ 6, pp. 357-370.
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At this point we shall look critically at a problem we have 
so far left in setspense— namely, the place of the knower with 
respect to reality or the known. This we can best do as we 
compare the two more recent approaches of inquiry just discussed, 
the inter-actional and the trans-actional. So far as the self­
actional approach is concerned, it is an approach no scientist 
would now make. When we turn to the in_teracticnal approach, 
however, we meet with a different picture. Interactionism seems 
still to be in full sway, especially with respect to the social 
sciences. In order, therefore, to throw some light on the problem 
of selecting one of the two approaches over the other we shall 
have to contrast them. In doing so we shall draw upon the 
preceding exposition of the progress in physical and natural 
sciences.
Interaction versus Transaction
Inter-actionism, as we have seen, implies the discoveiy of 
events of action, the units of which are assumed to be unchangeable, 
to be fully defined before the start of inquiry. We have seen 
that inter-actionism in all areas of inquiry has focused upon 
the determination of the units of action, whether in terms of 
material particles, magnetic or electric fluids, genes, cells 
and the like. Inquiry starts with these entities being adequately 
named, described and known and has as its purpose to determine
177
their modes of interaction. In contrast, transactional inquiry 
is such that description of events is taken as tentative and 
preliminary. In other words, new descriptions of the aspects 
and phases of events may be freely made at all stages of the 
inquiry. In transactionism, in short, inquiry is not directed 
towards the discovery of eternal qualities which are existentially 
real. Qualities of objects are functionally determined; they are 
never viewed as final. In the transactional approach, "It is 
not postulated that certain qualities always cohere in function.
They cohere as dependable evidential signs.1 ^
It follows from the above that interactionism is absolutistic, 
in the sense that inquiry does not touch upon the presumptive 
objects themselves but only upon their actions and reactions.
The unchangeable atom in Dalton's atomic theory is a case in point. 
Transaction, however, concerns itself with the redetermining and 
renaming of the cbjects comprised in a given system. We have seen 
in the foregoing exposition how the interactionist approach was 
stultified by its dependence upon presumptive particulars— such 
as, heat, the calorie (or particulate), light as corpuscular, the 
gene as an entity and so on. In relativity theory the concept of 
substance is being more and more suppressed and the particle has 
gone the way of space and time. It is the field, in which relation­
ships are determinative, that has become the locus of inquiry.
John Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry, p. 121;,
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A distinction between interactionism and transactionism can 
be made accordingly by a contrast of the field concept with the 
mechanistic concept. Thus, while interactionism treats the 
interacting constituents as separate from and independent of 
one another, in transactionism no one constituent can be adequately 
specified or defined as fact independent of or apart from the 
specification or definition of the other constituents comprising 
a unity or a system. "The path of a light ray, without including 
the environment of the light ray in the description, is an in-
•3d
complete impression and has no operational meaning.And to 
this Phillip Frank adds, "Speaking exactly, a particle by itself 
without the description of the whole experimental set-up is not 
a physical, reality.
The interaction approach, by focusing upon discrete entities, 
may be said to develop "the particularizing phase of modem 
knowledge." In contrast,^ "transaction develops the widening 
phases of knowledge, the broadening of system within the limits 
of observation and report." We need only refer here to the 
advantages of the transactional approach of Einstein's relativity
theoiy over Newton's mechanistic theory. It not only helped
3^
Phillip Frank, "Foundations of Physics," International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1, 19^ 6, No. 7, p. 39»
36
Ibid., p. U8.
^  John Dewey and A. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, Op. cit., 
p. 122.
Loc. cit.
solve the problems Newton’s mechanistic theory had created and 
failed to solve but led, also, to great advances in atomic 
physics as a result of its broadening outlook.
Interactionism views things as primarily static. In other 
words, time is no factor in investigation. Transactionism, in 
contrast, considers things in action, with action as observable 
as the objects. In other words, extension in time is as indis­
pensable as extension in space. This distinction is of paramount 
importance. Under the interactional approach inquiry is assumed 
to determin e the properties of an object as a thing apart from 
its activity; under the transactional approach, on the other 
hand, ’things and actions are taken as marking provisional stages 
of subject matter to be established through further inquiry.11^
Up to this point we find the transactional approach quite 
in harmony with the most advanced physical understandings in 
physical and natural sciences. In order that we may complete 
the picture and draw the oontrast between the two approaches to 
its logical conclusion, however, we shall have to consider the 
place of the knower with respect to reality or the knox-jn. This 
point is of special significance for psychological and philosophical 
understandings, though it is hardly clear to those who specialize 
in physical sciences. It is a source of serious confusion, 
therefore, This confusion leaves its impact upon the science of "-
1 8 0
psychology, since it is this area of inquiry which focuses 
directly upon the organism in relation to its environment.
The Knower and Reality— or The Known
Here we find ourselves facing an epistomological dilemma, 
since many thinkers tend to introduce a self-actional concept 
when viewing the relation between the organism and its environ­
ment. This, despite the fact that their approach to the physical 
environment may be quite transactional. In order to make this 
point clear we shall oonsider two critical propositions and 
examine the logical outcome of each.
First, there is the position that confines the human 
organism as knower in an position isolated from the rest of the 
world; or, more specifically, views it as a mental knower. 
Existence, as such, is then conceived as radically different in 
kind from the knower and is set over against the known. This does 
not necessarily imply an explicit recognition of a mental power 
as knower but, in fact, includes the most mechanistic as well 
as the most vitalistic points of view. Such a position is forced 
to postulate some natural laws— whether in physical phenomena, 
psychological phenomena, logic, etc.— to which knowing must con­
form. In other words, knowing must somehow conform to external 
reality through the discovery of natural laws.
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The second proposition, which is consistently transactional, 
conceives of man as an organism, behaving in a world of his 
origin, with his knowings included. In other words, this second 
position envisions man with his knowings and knowns within the 
framework of the theory of evolution. No separation between the 
knower and the known is hypostatized or considered necessary. 
Whenever reference is made to the 1 outside" world, it is only made 
arbitrarily and refers to an aspect of a given, transactional 
action which may be the locus of inquiry at any given time. A 
false conclusion is usually made by critics of this premise—  
namely, that such a position denies reality and consequently 
denies existence. The critics could hardly be more wrong.
Reality qua meaning is nonsensical, but reality qua existence is 
fact, and by fact, is meant the locus of inquiry, or the matrix 
of knowing with man a part of it. In other words, inquiry 
proceeds within an existential matrix; and the matrix is the 
locus of knowledge; knowledge as an evolving process.^0
Before examining the implications of such contradictory 
positions in their relation to psychological theory, it will be 
helpful to turn once more to physics. We have seen how Einstein 
tried and was able effectively to construct the theory of relativity 
according to a transactional approach. We need not go into any 
further detail about that here. Our concern at this point is 
with his position towards the knower and the known. One would
^  John Dewey1 s Essays in Experimental Logic and Logic: The 
Theory of Inquiry take 'their points of departure " from this stand - 
point.' Also his article, "The Reflex Arc Concept" written about 
60 years ago follows the same view.
182
assume that Einstein, who so effectively contributed to the 
decline of the mechanistic view, would continue with the same 
rigor concerning the nature of inquiry. And, indeed, he at 
least implies the free play of intelligence so far as physical 
phenomena are concerned, as he asserts that, "there are no 
eternal theories in science. It always happens that some of 
the facts predicted by a theory are disproved by experiment.
Every theory lias its period of gradual development and triumph; 
after which it may experience a rapid decline."^ *
Einstein was neither a philosopher nor a psychologist and 
epistomological and behaviorial phenomena, as such, were out of 
his field. When we come to his position on the nature of reality 
we sense at least some contradiction. Thus he seems, as pointed 
out by Dewey and Bentley, to set the mind (as knower) over and out­
side the known, in saying "Physical concepts are free creations 
of the human mind and are not, however it may seem, uniquely 
determined by the external world. In our endeavor to understand 
reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the 
mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving 
hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the 
case.1’^  This suggests that Einstein assumed an outside reality 
which in some aspects Is unknowable as far as experience is 
JJT
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concerned. The mind, as knower, is presumably supposed to create 
reality as he looks at it from the outside, though it may never 
reach it. The illustration, of . the watch is significant. Einstein 
failed to see, hoxjever, that inquiry, with man in the matrix of 
existence as locus, not only solves problems but also creates 
them. The problems which are outside of experience (whatever 
this may mean) never occur. In other words, Einstein failed 
to see man as Dewey did, as in and of the world he is inquiring 
into. He seems, in other words, to conceive of man— as knower—  
to be existentially different from physical reality which he 
inquires into. "That reality possesses practical character which 
is most efficaciously expressed in the function of intelligoice, 
that a reality-to-be-known is a reality-of-use-and-in-use and 
that 'a reality which is not in any sort of use or bearing upon 
use may go hang so far as knowledge is concerned. A n d  as such, 
the problems the scientist deals with may be as real and perhaps 
in a sense more real than his most important findings.
Einstein's position may be made still more clear by an 
examination of his concept of numbers. "The concepts of the pure 
numbers 2,3, 1+, etc., freed from the objects from which they arose 
are creations of the thinking mind which describe the reality of 
our world,"UU according to Einstein. Einstein here, again as a
result of his conception of man as knower as being outside of
^  A. Bentley, "Comments and Criticisms, As Through A Glass 
Darkly," J. Philosophy, p. U38 (italics in original).
reality, is forced to conceive of mathematics as a pure fom which 
describes the reality of the world. Many modern thinkers tend to 
hold to this belief, a belief which may be traced back to Kant 
in his assertion that the truth of mathematics is independent of 
experience. A close examination of the concept of pure number, 
following the transactional approach, xc.ll reveal that mathematics 
is a matter of symbolic organization with respect to ‘naming.1 
It does not differ essentially from other forms of linguistic 
behavior of man. When we say two plus two equals four always 
and everywhere, independent of experience, and hence claim that 
this is an absolute truth, we forget that in the equation 2 plus 
2 equals U, we have merely put in both sides of the equation 
what would make them equal. There may be sn element of truth in 
Hume'-s contention that mathematical truth is tautological. We 
need not go so far, however, as to consider it the only absolute 
trutht or an absolute truth at all. We merely knowingly organize 
our symbols in such a way as to express our experiences. In other 
words, we formulate the proposition that 2 plus 2 equals U and 
develop a system following that. This may mean, as some critics 
point out circularity in reasoning; this the transactional view 
admists, noting that reasoning is essentially circular, be it in 
the mathematical realm, the scientific realm or in whatever 
realm in which man engages in inquiry. There is no escape from 
this. So long as man keeps his assumption or postulates close to 
his investigations and findings, and allow both sides to play
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back and forth reversely modifying each other and being pitually 
coherent, he is on safe grounds. No theory, whether mathematical 
or otherwise is true unto itself without experimental verifica­
tion. In fact, no theoiy, as Einstein has pointed out, is ever 
absolutely true.
An argument between A. Einstein and his associates, B.
Podolosky and N. Rosen, on the one hand, and Neils Bohr, on the
other, is enlightening. Einstein and his associates maintained
that "if no one can predict with certainty the value of a physical
quantity" then "there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity." They added that in a
complete theory and not merely a correct one .... "every element
in the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical
theory." Neils Bohr said, in answer, that the above-mentioned
position concerning physical reality contained an "essential
ambiguity" when applied to quantum phenomena. He further asserted
that while realitivity had brought a modification of all ideas
regarding the absolute character of physical phenomena, "a
modification of all ideas regarding the absolute character of
physical phenomena,".... "radical revision of our attitude as
regards physical reality,"^ is required in view of the still
newer features of physics. On commenting on this debate Dewey and 
-
All citations here are quoted by Dewey and Bentley, Ojo. cit., 
pp. Iliu-ll5, from "Gan Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical 
Reality be Considered Complete," A. Einstein, B, Podolosky and 
N. Rosen, Physical Review, XLVII (1935), Neils Bohr, Ibid.,
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Bentley said, lfWhat is involved here is an underlying, though 
not explicitly developed, conflict as to the manner in which 
mathematics (as symbolic) applies to physics as (fact-seeking). 
This in turn involves the organization of symbol with respect to 
name among the linguistic behavior of men.
Interactionism, as shown in the foregoing proposition, 
views the organism as separate from the environment. It views 
organism and environment as if they were different forms of 
existences and, therefore, as far as inquiry is concerned, the 
organism has, somehow, to discover reality in a soate of inde­
pendence from its own existence. In other words, interactionism 
assumes an outside reality which interacts with the organism 
(whether in term of mental or physical entities) to produce 
knowledge.
Transaction, in contrast, views the organism as in and of 
the world. Reference to inner or outer with respect to the 
organism merely signifies the locus of investigation and not a 
separation between the organism and its environment. Transaction 
thus views inquiry as an evolutionary process. It does not hold 
dogmatically to any views as ascertained truths before entering 
into inquiry.
In summary we may say that the transactional approach does 
not accept any of the familiar dualisms: subject versus object,
soul versus body, mind versus matter or self versus non-self.
__
John Dewey and A. Bentley, Ibid., p. 115.
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Knowing, in like manner, is not set off distinctly from the known, 
nor is the knower separated from the known. No absolutes or 
entities are assumed to exist outside the experience of the knower 
to serve as the objects of inquiry and no vitalistic or mentalistic 
entities are assumed as knowers. "Since we are concerned with what 
is inquired into and is in process of knowing as cosmic event, we 
have no interest in any form of hypostatized -underpinning. Any 
statement that is or can be made about a knower, self, mind or 
subject— or about a known thing, an object, or a cosmos— must 
so far as we are concerned, be made on the basis, and in terms 
of aspects of event which inquiry, as itself a cosmic event,
) 7
finds taking place."4
At this point we find ourselves in a position to be able 
to examine psychological theory in terms of the transactional 
approach to find out what the implications of stich an approach 
are for the study of behavior. This will be the object of the 
next chapter.
Ibid., p. 86.
CHAPTER VI
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY CONSIDERED FROM A TRANSACTIONAL STANDPOINT
This exposition of psychological theories has confined it­
self to certain aspects of psychological theory today and some 
of the persistent problems with which they deal.'*' As a result, 
it has been confined, by and large, to relatively insignificant 
issues, if we adopt a wider frame of reference than do most 
present-day psychologists. Psychology has lived for seme time, 
indeed, for quite a long time, with the rat in his maze. It has
done son, the psychologists seem to indicate, in the hope of
arriving at fundamental principles that might clear up some of 
the insistent and crucial problems of our times. But the rat 
in its maze, and the principles and laws derived from such 
situations, do not offer much, if any, help when we confront 
certain crucial problems of our times •which are significantly 
psychological. 3h a comparable criticism of the state of 
psychological theory Allport has said, "Public officials,
confronted by post-war dilemmas, are urgently seeking the aid of
psychologists. Many of us who have been approached are embarrassed
by the scarcity of scientific findings, and even of serviceable 
. ___
See Chapters 2, 3 and lj especially.
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concepts and well-formulated problems, that psychology has to
2
offer of the type being sought.
Psychologists are, indeed, way behind the expectations of a 
world ridden with fear, anxiety and turmoil. One concept from 
behavior theories may be illustrative. Behavior is viewed, in 
one group of behavior theories, as essentially dominated and 
guided by rewards and punishments. When we inquire into the 
meanings of these concepts we hardly find reasonable agreement.
We have to draw our own conclusions. Reward is essentially a 
pellet of food at the end of a maze, and punishment has become 
almost a synonym of an electric shock. It is from such limited 
envisionment that the sweeping generalizations have been made 
frequently to provide a basis for the interpretation of human 
behavior.
We have chosen to dramatize this picture in order to make a
point. It would be unfair, indeed, to assume that psychologists
are not apprehensive about the readiness of psychology to play a
serious role in human affairs. Nor dare we overlook the vital
services some branches of psychology, such as counseling psychotherapy
and the like are offering. The questioning is more specific,
related to the legitimacy of the limitations many psychologists 
p
G. Allport, "The Emphasis on Molor Problems," Psychological 
Theory, p. 158.
seem to have deliberately put upon the scope of their inquiry.
The problem does not change even when psychologists turn their
attention to problems of social import. They simply bring to
such important problems the tools with which they are familiar,
tools developed in their preoccupation with animal behavior.
'•Accustomed to work with animals or with infants, need cathexis
psychology labels adult human intensions Secondary drives,*
3
*derived drives’ or ’drive conversions.*" And this despite 
the fact that essential differences between lower animals and 
man have been shown and emphasized, especially with respect to 
one feature, symbolic behavior. Thorndike early in his career 
made a distinction along this line between lower animals and 
man. According to him, animals react to things or signs while 
man thinks about them. In other words, animals may be said to 
'think things,’ whereas man 'thinks about them.' In making 
this distinction between these two modes of behavior he contended 
that man was capable of both but that lower animals were capable 
only of reaction to concrete objects. "The one sort of attention 
leads you to think about a thing, the other to act with reference
k
to it." This distinction, however, did not turn out to make
much difference with respect to Thorndike's system, especially _
Ibid., p. 160.
E. L. Thorndike, Animal Intelligence. The Macmillan Co., 
1911, p. 102.
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in its later development.. Thinking was viewed, essentially, to
be of the same nature as other modes of behavior. All were reduced
to physiological processes. Hence, the laws that applied to
animal learning and behavior in general were essentially the
same laws that applied to man*s. 3h this connection Thorndike,
in a later work, said:
.... the right weighting of elements, held in right 
relations, and connected with right associates, 
explains correct thinking. Thinking and reasoning 
are very different from automatism, and custom, and 
habit in their superficial appearance, and also in 
their power. But in their fundamental nature they 
are not the opposite of automatism, custom and habit, 
but rather are bone of their bone and flesh of their 
flesh. They show the action of simple general laws 
of connecting in cases where the connections are 
with elements of the situation rather than with gross 
totals and where the connections compete and co-^ 
operate in subtle and complicated organizations.^
Thorndike’s view concemin g thinking is essentially the
same view held by contemporary behavior theorists. We have seen,
for instance, how Hull interprets ideas by saying that pure
stimulus acts are not the cause of ideas but are themselves the
ideas. Behaviorists all seem to solve such problems by anchoring
or identifying them with physiological processes or physiological
entities. What then seems to be the trouble? If behavior
theorists seem to be able thus to account for such fundamental
concepts, such as thinking and ideas, then it should be merely
— r ~ _ -----
E. L. Thorndike, Human Learning, 1931? p. 160.
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a matter of time before they may come to grips with the more 
complicated modes of behavior which cause many of the ailments 
of modern society. Patience, then, is all that a behaviorist 
need aslc for. After all, the science of behavior is barely 
past its infancy, and exacting scientific inquiry cannot be rushed. 
Allport’s question is here legitimate: "Is it that we are young
and need to follow the machine model for a thousand years? Or 
have we gotten off to a thoroughly bad start through our adoption 
of root-metaphors that lead away from, rather than toward, the 
problem at hand?"^
The problem is thus a problem of the psychological model 
the psychologist selects for his system. The following citation 
is intriguing:
I believe that robotic thinking helps precision 
of psychological thought and will continue to help it 
until psychophysiology is so far advanced that an 
image is nothing other than a neural event, and object 
constancy Is obviously just something that happens in 
the brain. That time is still a long way off, and in 
the interval I chose to sit cozily with my robot, 
squeezing his hand and feeling a thrill— a scientist’s 
thrill— when he squeezes mind back.7
The machine model then seems to provide the behavior theorist
with the only possible scientific framework for the study of both
animal and human behavior. If this is so, we must wait patiently
 r ---------
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51+, p. 192.
till physiology has advanced far enough to provide us with the 
needed data to make the study of behavior full and complete.
This argument reminds us of Titchner*s argument in support of the 
supremacy of the study of structuralism until it became possible, 
on the basis of our knowledge of the structure of consciousness, 
to study the functional aspect of behavior. We are not oblivious 
of the difference between the two positions: that of Titchner
and that of behavior theory. The similarity in reasoning is, 
however, evident. Furthermore, while Titchner was criticized by 
other psychologists for his reasoning, behavior theorists are 
likewise criticized on the same score. The thesis that the
machine model is the only scientific framework for the study of
5
behavior is consistently being challenged*
Importance of the Scientific Model for Psychology
The conflicts between different psychological theories have 
centered for some time upon the issue raised by the molar and the 
molecular approaches. This signifies that psychologists from 
this angle at least have shown some concern about the logic of 
their scientific models. It is the new trend now to advocate a 
molar rather than a molecular approach. But this issue of molar- 
molecular is confusing, since it means different things to different 
-g —
See Egon Brucaswik, "The Conceptual Focus of Some Psycho­
logical Systems," J. Unif. Sci., 1939, 8, 36-U9, and G. Allport,
"Scientific Models~and Human Morals,” Psychol. Rev., 19h7, 5U, 
182-192.
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psychologists, even as they work within what are said to be
identical approaches.
Hull, for instance, is said to be molecular in his approach,
especially by those who incline towards perceptual theories. He,
himself, however, makes it clear that his is a molar approach.
He asserts that his aim is to describe, ”.... the basic molar
behavioral laws.... the uniformities discoverable among the
gorssly observable phenomena of behavior as contrasted with the
laws of the behavior of the ultimate ’molecules* upon which this 
9
behavior depends.”
But Hull, in this respect, does not mean what some other 
psychologists mean by the term molar. Fundamentally, he inter­
prets habit— a central concept in his system— as a relatively 
simple mechanical connection between the two peripheral events 
of stimulation and effector reaction, saying ”.... reinforcement 
leaves within the organism a relatively permanent connection 
between the receptor and the effector associated in the original 
reinforcement. It is this which in the present system is meant 
by the term ’habit,’ a technical adaptation of the common-sense 
concept that goes by the same name.”^  In the same manner, Hull 
9 -
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speaks about stimulus generalization, response generalization 
and stimulus-response generalization.
It is significant at this point to remember that Hull does 
not make much use of his first two postulates, especially the 
second one (afferent neural interaction), only giving a warning 
to the effect that we may not get the results expected from the 
peripheralist connections. In defense of his position, Hull 
contends that he focuses on small segments of behavior to insure 
the accuracy of prediction. He says, "It would seem, however, 
that the smaller the molar segment employed, the less will be 
the uncertainty regarding the conditions and so the smaller will 
be the probabilism in molar dynamic outcomes.The difference 
b etween the significance and implications of the molar units 
for different psychologists may be seen if we contrast Hull's 
conception of molar units with that of others with a gestaltist 
bent, Krech and Crutchfield say:
In the absence of molar units, the description 
of behavior can be little more than an enumeration 
of unsystematized bits and pieces of momentary, 
limited, and unrelated responses. Viewed wholly, 
in the context of needs and goals, on the other hand, 
the behavior of the individual can be seen as meaning­
fully organized. The unity implied in the molar 
description is not the individual as he behaves; the 
individual is a dynamic unity, a whole person, and it 
is as such that he takes part in social phenomena.-*-^
11 ^
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I). Kretch and R. S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of 
Social Psychology, Hew York: McGraw Hill, 1910, p. 31.
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A brief reference to other behavior theorists may here 
suffice. Skinner holds with Hull the concern about the importance 
of relatively gross behavior segments. But his system is 
definitely molecular, if we take the above citation as a frame 
of reference. Guthrie, however, seems to go to the extreme in 
the direction of molecular behavior in view of his attention 
to bodily movements rather than to achievements.
The molar versus molecular issue, although a symptom of 
disagreement and perhaps some dissatisfaction with respect to psycho­
logical systems, does not really diagnose the problem. This is 
chiefly because the issue goes deeper than that. Litman and 
Rosen present seven meanings of the issue. These are?13
1. Interaction: By which term is meant the distinction 
between experiments and observations employing many 
variables in interaction with each other as contrasted 
with the classical experiment of one independent, and 
one dependent variable in isolation from all others*
The former approach is molar, the latter molecular*
2. Action units: The molar unit of description is one
which starts by a need and ends by cessation of behavior 
by achievement of a goal. For a behavior unit to be 
molar or molecular, therefore, depends on its meaning­
fulness as a functional unit. This in turn depends on 
the system.
3. Levels: This refers to the physiological correlates of 
behavior; if in terms of ultimate units, it is molecular 
and if in terms of gross concepts, it is molar.
13 Adapted from R. A. Littman and E. Rosen, ’Molar and Mole­
cular,” Psych. Rev., 1952, 57> 58-65*
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iu Construction: This refers to phenotypic vs. genetotypic
explanations. Genetotypic explanation is considered 
more molar than phenotypic, since the former focuses on 
the observables only, while the ilatter transcends the 
merely observable to intervening variables and 
constructs.
5. Phenomenal: This criterion considers as molar those
theories which treat data as given; putting its 
emphasis on the appearance of the variables and
the process by which they are observed, rather than on 
their derivation or analysis, which is considered 
molecular.
6. Urgency: This criterion is a moral one. Problems deemed
significant for society are considered molar, other­
wise they are molecular. This criterion, therefore, 
emphasizes methodology only insofar as it leads, or
does not to the investigation of significantly social 
problems.
7. Holism: An old and ambiguous criterion. If the 
behavior phenomenon is treated as a whole, it is molar; 
otherwise it is molecular.
We do not seem to benefit much from these distinctions. For
some the issue is basic; for others it is relative, a matter of
degree. At bottom is the psychological model which this or the
other psychologist prefers for the interpretation of behavior;
this, in turn, depends on his general philosophical outlook.
One may say, referring back to our historical introduction,
that behavior theorists, in an attempt to save the science of
psychology from the entanglement of the mysterious mentalistic
processes which its historical orientation had led it into, and
in keeping with a purely empirical methodology, emphasized the
observable and only the observable. And the observable ultimately 
became the mechanical.
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On the other side of the fence we find a different 
philosophical orientation, and hence a different psychological 
model. We have seen how the gestalists, in their emphasis upon 
sensory organization, have undermined the importance of past 
experience and hence learning. The whole is emphasized, per­
ception is a given or almost a given. The extreme case of such 
an approach is found in Wheeler’s organismic psychology in which 
he goes beyond Gestalt and rejects the theory of memory trace to 
account for memorizing. And as we saw in our analysis in the 
preceding chapter his concept of the organism comes close to a 
self-actional system.
Conceptual Framework of Psychological Systems
What is it that a science of psychology does or should do 
in order to fulfill its social and moral task and at the same time 
keep itself scientific and not regress to the entanglements of 
metaphysics. This question has to be considered carefully before 
we venture to pass judgment on any given system. Is positive 
empiricism a safe guarantee? One hesitates long before saying 
"les" or "No" to this question. One may be exacting so far as 
fact finding is concerned without being fully scientific. At the 
same time, one may be very scientific in dealing with problems 
which do not count much so far as their social function and 
significance are concerned. It is neither the method alone nor
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the content alone that make or break the significance of the 
scientific method. The choice of the problem to be inquired into 
is as much a concern of the scientific method as the most accurate 
findings. In a sense, the choice of the scope of inquiry is of 
more importance than the results of investigation. We need to 
focus on the context of psychological systems as a preliminary 
step for their evaluation. For this purpose we will have to 
envision the organism in its environment and analyze the situation 
in the hope of finding out the possible loci for investigation,
In doing this, we do not imply that such loci are independent 
entities, or that they constitute dichotomies in such terms as 
inners and outers environmentalistic and organismic. They are 
mere abstractions and as such they are arbitrary.
The organism is active; and it lives in an environment. It 
is surrounded by environmental objects and things. It has had 
its past experiences and it faces a future--immediate and remote.
On this simple descriptive level we seem to have said almost 
nothing new. But it is essentially this picture that a psycho­
logist has to adapt and manipulate for his purposes. The 
following categories may help clarify this point.^
1, Remote past,
2, Immediate past,
3, Concrete objects in the environment. (Things and/or 
organisms as distal representation.)
^  Adapted from E. Brunswik, "The Conceptual Focus of Some 
Psychological Systems," Journal Unified Sciences, 1939, 8, 36-^ 9•
The analysis that follows, however, is nofTToased on Brunswik1 s 
but on the philosophical background presented in the preceding 
chapter, i.e., in terms of self-action,inter-action and transaction.
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h» Local stimuli impinging upon the skin boundary of 
the organism (including stimuli on the retina and 
other receptors)organs such as the skin proper, 
tongue, etc.)
5* Central events within the organism (whether conceived 
of in terms of nervous, brain or mental processes.)
6* Muscular reactions•
7. Immediate effects of muscular reactions (in terms of 
satisfactions, rewards, punishments, goal achieve­
ments, etc.)
8, Consequences of reactions and their effects.
Accepting this as an adequate representation of the total 
situation, we may proceed to analyze different psychological 
systems briefly with respect to their points of emphasis.
First Field Theories— Mainly Gestalt
Gestalt theoriests do not pay much attention to remote past 
experience. They emphasize the immediate past to the extent that 
it designates a state of disequilibrium or a gap to be closed.
In other words, the immediate past is continuous with the present 
in terms of motivation. They do emphasize concrete objects in the 
environment as distally represented. In fact, this point in 
Gestalt psychology influenced the whole system. The emphasis 
on distal representation of objects in the environment is not so 
much in terms of the manipulation of these objects as it is in 
terms of what is perceptually given. With respect to proximal
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stimulation, Gestaltists emphasize organization. Instead of 
limiting themselves to local stimulation of receptor organs in 
terms of a single stimulus, they extend the notion of a stimulus 
to the stimulus pattern, or sensory organization, which is 
independent of past experience, whether in terns of interpreta­
tion or of learning, as is emphasized by learning theories. 
Perception does not correspond to local stimulation. Hence a gap 
is created between what is "out there," i.e., the object or event 
in the environment and what is actually perceived by means of 
central brain processes which are summed up in the principle of 
isomorphism. This is to say that there is a sort of parallelism 
bettwen the structure of the outside world and what goes on in 
the brain.
The term "outside world" advisedly, since the organism 
does not actively participate in what happens to him. The outside 
■world is described in terms of the field concept and so is the 
organism, and in between the two seemingly separate fields, there 
are mediation processes which are described by the law of Pragnans. 
“When we come to areas of learning we find the concept of insight, 
which dawns on the organism somehow after the brain has fulfilled 
its task in representing the happenings outside and hence the gap 
is closed. There is no interest in muscular reactions as such, 
although when it is dealt with as by the organismic psychologists 
the locus of interest lies in following its development from the
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whole— that is— the unstructured whole--to the parts through 
structurization. The immediate effects of muscular reactions 
is of secondary importance to insight and structurization.
Once the situation is perceived in a certain fashion, then action 
follows. Learning is abrupt, not as a result of transaction, 
munipulation of the objects of the environment, but as a result 
of perceptual closure.
It is significant here to note that psychlogical theories 
■which are influenced by Gestalt theory, such as Tolman's molar 
behaviorism, lean heavily towards this sort of interpretation.
The cat in the maze learns the position of the food— what leads 
to what— without eating or even touching it. Perceptually, the 
cat somehow gets to know that that is food by merely seeing, it 
(even though it may not need it and, hence, not look for it at 
that time ,and  that a particular route leads to it when needed. 
And finally the consequences of reactions and their effects are 
also tied up with the concept of insight. In a future occasion, 
the stool which the chimpanze has used before as a chair to sit 
on, for instance, becomes as a result of insight in a problematic 
situation, a tool by which a banana hanging from the ceiling may 
be reached. As a part of the phenomenal field, it is no more 
just a chair, it is now a tool to use in reaching the desired
13
Refer to latent learning, Chapter IV.
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banana. This is certainly a sound feature of Gestalt psychology 
so far as it goes, but in reference to the premises from "which 
the phenomenal field originates, it represents a dangerous sign, 
as it is built on an implicit mental actor which is the knower 
and which controls behavior. Such a state of affairs reaches 
its extreme in the case of psychological theories which adhere 
only to the phenomenal field in interpreting behavior, such as 
the theory advanced by Snygg and Comb, and thus, as Hullfish says, 
tend to fall into the entanglement of sollipcism.
In a sense Gestalt psychology, though a field theory, seems 
to be, as Brunswik calls it a fragmentary theory. Brunswik says, 
"Gestalt psychology, though totalitarian or molar is, however, 
still fragmentary insofar as it is in its most elaborate parts, 
a psychology ’from the retina inwards’ so to speak." The present 
writer does not fully agree with Brunswik’s interpretation. It 
is true that as generally formulated the Gestalt theory, seems 
to focus, to a large extent, on the area from the ’retina inward.' 
But as a matter of fact, the laws by which they describe the 
inner processes did not come primarily from a direct physiological 
analysis of the inner field but from the outside environment. Thus, 
without concerning themselves much with the activities of the 
organisms, Gestaltists attributed to that which lies "from the 
retina inward" a sort of a self-actional mechanism which copies, 
so to speak, reality as it exists outside. The law of Pragnanz,
20U
and its sub-laws of similarity, continuity, closure, etc., refers 
to the distal or the structure of the outside world. Thus, the 
Gestaltists, generally speaking, do a good job when they analyze 
the outside field, but because theyfall unwittingly in the dichotomy 
between the inner and the outer they fall short of the trans­
actional approach. In commenting on Wertheimer's analysis of 
Galileo’s search, Dewey and Bentley say,
Wertheimer concentrates our attention on the 
’structure’ or ’Gestalt’ which governed Galileo’s 
search. Seen as a stage of development in understanding 
and presentation in the cultural setting in which it was 
produced, this is in the line of our treatment. Seen, 
however, as Wertheimer has continued to see it, as a 
mental activity of self-actional parentage applied to an 
outer world of objects, it falls far short of the manner 
of statement which we believe to be necessary. The ’mind' 
Wertheimer relies on is far too reminiscent of the older 
days in which the ’physical’ opposed to it was an all too 
solid fixture.^
We turn at this point to consider behaviorism as represented
especially by Hull’s system, the most widespread of all behaviorist
theories today.
Second, Behaviorism
Behaviorism emphasizes the remote as well as the immediate 
past. Behavior is considered as a positive multiplicative function 
of habit, drive, reinforcement and strength of stimulus, and
 13---------
John Dewey and A. Bentley, 0£. cit., p. 118.
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negative function of inhibitory reactions learned or unlearned and 
oscilation. The following sketch may help for illustration:
5E r - sHr x D* K *  V- Xr+ 5Ir + 4O k
I M l
{ f | |
N t) Q PI
Where S R represents excitatory potential at a given
moment which determins whether or not a 
certain reaction will be evoked.
H
S R represents habit strength
D represents drive
K represents reinforcement (constant depends on
individual difference)
V represents stimulus strength
IR represents unlearned inhibitory reaction (the
natural tendency for any reaction to seize by 
itself
SIR represents learned inhibitory reaction
SOR represents oscilation
N represents number of reinforcement
D represents history of deprivation (in terms of
number of hours without food for instance)
Q represents quantity of incentive (food for example)
PI represents physical intensity of stimulus
f represents mathematical function
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The above sketch shows that behavior depends on remote past 
experience in terms of habit strength and on immediate past 
experience in terms of drive and inhibitory factors.
The concrete objects in the environment are utilized only 
so far as they are tied up with primary reinforcement in terms 
of primary need reduction or (when they are not directly tied up 
with primary need reduction) they are assumed to play the role of 
secondary reinforcers if they are consistently associated vrith 
primary reinforcement. The structure of the outside world is of 
no great moment at this point, since ail that counts is whether 
or not an object is reinforcing. As a consequence, local stimuli 
impinging upon the skin boundary of the organism are considered 
the main instigators of behavior. But since these are not 
observable they are inferred from bodily movements. With the 
exception of the two first postulates of Hull, the system is 
essentially peripheralistic, that is, it depends on mechanical 
connections of segments of behavior. So far as central events 
within the organism are concerned, only peripheralistic events 
count. Muscular reactions are important in so far as they are 
terminated by reinforcement, or a reinforcing state of affairs, 
and they are the events by which sensory processes are inferred. 
The consequences of reactions and their effects are treated in 
terms of habit strength as it reveals itself in future tries.
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The Two Systems Contrasted
We have seen how the Gestaltists emphasize distal representa­
tion of the objects in the outside environment. As a result 
bdiavior patterns, so far as the organism is concerned, are taken 
for granted to represent the structure of the outside field. 
Paradoxical as it may seem, by taking their point of departure 
from the outside environment they become (with respect to the 
organism) the nativistic group. This should not prove surprising 
since by approaching the problems of behavior in the traditional 
dichotomy of organism vs environment, they were forced tc start 
with one side of the dichotomy and assume that the other should 
conform. They happened to focus their analysis on the environment. 
Similarity and proximity, for instance, are not features observable 
in the organism but are characteristics seen in the objects in 
the environment. The organism turned out to be natively endowed 
with the predispositions to behave in accordance with the principles 
with which they described the environment, or so it was assumed. 
Consequently, when they observed the behavior of organisms in 
their experimental studies, they saw these principles work. It 
is an illustration of the autistic factor which Gardner Murphy, 
Bruner and Postman, Klein and many others have shown to play an 
important part in perception.
Behaviorism, roughly speaking, can be shown to have followed 
the opposite direction. Following an empirical approach, behaviorists 
emphasized the observable in behavior, stimuli and responses, with 
the one causing the other. Hence, the machine model. By focusing 
attention on the bodily movements of the organism behaviorists 
came to opposite conclusions from those reached by Gestaltists.
This is well illustrated by the development of Thorndike's 
system. As he gradually came closer to the machine model, and 
after he had stripped his system from its earlier mentaiistic 
and cognitive contents, he became more and more attentive to the 
detailed reactions of the behaving organism. He became, in other 
words, more and more environmentalistic. Neither the organism 
nor the environment in isolation from each other can adequately 
provide us with an intelligible explanation of behavior. If 
we make the organism our starting point, we find that the behavior 
of the organism cannot be explained by itself, especially as we 
reject explicit self-actors or mental entities as the causal 
factors of behavior. We turn, then, to the environment to 
provide the answer. We tend to limit our understanding of the 
behaving organism by the limitation we put upon the environment 
we provide for the experimental animals. As Skinner has said 
in another connection, the learning curves we draw fro rats in 
mazes, actually represent the mazes more than the rats* behavior.
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The moral is that unless we make our starting point the 
organism in and of its environment we tend to err. Almost all 
psychologists currently emphasize the relation between the 
organism and its environment and, sometimes, they go so far as 
to claim that the separation between them is artificial and 
serves only for analysis. By and large these proclamations 
amount to little more than lip service, the psychological models 
not expressing this understanding. This understanding, however, 
should be instrumental in reformulating the psychological models. 
It is not the task of this study to perform this reformulation. 
Some suggestions are possible, nonetheless.
A Transactional Approach to Psychology
In his historical article, ’’The Reflex Arc Concept,” Dewey
raised his voice to warn psychologists against the danger of
duplicating, in the name of the reflext arc concept, the older
dualism of prescientific psychology. Dewey said,”The older
dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current
dualism of peripheral and center structures and functionsj the
older dualism of body and soul finds a direct echo in the current
17dualism of stimulus and response.”
. ^
John Dewey, ’’The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.” 
Readings in The History of Psychology, p. 335.
His attack on atomism, made more than half a century ago, 
is surprisingly valid today.
Instead of interpreting the character of sensation, 
idea and action from their place and function in the 
sensori-motor circuit, we still incline to interpret 
the latter from our preconceived and preformulated ideas 
of rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts and 
acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, the central 
activity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the 
motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third,l°
We need only replace the word "idea" in the last sentence by the
term "pure stimulus act" to have a perfect description of the
state of affairs of behaviorism as it stands today. It is only
when we atomize the organism that we tend to interpret behavior
in terns of a machine model. Random movement and fumbling thus
become major elements of behavior. But when we view the different
senses, as well as the motor activities, as aspect of behavior
in co-ordination, fumbling and trial and error in their derogatory
meaning will have no place. Dewey, speaking of the instance of
the child responding to the candle, said, "Now if this act, the
seeing, stimulates another act, the reaching, it is because both
of these acts fall within a larger co-ordination^  because seeing
and grasping have been so often bound together to reinforce each
other, to help each other out, that each may be considered
19practically a subordinate member of a bigger co-ordination,"
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Dewey prefers to speak about an organic circuit rather than a 
reflex arc with disjointed distinct existences brought together 
by the pull and push of an outside environment by something out­
side the process of experience itself, such as an actor within. 
"This circuit is more truly termed organic than reflex, because
the motor response determines the stimulus, just as truly as
20sensory stimulus determines movement*n To this he added, ’’The
fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of
existence, but teleological distinctions, that is distinctions
of function, or part played, with reference to reaching or main- 
21taining an end*1'
To conclude, Dewey in one breath, aimed a blow at both of 
our groups of psychology. He showed the distinction between 
the inner and outer to be false and unreal. In Bentley’s 
words one may say that Dewey effectively destroyed the dermal 
boundary of the body so far as knowledge or behavior were con­
cerned. Knowledge is not a chain of mechanical events located
22inside the body as Hull would have us believe. It is instruc­
tive at this point to recall how Hull as a consequence of his
mechanistic interactionistic approach was led to hypostatize an 
inner chain of actions and reactions to constitute knowledge
20
Ibid., p. 359.
21
Ibid., p, 361.
22 See Chapter III in this study.
abiding within the organism. An outside stimulus elicits a
response which acts as an inner stimulus, and the inner stimulus
in turn initiates an inner goal reaction and so on along the
chain till the evocation of the goal response which, by necessity,
is a matter of mere chance. In order to lend coherence to the
chain in terms of habit, Hull had to postulate an inner stimulus
drive which functioned throughout the chain. But in view of
his interactionistic outlook even this new entity had to be
fractionated or fragmentized so as to correspond to the segmental
character of the chain. The difficulty evidently lies in the
split made between the organism and the environment as a starting
point. It is true that Hull claims that organic needs and organic
environment should be "somehow jointly and simultaneously brought 
23to bear," upon organic movement. The fact of the matter remains
that the split he occasioned between the organism, on the one
hand, and the environment, on the other, forced him to bridge the
gap as Dewey and Bentley have pointed out "by a series of inter-
211vening variables of a fictional, pseudo-logical character."
As far as gestalt theory is concerned it suffices here to
emphasize once again the artificality of the distinction made
between the sensory and the motor aspects of the organic circuit
Dewey has so aptly elaborated. In their preoccupation with formal 
—
Hull, Principles of Behavior, Op. cit., p. 18»
2lt ,
Dewey and Bentley, Op. cit., p. 1U3.
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structure, the gestalt group overemphasized the sensory aspect 
of the circuit, in terms of dynamic sensory organization, to 
the negligence of the motor aspect. An account of knowing in 
terms of a self-actor independent of experience, is inadequate 
even though the self-actor is termed "dynamic brain processes," 
Viewing the problem from a philosophical point of view we 
may conceive of the psychological problem as an outcome of the 
philosophical problem of knowledge and knowing. The distinction, 
historically speaking, was made between four entities— namely, 
knower, known, knowing and knowledge. Philosophical systems 
were able to specify and locate three of these four entities.
The knower was described either in terms of soul or psyche and 
located internally. The known was located somewhat as outside 
reality. Knowing was a mediator, a process inside the organism 
which brought together the two separate entities, the knower and 
the known. The fourth entity, however, defied localization or 
specification in terms of substance as inner or outer and 
consequently caused philosophers a lot of headaches. Along 
these lines Bentley says:
With soul weakened into psyche, and with psyche yielding 
to body as its ?stand-in,f 'knowing1 could in a way 
be viev?ed as psychological process within the skin.
This supplied a confused pretense of definiteness to 
three of four terms, viz., to knower, known and knowing.
But what kind of definiteness could then be given to the 
fourth term, ’knowledge,?1 ’Knowledge,’ substantively 
viewed, was left to bear the brunt of the inquiry: Was
21b
it inside the skin, or out? Was it flesh, or spirit?
Was it fact, or thought, or word?^
Here we find that psychology and philosophy both face one 
and the same problem, no matter how different the terminology.
In this area at least the basic problems of both psychology and 
philosophy have common roots. Thus, in a reconstraction of 
either philosophy or psychology we must bear in mind the danger 
of dualism in all forms. It is this need which has made a trans­
actional frame of reference promising.
Human Behavior as Transactional
We have seen that the main differences and conflicts between 
different psychological systems arise as a result of the different 
points of emphasis psychologists of different points of view 
place on the explanation of behavior. More specifically, we 
found that while one group puts its emphasis on the observable 
behavior of the organism, with little attention to the structure 
of the environment of the behaving organism, the other group 
does precisely the opposite. A transactional approach should 
treat the structure of the environment as well as the observable 
behavior of the organism as inseparable aspects of a dynamic process. 
If we fully oomprehend this position we can no longer separate 
perception from action. To do so would be to assume some sort of
Arthur Bentley, “The Human Skin: Philosophy’s Last Line 
of Defense.” Philosophy of Science, 19)4.1, Vol. 8, p. 13.
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self-actor to account for such phenomenon. Nor can we separate 
action from perception. To do this would be to admit a dualistic 
philosophy of action versus knowledge or between the motor and 
the sensory. Dewey pointed out that in reaching x.or the candle 
flame,, the child’s seeing (perception) is directed by his move­
ment in as much as his movements are directed by his seeing.
He further pointed out, with respect to auditory perception, 
that, "The movement and posture of the ear, the tension of the 
ear muscles, are required for the ’reception* of the sound."
A transactional approach to the study of behavior should, 
therefore, be inclusive of the different aspects of any event 
und_er investigation. Naturally, investigation requires analysis 
and specification of certain aspects of a given event, but such 
analysis or specification should always be referred as fully as 
our means and techniques allow to the total event. Cantril has 
described transaction as follow's:
Each transaction of living involves numerous 
capacities and aspects of man's nature which operate 
together. Each occasion of life can occur only through 
an. environment, is imbued with some purpose, requires 
action of some kind and the registration of the 
consequences of action. Every action is based upon some 
awareness or perception which in turn is determined by 
the assumptions brought to the occasion. These assumptions 
are in turn determined by past experience. All of these 
processes are interdependent. No one process could 
function without the others.27
John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Ibid.,
p. 359.
^  H. Cantril, The Why of Man * s Experience, p. 59.
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In general terms, this citation from Cantril falls in Une 
with the transactional approach as this is conceived in this 
stucty. Yet,while Cantril emphasises the dependence of action 
upon ‘‘awareness or perception," he does not seem equally to 
emphasize the reverse dependence of "awareness or perception" 
upon action. Instead, he emphasizes the dependence of "aware­
ness or perception" upon assumptions which are determined by past 
experience. This is not to stretch a point which may seem to be 
merely verbal.. It is true that past experience may imply action.
But the problem is so delicate that precision is needed. The 
danger is that the term "assumption" may carry mentalistic 
connotations and lead us into trouble as it actually did with 
A, Ames. We shall return to this point after considering the 
experimental work directed by Ames, the transactional point of 
view in his study of human behavior. To do this we shall examine 
a representative sample of his experiments.
28Chair demonstration
The subject looks (sees) through three peep-holes on the
2.9front side of a box. When he looks (monocularly) ' through these 
apertures, one after the other, he sees what appears to be a chair
2F“
Described in William H. Ittleson’s, The Ames Demonstrations, 
p. 8, ff,
29
The implications of this experiment apply also to binocular
vision.
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in each case. If he then goes behind the screen, he will find,
to his surprise, that the objects he took to be identical chairs
were actually an assortment of black wires with white strings
strung on them; different in size and shape and at different
distance from the peep-holes. "The wires and strings are arranged
so that identical, or nearly identical, retinal images are formed
30when the subject looks through each of the three apertures.
By a certain procedure, the images of the three objects, by 
means of lenses focused on ground glass plates, are made to 
correspond to the images formed on the retina of the eye. The 
three images will be found to be quite identical, therefore,-^
Conclusions
The similarity between what is perceived, the 'visual aware­
ness* of the three chairs, must be related to the similarity 
between the three, retinal images. The similarity between the 
retinal images must, in turn, be due to physiological phenomena 
related to the light rays impinging on the retina. The light 
rays are reflected by the objects outside the perceiving organism. 
But what were perceived as identical objects were in fact different. 
Hence, the perceiver must have contributed something to what he
Mary Alice Price, Teaching Mental Hygiene With Visual 
Demonstrations, p. 11.
31
See Adalbert Ames, Jr. An Interpretative Manual, p. 18.
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perceived or to his ‘visual awareness.* Ames makes the distinction 
between visual awareness (what a person is subjectively aware of) 
and the thing out there, independent of perception or awareness,
Ames says, "The expressive term ’what is in your visual awareness1 
will be used to refer to what you are subjectively aware of as 
distinguished from its occasion out in .your environment.1’ He 
goes on to assert that “Such phrases as ’what you see’ or ’what 
you perceive* csr ’what you are aware of* do not make this 
differentiation. They refer both to the content of your per­
ception and its unperceived occasion 'out there,’ and hence do 
not specify which of the two is being referred to.**^
Here, once again, it is necessary to voice a word of caution.
The distinctions Ames makes above may presuppose existential 
distinctness between “the something out there,” the stimulus 
pattern and bodily processes, and the subjective contribution of 
the perceiver to it. Such presupposition may lead to the identifica­
tion of the thing out there with physical reality, as distinct 
from the physiological reality of the body or the organism, and 
these two categories from consciousness or awareness. They may 
imply a mentalistic concept which Ames does not mean. The 
emphasis of Ames is on the necessity of bringing our knowledge 
with respect to the different aspect of behavior to bear upon 
our problem. With respect to our knowledge about the above- 
32
Ibid., footnote, p. 18 (my italics).
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mentioned categories. Aimes says,
While modem physics has disclosed a great deal 
about certain aspects of the 'something out there,' 
and while modern physiology has disclosed a great 
deal about our stimulus patterns and bodily processes, 
relatively little has been learned about the nature of 
what we ourselves 'subjectively' contribute to our 
perceptions of the 'something o u t  there. *33
It is, of course, legitimate and necessary to bring our knowledge 
of physics and physiology to bear upon psychological inquiry, 
as complementary phases of human experience. It is also 
legitimate to choose as our locus of inquiry the study of physical 
phenomena and of physiological phenomena. let it is well to 
remember that they are but aspects of one broad process, human 
experience. Our understandings of physical phenomena, for 
instance, are as much dependent upon what Ames cells "our subjec­
tive contribution to the something out there "as are the demonstra­
tion experiments or our common day experiences. The only difference 
lies in the locus of inquiry, the knowledge we have, the purpose 
of the inquir3r, and, perhaps, the techniques we use and the means 
we possess for checking results. Such also is the only legitimate 
distinction we can make between common sense and science. •
With thin orientation we may view the other samples of the 
experimental work conducted by Ames in a more suggestive perspective.
3 3
Ibid., p. 20.
2U
See J. Dewey and A. Bentley, 0u. cit., Ch. X.
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3E>Star Point Demonstration
In this experiment, two star points of light in an. other­
wise darkroom appear at equal distances from the observer. The 
observer looks monocularly at the star points with his head 
stationary. The brighter point is perceived as nearer to the 
observer.
Conclusions
Since the distances are ’objectively1 equal, the observer
must have contributed -bo his perception by assigning a shorter
distance to the brighter point. The difference in brightness is
used as a clue to the relative positions of the two points. In
other words, the observer assumed, that the two points were of
equal brightness. In general terms, 1 The assumption is that
36
similar things are identical.”
The assumption of identity, however, does not arise solely
fooin similarity but is also related to direction as is seen by
changing the relative positions of the two bright points. If
the two points are of equal brightness, and one is located one
foot above the other, the upper one will be perceived, as farther
away than the other, if both are situated near the floor, and as
See W. H. Ittelson, The Ames Demonstration, Op. cit., 
p. 3f. and A. Ames, 0£. cit., p. 21 f.
Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Some Aspects of Assumptions to 
Perception, p. 2.
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nearer, if they are situated near the ceiling. Thus, in these 
instances, assumption coincides with our common everyday exper­
iences with visual objects. When we look at things on the ground, 
the objects located at a farther distance are seen as upper and 
vice versa., when we are looking at the horizon. So, too, in 
drawing and painting we locate the objects which lie further away 
above the object which lies nearer to us, when they are on the 
ground and vice versa when they are in the horizon.
Size-Brightne ss Demonstration
In this experiment, two partially inflated balloons are 
illuminated from concealed sources. The balloons are stationary 
in position and are one foot apart from each other. By a certain 
device, one or the other of the -two balloons, or the two together 
may be increased in size. Another device permits the brightness 
of the two balloons to vary in- the same way. The room is kept 
dark and the observer looks at the balloons monccularly, with 
his head stationary. When the two balloons are equal in size and 
brightness, an observer, ten feet or more removed, sees them as 
two glowing spheres equal in size and at equal distance from him. 
When brightness is left equal, with their sizes fixed at their 
maximal possible difference, most observers wiU see the larger 
balloon as somewhat nearer and the smaller as somewhat farther
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away. When the sizes are made to vary continuously, one balloon
getting larger and the otber smaller and vice versa, the larger
one appears to move imch farther forward and the smaller one
to recede farther away than is the case when their size difference 
37
remains constant. When, however, the sizes are kept constant, 
with brightness varied, the apparent movement, though still per­
ceived, diminishes in degree. The apparent movement reaches its 
maximum when both size and brightness vary simultaneously and 
in the same direction.
Conclusions
In this instance the observer's assumption—-some sort of 
average of his past experience— is that when things move meaner, 
they become brighter;hence, when they become brighter, we may 
assume that they have moved nearer. The same applies to variation 
in size. The above experiments show, however, that by and large 
men assign more weight to the change in size than to that of 
brightness. It is not very common to observe stationary things 
growing or diminsihing in size, though their brightness may vary 
due to shadows, multiple sources cf illumination, etc. This 
discrepancy between the weights we assign to brightness versus
3 7  “  '
See Franklin P. Kilpatric, Ibid. f p, 3,
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size depends on past experience. Kilpatrick says,
The relative weights given to size and brightness 
differ for a small percent of observers, apparently in­
line with, specialized experience they have had. For 
example, of approximately 150 people who have seen the 
balloon demonstration in car laboratory, three have 
seen distance change with changes in brightness, 
irrespective of size. One of these observers was a 
well known motion picture photographer, and the other 
two were architects specializing in interior lighting 
for buildings,38
The demonstration further shows that in the dynamic situation
when size and/or brightness vary continuously as compared with
the static situation in which the difference between the two
balloons in brightness or size is constant the ‘prognostic1
reliability is high.
The Thatness— Thereness Demonstration^
This experiment illustrates the interdependence of the per­
ception of the distance of an object and its characteristic 
properties. Two cubes are suspended by invisible wires, one at 
twelve feet and the other at three feet from the observer. Two 
sides and a part of the upper side of the nearer cube are seen 
binocularly. The same view of the farther cube is seen mono- 
cularly. If the head is then adjusted so that the vertical edges
Ibid., p. It.
39 Loc. cit.
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of the two cubes coincide, the distant cube will be seen to move 
forward to an even position with the nearer cube. As it is seen 
at a position even with the near cube, it appears smaller in size 
than when seen farther away. Moreover, not only its size changes 
but also its shape.
Conclusion
Coincidence of contours suggests that the objects observed 
lie spatially together. In other wards, perception in this case 
is based on an assumption that coincidence of contours means 
’‘togetherness,*1
Aniselconic Glasses Demon strati on^
Anisekonic glasses produce visual distortions. They produce 
different size images or the two retinas. With these glasses on, 
an observer looking at an ordinary room does not perceive the 
room to change substantially in shape. When, however, the 
observer looks at a rectangular room covered from the inside with 
green leaves, it seems to be drastically distorted in shape. A 
room so designed reduces monocular cues and the observer has to 
rely chiefly upon binocular cues. He sees, when focussing on 
the whole room, that the back and side walls slant towards him 
Ibid., p0 b and A. Ames, Ojo. cit,, p.
at the top and farther away from him at the "bottom. The leaves 
on top appear than on the bottom. The ceiling looks
lower and nearly horizontal, with its leaves relatively small.
The floor drops away, being also horizontal and its leaves large. 
This shows that the size of the leaves depends on their localiza­
tion in space. If they seem nearer than they are, they appear 
large .in size and vice versa. If the observer focuses his gaze 
to the floor, it appears nearer to him and tipped up at an angle 
of about 1(5®. To dramatize this phenomenon wre may compare the 
perception of a large body of water with that of a large area 
of level lawn, with the same glasses on. The water appears as 
horizontal, although farther away than its position, whereas 
the level lawn appears tipped.
Conclusions
Without fully discussing the effects of the anisekonic 
glasses, some, relevant conclusions seem to be pertinent. First, 
there seems to be an Interdependence of the perceived sizes of 
the leaves and their assumed distance. Second, there is the 
discrepancy between the perception of a normal room, as compared 
with that of the specially designed leaf room. The normal room 
does not suffer much distortion, perhaps, among other reasons, 
because of past experience. The leaf room, in contrast, is not 
a matter of everyday experience and its perception exhibits
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marked distortion. Furthermore, when the observer looks at the 
room as a whole the floor looks approximately horizontal. This 
suggests that the assumption that he is looking at a room some­
how suggests the floor be horizontal. It is unlikely that a room 
will have a tipped up floor. But when the observer focuses on 
the floor, rather than on the room as a whole, the necessity for a 
horizontal plane is not needed. At this moment the observer Is 
not looking at a room. The effect of past experience is in 
evidence when we compare the perception of the large expanse of 
lawn with that of a body of water. The assumption that water 
takes a horizontal plane is so strong that the distortion does 
not affect It. The lam might be tipped, however, and, hence, 
it suffers the distortion. All this seems to add up to the sugges­
tion that the observer choses from among the many ‘cues1 in his 
environment, as best as he can, those which coincide f^ith the 
expectations that are a result of his past experience.
The Vertical Lines of Light Demonstration^
In this demonstration, a black light box with slits of 
vertical lines of different lengths cut in its face, confronts 
the observer. Two lines are at the same distance from the 
observer, with their middle points at the same level. The observer,docking
at these two lines in an otherwise dark room, wild, see the longer
See Kilpatrick, Ibid., p. 5, and Mary Alice Price,
Op. cit., p. 9.
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line nearer to him than the shorter one, although objectively 
both are at the same distance from him. If the observer now 
takes a wand with a luminous tip and tries to touch each of the 
two lanes, he will fail at the beginning. After repeated trials, 
the subject will eventually succeed in touching the two lines 
with accuracy. When he so succeeds, his perception changes 
and the two lines appear at equal distance from him.
Conclusion
The observer at the beginning seemed to perceive the two 
lines as identical (that is lengthwise) and hence his visual 
awareness attributed to them the difference in distance. After 
action based upon that assumption failed, the assumption and, 
consequently, his perception of distance changed according. This 
demonstration illustrates the effect of action upon perception, 
assumption or visual awareness.
A modification of this experiment, illustrates another point. 
If the observer is allowed to see the two lines while the light 
in the room is on, and then the light is turned off as the 
demonstrator says 'telephones pones', the shorter line is seen to 
fall back in distance. This modification illustrates the fact 
that as the observer accepts the assumption, suggested by the 
demonstrator, that the two lines represent telephone poles, their
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relative lengths are taken as cues for their relative positions.
The Distorted Room Demonstration^
In this demonstration a box representing a room has its 
size distorted in such a fashion that the observer looking at it 
from the outside can see quite clearly that it doe s not have the 
shape of a normal room. The floor slopes from the front down to 
the left. The ceiling slopes up and also the left. The rear 
wall recedes from right to the left. The rear wall has two 
windows both trapezordal in shape and different in size. The 
window located to the right is smaller than the one to the left. 
In the middle of the floor there is a trough with a grove in it. 
The trough slopes upwards from the front to the back relative to 
the floor but the slope is still downwards with respect to the 
horizontal plane.
After viewing the distorted room from the outside aid 
observing, 01- being guided to note, the specific distortions, 
the observer, if asked to look monocularly at the inside of the 
room from one particular point, the distortion disappears aid the 
room looks quite normal. Under these conditions, if the two 
hands of a person are shown simultaneously through the windows
----- j-,--- - --- ,.
Ross L. Mooney, Teacher^ Manual on The Distorted Room 
Demonstration, Also see A, Ames, Op. cit,, p7~*5lf, and Ittleson, 
Ibid., p. 39 ff.
229
in the rear wall, the one seen in the right window appears 
much bigger than the one in the left. Similarly, if two faces 
are seen through the two windows, the one to the right looks 
much bigger than the one to the left. Further, if a marble is 
permitted to roll through the grove in the trough it will be 
seen to move uphill. Finally, and critically, if the observer 
holds a stick and tries to touch the four comers of the room ' 
he will fail at the beginning. After repeated tries, he will 
gradually succeed, increasing Ms accuracy through trial. It is 
significant to note at this point that as the observer manages to 
touch the corners of the room with success, Ms perception changes 
accordingly and he eventually perceives the room as distorted.
Conclusions
This demonstration illustrates the fact that the unicular 
stimulus pattern is not an outcome of just one configuration in 
space. The stimulus pattern of the distorted room, was similar 
to that of a normal room. An infinity of configurations in space 
may yield similar stimulus patterns. Furthermore, the demonstra­
tion shows that predetermined knowledge about the situation may 
fail to influence the perception. The significance of action, 
however, is dramatic. In the first place, action was determined 
by perception. In the second place, the consequences of action 
(the failure to touch the corners), were effective in guiding 
future action and perception as well.
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The Demonstration of The Rotating Trapezordal Window (The 
Surety Demonstrati on)^
This demonstration is especially significant for this study, 
since it reveals some interesting and pertinent observations.
Two millioned planes with gray markings on them corresponding to 
shadows resulting from illumination from one side of the room and 
considerable above the middle of the planes. They look like 
windows but one is rectangular while the other is a trapesoid. 
Both planes are parallel to one another and both are attached 'bo 
a mechanism by which they can be made to rotate clockwise. A 
pipe is so fixed as to project through the plane (or window) in 
the trapezordal shape at an angle of \>S°• When the light in the 
room is turned off and the two planes are permitted to rotate, 
the observer is allowed to watch them monocularly for four or 
five minutes. The observer will report that one window (trianglar 
in shape) appears to rotate clockwise, while the other (trape­
zordal) appears to rotate a half-turn clockwise and then change 
direction, rotating a half-turn counterclockwise. The observer 
will report that the pipe moves clockwise and cuts through tie 
window, as the window reverses its direction of movement. Ames 
has studied the stimulus patterns which are formed on the retina, 
in the case of the trapezordal window by means of an artificial
r See A. Ames, Rotating Trapezordal Window Demons tr at in n.. 
1950, Hanover.
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eye "consisting of a lens corresponding to the dioptric system 
of the eye, and a ground glass which is marked off in rectilinear 
squares corresponding to the retina,'1^  His study revealed that 
the images on the ground glass go through a series of varying 
trapezordal forms which are never rectilinear; that there is no 
change in the speed of the trapezordal pattern to correspond to 
the apparent change in speed or direction of the trapezid;• that 
there was no change in form or size of the stimulus pattern to 
correspond to the apparent change in form or size of the trapezidal 
window. The rectilinear window also showed "the same general 
characteristics as the images of the trapezoidal window."^
This demonstration clearly shows that perception does not 
correspond to a fixed pattern in the outside world. In other 
words, perception does not copy'1 external reality as it is.1 
The trapezoid was seen to oscillate back and forth, covering an 
apparent angle of 100°,, The trapezoid, however, did rotate 
around an angle of 360°.
The trapezoid has a short edge and a tall one; but, since it 
is assumed to be a rectangle, the assumption is that both edges 
are equal. When the trapezoid is seen in a horizontal plane, the 
difference between the lengths of the two edges is noticeable.
Ibid,, p. 10.
US
Loc. cit.
Hence, with. the conclusion reached that it is tilted in position, 
the shorter* edge is assumed to be farther away than the larger 
edge. As the trapezoid then rotates around its axis the lengths 
of the two edges should vary (under the assumption that it is a 
triangle), according to past experience, the shorter edge becomin 
taller as it comes nearer and the taller shorter as it moves 
farther away. This does not happen, since the dimensions of the 
trapezoid ar*e so made as to be seen (in perspective) as a 
trapezoid no matter in which position (relative to its distance 
from the observer) it is. The observer sees the motion clock­
wise, until the point when the relative lengths of the window 
(assumed tobe rectangle) are to be reversed. Since they do not, 
the window is seen to come to a standstill, reversing its direc­
tion of motion to conform to the expectations of the observer 
(perceptive), apparently as a result of his past experience. The 
pipe, however*, does not suffer from the same illusion. In fact, 
it is tied up mth a certain clue or sign which insures its 
perception in a rotory movement. It projects through the 
trapezoid, covers a certain portion of it and revolves around 
with it. The portion of the trapezoid it covers is .supposed, 
if it is to Hollow the apparent oscillation of the window, to 
continue in view. But it does not. It disappears and the other 
part of it 02a "the other side appears instead. To resolve these 
conflicting signs or clues, the pipe is seen to cut through the
■window as it starts on its apparent counter -clockwise movement.
So strong is the assumption that the window is a rectangle that 
it dominates and conditions other features of the perceptual proce 
In this experiment we see the importance of past experience 
and of its role as "assumption” in Ames’ terminology. We see 
again that the stimulus pattern on the retina, does not correspond 
to a fixed pattern in the outside environment but may be pro­
duced by multitudinous patterns* Hence,, perception cannot be 
accounted for in terms of the structure of the outside world in 
independence of the human organism. The experiment, however, 
raises some questions. What if the observer knows that the 
window is a trapezoid and not a rectangle? What if he is allowed 
to touch the window and. find for himself that it is a tr ape gold 
end not a rectangle (as was the ca.se with the Distorted Room 
Demonstration)? Furthermore, what would be his reaction if he 
were asked to concentrate on the shape of the window, to find, 
out through his observation what shape it was or, in other words, 
instead of having his assumption of a rectangle taken for granted, 
make it the locus of his observation? What if, instead of a pipe 
inserted in the window, a rectangle of wood were inserted to 
offer some conflicting cues or signs relevant to the shape of 
the window? And with respect to past experience, what would the 
response of young children be to this demonstration? Can we 
experiment on children young enough who have not yet developed the
assumptions that cause the illusory perception? In other words, 
is there any difference in this respect with, different age groups? 
Of course, we may find that when the children have reached the 
age at which they can participate in such a demonstration, they 
will have developed the assumptions which account for the 
illusions. The answer, however, remains to be found out. In any 
case, the above questions are relevant to the problem of per­
ception and human behavior in general and experimentation will be 
needed if they are to be answered.
CHAPTER VII
CRITICAL ASPECTS OF AMES* TRANSACTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION
The dsnonstrations reported on briefly above are very significant 
from the psychological point of view; and, indeed, from the phil­
osophical point of view. Some of the important insights revealed 
by these demonstrations are worthy of further consideration. They 
are presented below.
1. Perception cannot be accounted for merely in terms of the 
structure of the outside object. We have seen, for instance, in the 
chair demonstration, that the observer saw chairs where no chairs 
existed. The only plausible explanation of this, is that the 
observers past experience with chairs accounts for the fact that 
a similar stimulus pattern led to the perception of a chair. We 
cannot predict what his perception would have been if he had not 
had experiences with chairs.
Most of the demonstrations bear this out. Take for example 
the trapezoid demonstration. We may justifiably say that the 
observer perceives a rectangular object as a rectangle, even 
though the stimulus images on the retina scarcely represent a 
rectangle but almost always a trapezoid because of an invariance 
factor, as Gestaltists say. This explanation, however, cannot 
account for the fact that a trapezoid is perceived as a rectangle
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unless we take past experience into consideration. In fact, an 
invariance factor would lead us to believe that a trapezoid 
should be perceived as a trapezoid no matter from which position 
we look at it. The distorted room demonstration seems to show 
clearly that it is not merely the distal object physically 
described that accounts for our perception. We venture to say 
here again that if the rooms the observer had been associated 
xri-th were of the same form as the distorted room described in 
the demonstration, then, if under the conditions prevailing in 
the demonstration, the observer were presented with a normal 
room, he would perceive it in terms of his past experience 
as distorted. He would have then exhibited reactions parallel 
to those referred to in the demonstration. These conclusions are 
mere deductions, but they seem plausible enough in terms of what 
the demonstrations reveal.
2. The demonstrations seem to disprove the dictum theory that 
to be is to be perceived. For every retinal image, there may be 
conceived innumerable distal stimulus patterns. We do chose. From 
the many different stimulus patterns in the environment the organism 
choses those which coincide with his past experience. The demonstra­
tion with the anisekonic glasses bear this out. This conclusion 
seems to lend support to James' and Dewey's contention that our 
perceptions are of probable rather than real things (epistomologically). 
We shall return to this point presently.
237
3. The demonstrations reveal the role of action in human 
understanding in a way that is reminiscent of Dewey's description 
of experience. It is the "doing" and the "undergoing" of the 
consequences of "doing" combined that constitute the basis for the 
reconstruction of experience or learning* Prior knowledge of 
the structure of the distorted room, as we have noted, was not 
enough to guide action. Knowledge is knowledge only in use and 
of use. Dewey's conception of knowledge finds strong support, 
therefore, from •Ames' demonstrations*
ij.* Concerning the nature of reality, the demonstrations 
seem also to support Dewey's position concerning knowledge. This 
problem is a source of much confusion and it is beyond the scope 
of this study to deal with it in a comprehensive manner, though 
it deserves further stydy. Dewey, contrary to a common mis­
conception of many of his critics, does not deny the existence 
of reality, epistomologically speaking. He asserts, "There is, 
of course, a natural world that exists independently of the 
organism, but this world is environment only as it enters directly 
and indirectly into life functionsThis is a bold statement.
It means, simply, that reality qua, existence is a fact but qua 
meaning it does not exist outside of human experience.
1 —
John. Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, p. 33.
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This does not mean that we live in an illusory world. Our 
world is real; it is the world we are part of and it is the world 
which consititutes our transactions and knowledge. It is the 
active connections between the human organism and its environ­
ment that constitute our knowings and knowns, i» e#, knowledge. 
"The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and
exists as organism only in active connections with its environ- 
2
ment." There is no knowledge that exists apart from these
active connections. And, as a matter of fact, no has ever
been able to know a thing in itself, or a thing as it is
existentially. Things are known only as they are experienced.
Experiences may vary and, indeed, as is done every day in
scientific laboratories, we may vary the conditions of experience
deliberately, but it remains a fact that the knowledge we arrive
at is experiential.
From the psychological point of view, the problem is dealt
3
with in terms of veridical versus non-veridical perception.  ^ The 
realist would distinguish between the significance of the thing 
perceived and its essence and would equate the essence with 
veridical perception, or would hold that by knowing the laws of 
perception the essence of things can be disclosed by reasoning.
2 Ibid., pp. 33-31*.
3
This problem is dealt with by Eugene Freeman in a paper 
entitled The Transactional Theory of Perception, which was read at 
the meeting of the American Academy of Optometry held in New York 
on December 9, 1951; mimeographed copy borrowed from Ross Mooney, 
The Ohio State University.
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,fIt is in these terms” says Freeman, ”that I am impelled to 
conclude that in its very laudable efforts to point out the vital 
significance of perceptions as meaningful symbols, the transactionists 
confuses significance with essence and tend to treat one as though 
it were the other. A realist, however, would judge that it is a 
transparent and fatal mistake to do so«”^
But how can we even know the essence of the thing in a 
realistic sense? The experiments seem to prove that we perceive 
and deal only with signsj signs, in other words, which point to 
something more than the brute thing itself can disclose, signs that 
are not thanselves knowledge, for our knowledge about them changes 
when we act upon them. And this is true even when we come at 
such demonstrations with knowledge about the veridical quality 
of the objects perceived. Ames has shown that knowledge of the 
fact that the balloons change in size and do not move in the size- 
brightness demonstration does not help. The distorted room 
demonstration confirms this. But we have not yet fully answered 
the question of veridical perception, which, from a realist's 
point of view, is the curx of the matter. Freeman says, "The 
fundamental postulate of critical realism holds that perception, 
unless it is proven to be non-veridical, is a genuine disclosure 
of the nature of external reality— in short, that veridical 
perception discloses things as they really are.”"’ He further 
Ibid., p. 13 (italics in original) 
y Ibid., p. 15.
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adds, "When conflicting testimonry is presented, instead of 
repudiating the validity of all perception, he (that is, the 
realist) takes stock and reasons out the nature and source of 
the error."^
The question now is what veridical perception is. We will 
have to resort once more to the chair demonstration. The observer, 
as we mentioned before, saw chairs where no chairs really existed. 
For him, what he saw was real. May we say that in this situation 
his perception was true? By what right could we conclude otherwise? 
So long as the observer does not exhibit any doubt about what he 
experiences, it will remain true. When, however, there is doubt 
(and in the demonstration the demonstrator occasions doubt by 
having the observer look in upon the strings)^ the problem is 
settled by bringing more connections to bear upon the problem 
until it is resolved. From then on the newly arrived at knowledge 
is accepted as true until doubt is again aroused and more 
connections are brought to bear up the problem. This is the scope 
of inquiry, a process without end and it describes the method of 
scientific inquiry in all fields of natural science. Dewey says,
When there is doubt as to an alleged representa­
tive relative and it has to be settled by inquiry into 
its connections with other things, we are obviously in 
a realm where 'appearance* has an intellectual significance 
.... In this meaning there are further relations involved
£
Loc. clt. (italics mine)
7
It is worth noting that the presence of the demonstrator, and 
his purposes, provides a public situation which places a check upon 
the observer's perception. This is characteristic of all perception 
in which action is involved, verbal or otherwise. What men claim as 
knowledge has to stand a public, a relational, test.
2U1
than in t he second case where manifestation or exhibi­
tion is taken as an undoubted part of the situation.8
Inquiry, starts, therefore, when things do not appear as they 
are believed to be, when in the course of experience things do 
not seem to work out as they were expected to. There is then 
doubt as to their significance. They become objects of inquiry 
and serve as signs to direct it, necessitating that new observa­
tions be brought to bear upon the problem thus posed. Signs 
function to bring more connections into the situation and create 
thereby a broader envisionment for the problem. This is the 
function and office of human inquiry or of reason, if we chose 
to use the term. Thus inquiry in Dewey*s term is out-reaching, 
going beyond what is immediately presented. In this sense 
inquiry is in and out of the matrix of human experience.
We may here again ask, "Who has ever been able to know a thing 
in itself?" And we may ask of Freeman what beyond this he means 
when in the instance of "conflicting testimony" the realist 
"takes stock and reasons out the nature and source of the error."?
The chair demonstration seems to be of great significance 
in this connection. When the observer was held to the observa­
tion of the objects in the confinement of the experimental set-up, 
he exhibited no doubt, no curiosity, no surprise, etc. There 
was nothing, in short, to conduce him to further inquiry about
 8---------
John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 62.
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the validity of his perception. When, however, he was permitted
to look behind the screen, a significant change in his attitude
occurred. In this connection, Ames says, "Why we are surprised
when we see things that we know are not there when we are not
surprised if we don’t know what we see is not there deserves 
9
further inquiry*"
A final word about the nature of reality is in order at
this point. This is the implicit identification of scientific
inquiry with veridical perception and, hence, the alleged claim
that science discloses the true nature of reality as existence*
Veridical perception from a realistic point of view is considered
the perception of objects as described scientifically. The tacit
assumption here is that science and common sense are of different
orders. Dewey has dealt with this problem and pointed out that,
although there are marked differences between the two categories,
they still are of the same order. Both are human activities, and
are part and parcel of the matrix of experience. Psychologically
speaking, Dewey has pointed out this fact in terms of the reflex
arc concept. Awareness is a function of the transactional process
described in terms of the sensori-motor circuit.
Perhaps the important difference between common sense and
science is the level of understanding or knowledge from which
man operates in each case. An example from physical science may 
-
A. Ames, An Interpretative Manual, Op. cit., p. 19*
be illustrative. According to Newton’s mechanics, light travelled 
in straight line and time was a static entity, not effecting 
the event. Einstein has shown that light does not travel in 
straight line and that time is a factor along with space. 
Consequently, according to Newton, two observers would see a 
certain event at the same time no matter where their positions 
were. According to Einstein this is not true. Newton's position 
would have been considered as revealing an absolute truth, or 
a disclosure of nature independent of experience. But this is 
no longer true from the point of view of modem physics. We may 
say now that Einstein's position represents the truth or the 
essence of reality. But by what right? It is true only insofar 
as it works as part of man's experience. If we only remember 
that, whether it is Newton's or Einstein's position we are dealing 
with, each position rests on reliable knowledge secured through 
observations within experience, the problem of the true essence 
of reality becomes meaningless. The problem ,ds indeed, meaningless, 
unless we assume that 'reasoning* can transcent actual life 
experience. This can be explained only in terms of a "Being" 
which exists outside the sensori-motor-circuit which Dewey 
described. Hence this "Being" must be a self-actorj that is a 
soul, a spirit or mind.
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Assumptions and The Assumptive World
We have again and again mentioned the word assumption in
connection w ith Ames* work. The term needs clarification,
Kilpatrick says, "By assumption is meant that generally unconscious
aspect of the transactional process which may be described as a
‘weighted average* of past experience in dealing with those
portions of the impingements from the environment to which it is 
10
related,*' The emphasis on the general unconscious nature of 
assumptions needs some clarification, especially in view of the 
fact that the world we live in is considered by this approach 
to be an assumptive world. Kilpatrick says, "Taken ell together, 
our assumptions form our ‘assumptive world* on which our assump­
tions are based; therefore, the only world we know is determined 
by our assumptions,This seems to be Ames’ position. He 
wrote to Dewey saying, "The observer’s visual sensation does not 
correspond to the ’externality’ as disclosed to him by later 
action. Now in every case his illusion is due to specific 
assumptions the observer makes that he is not aware he is making,^ 
Ames further made the distinction between assumptions and the 
10
F, P. Kilpatrick, Og, cit,, p. 1 (italics mine),
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Dewey-Ames Correspondence on The Nature of Knowledge and 
Semantics; a letter from Ames to Dewey dated May 26, 191*8, p. 1®
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sensations an observer is aware of in actual transactions of 
living. He says, ",... these assumptions are inherently different 
from the sensations of which we are aware in an actual occasion 
or ’transaction of living.’ Sensations and perceptions are pre­
sumptions, i. e,, prog nostic.”^
The difficulty with this terminology is that it implies a 
mentalistic entity. An assumption is in ordinary usage intellectual 
awareness, or intellectual possession. The problem becomes com­
plicated when assumptions are considered as largely unconscious.
The same difficulty applies to presumption, which also implies a 
mentalistic connotation. Dewey pointed out in his reply to 
Ames that "the main trouble with traditional philosophical termino­
logy is that it has dropped out the primary active sense and left 
a thinned-out intellectual usage as if it were exclusive.”^
Thus "to assume," Dewey pointed out, had an early usage (from 
Oxford Dictionary "to adopt into partnership, service, use." *^)
As for presumption, Dewey noted that in its historical usage it 
meant, ".... seizing without right, usurping; then to take upon
oneself without authority— then to dare, venture; passing into 
_
Ibid., p. 2.
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the intellectual sense— to take for granted; to take as proved till
the contrary is proved— to be presumptuous is to take liberties.”
These usages are evidently not what Ames intended. On the one hand,
there is the implication of mentalistic connotation in present day
usage, which does not go with the transactional approach; and, on the
other hand, there is the unconscious connotation which Ames
demonstrated and which is not intended by the common use of the
terms. He said, the objection to both ’prognostic1 and
’presumptive1 is that in themselves they don’t give any sugges-
17tion of action, which is the very essence of the phenomena.”
The problem, to recapitulate, is a matter of semantics and 
the difficulty arises from the connotations of the terms used and 
the meanings they are intended to signify for the description of 
behavioral phenomena. By assumption is meant mental awareness, 
but no action. But in Ames1 usage of the term assumptions are 
largely unconscious, and action plays a fundamental role in their 
formation. Kilpatrick says, "Assumptions are probabilities which 
are built up by action, checked by action and modified by action.” 
There is more to the problem, however. How can we reconcile 
betxreen the fact that assumptions are based on action and that 
at the same time they are -unconscious? Does this mean that 
action itself is largely unconscious? If so, what then is
Loc. cit.
17 Dewey-Ames Correspondence, Ibid., a letter from Ames to 
Dex'rey dated June 9, 19UB, p, 2.
F. P. Kilpatrick, Og. cit., p. 1. 1
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conscious action, if there is any? The difficulty here again is 
one of semantics, it concerns the connotations of the word 
•unconscious.* "What does unconscious here mean? Does it imply 
Freud’s concept of the ’unconscious*; Ames does not accept that 
meaning. Does it then mean non verbalized or non reflective 
behavior? We shall come back to this problem in relation to the 
process of inquiry.
’Presumption or prognosis’ suffer also from the same
difficulties* Moreover, the term prognostic implies knowledge,
but as is intended in Ames’ usage, it connotes a directive to
19knowing because, ”.... we don’t know as yet.”
All this means that the usage of these terms may lead us to 
the entanglements of the traditional philosophical treatment of 
the terms, assumption-presumotion.
For while the traditional philosophical logical 
treatment deals with them as if they were cognitive 
from the start and inherently, the idiomatic usage 
makes the ’practical’ sense primary— that is, treats 
them as attitudes or dispositions which give direction 
to subsequent so-called responses, or, better, to the 
course of behavior of life conduct already entered upon 
and engaged in.^ O
The problem may be clarified if we treat it in terms of the 
oi
theory of inquiry." Inquiry starts when something arises in the
19
Ibid., p. 1*
20 Dewey-Ames Correspondence, Ibid., a letter from Dewey to 
Ames dated July 18, 19U8.
21 It is not within the scope of this study to deal with the 
theory of inquiry in detail, but only briefly insofar as it bears
on the present problem.
course of living transactions— that is, in the course of the
continuity of life activities— which renders the continuity or
smoothness of these activities difficult or impossible. In other
words, so long as life activities are smoothly carried on, the
need for 'intellectual1 inquiry does not arise. There needs to be
a hitch or blockage to further activity for intellectual inquiry to
arise. Inquiry finds its origin in a practical situation. ’’This
'hitch' or blockage is then primarily 'practical* in the sense
that it tends to evoke the forms of behavior called fear and rage
which, as specifically seen in animal behavior, are respectively
withdrawing and aggressive, and in less intense instances curiosity,
a kind of ambivalent mixture of an attacking movement with readi-
22
ness to withdraw.’1 In the demonstrations, the perceiver as we 
have seen, does not confront a hitch or a blockage unless the things 
he observes represent signs and these signify different meanings 
from what they have meant to him in his past experience. This is 
especially true when he reacts to 'things' as signs and the action 
does not conform to his expectations with respect to what is 
signified. By signs here we mean that the 'things* observed are 
meaningful as a result of past life transactions. Signs refer to 
and signify things not immediately observable, i. e., a block 
cloud means rain, a knock on the door means a guest or a visitor,
52
Dewey-Ames Correspondence, Ibid., a letter from Dewey to 
Ames dated July 27, 19U8.
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etc. It is interesting to observe at this point that Pavlov in 
his experimentations on conditioning used the term sign for 'the 
outside’ unconditioned stimulus. Furthermore, as Bentley has 
observed, Pavlov did not make the sharp distinction made now by 
behaviorists between the inner and the outer, that is between 
the outside stimulus and the inner reaction.
To return to our discussion, we see that signs are out- 
reaching, being contained neither in the ’thing’ nor in the 
organism; and, moreover, they are dynamic, not static. Inquiry 
starts, as suggested, in a situation made problematic because 
the significate of the sign (or signs) does not correspond to the 
expectations of the organism in a given transactional process or, 
to use Whitehead’s terminology,in a given occasion of life. Hence, 
inquiry is wide in scope, and its aim Is to envision the occasion 
in a wider context than heretofore was necessary. It searches out, 
so to speak, for new connections to bear upon the problem at hand.
It is only when we enclose the organism in the confinement of a. 
maze or a tight box that we tend to describe its behavior in terms 
of a rigid chain of events which start with a stimulus and culminate 
in reinforcement and, hence, in learning. These conditions are 
not without their value and significance, but we should under­
stand them for what they are, in their limited scope. Faraday
over one hundred years ago discovered that the electric current
2% “
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was not confined merely in the wire connecting the two poles of 
an electric battery and his discovery has been instrumental in 
changing the history of physics. It would seem to be time for 
the significance of this discovery to be realised in behavior 
theoiy. As for Gestalt psychology, it is time to take the 
searching attitude in perceptual behavior seriously. Ever since 
Gottschtadt performed his perceptual experiments with the concealed 
figures,^ and arrived at the conclusion that past experience 
does not enter into the perception of forms, Gestalt psychologists 
have capitalized on his findings and ignored the role of past 
experience. Experiments which deviate from Gottschtadt’s have 
been attributed to a searching attitude. But this reasoning begs 
the question. The searching attitudeis as potent an element in 
perception as is the structure of the perceived object; as such, 
it should be considered as essential for the study of behavior.
To return again to our original problem, we find that by and 
large behavior is a function of signs and that signs refer to some­
thing beyond that which is immediately observable. ’’Whenever a 
thing becomes a sign of something else it is said to have a meaning, 
the meaning being that which is pointed to, suggested, or indicated." 
In a problematic situation, where signs do not work as expected, 
fear, bafflement, confusion, surprise or curiosity may result, 
as the case may be. To enter into search or inquiry means that
there are new aspects of the situation to be found and examined.
^  K. Gottschtadt, ’’Uber den Einfluss der Erfahrungauf die 
Wohrenhniung von figuren." Psychol. Forsch., 1926, 8, pp. 261-317.
^  Boyd H. Bode, Fundamentals of Learning, p. 10!?.
But this is possible only insofar as there are already signs to 
give direction to further behavior or action. In other words, the 
problem solving process dees riot occur if the situation is In a 
complete state of chaos. There must be some anchorage for behavior 
or search to be initiated. The meanings of the signs may not be 
true in the occasion, but they are taken for granted, so to speak, 
as a result of past action, with the consequent behavior being led 
astray. This is another wgy of interpreting some aspects of Ames’ 
demonstrations. The locus of search in the trapezoid demonstration, 
for instance, was not the form of the window; this was taken for 
granted as a rectangle, with the resulting illusions following.
It is true that the ’assumption’ involved was not consciously 
formulated, but this merely means that its significance was not 
acted upon, nor was it the locus of search. In like manner many 
verbal puzzles can be explained. ”The‘ cock laid two eggs to 
be divied among three persons so that everyone takes one whole 
egg; how come?” The skill cf the person presenting the puzzle 
lies in his ability of concealing the clue so that it may be so 
taken for granted that it does not become an object of scrutiny.
The function of signs—-or assumptions, to use Ames’ termino­
logy— in the above sense is to give permanency and coherence to 
behavior. In the case of men the use of language is of such 
importance that it may be said justifiably that man stands alone 
in reference to the rest of the animal kingdom. Human inquiry is
2^ 2
unique and deserves special attention. It may not be basically 
different from other modes of animal behavior but, as a result of 
its dependence on artificial signs and sjmibols (as language), it 
makes man a human being in the full sense of the word. Dewey says:
In the human animal conditions are such (I would 
imagine because communication with others of the species 
takes the form of language) that curiosity becomes 
directed inquiry in which the ’hitch’ in question 
becomes stated, i. e., a problem, the articulated formation 
of which is all one with the movement toward what is taken 
as its resolution— and hence the restoration of the ongoing 
continuity of bheavior which has temporarily been diverted 
into reflective or into intellectual, processes: inquiry, 
examination, observation, reasoning out, search, tentative 
follotnng of clues (a process logically called hypothesis) 
etc., the practical aspect of behavior turning into 
manipulation of conditions to improve observations and 
thereby providing better clues for reasoning to follow, 
while the direct emotion of curiosity becomes an interest 
.... in finding out; that is, an inquiry--discovery as 
itself amount to a life concern.
Language, Thinking and Perception
We turn now to the implications of the foregoing for language, 
thinking, perception and conception. Behavior can be conceived in 
general terms as communication with the environment. The function 
of signs, whether natural or artificial, including the highly 
developed forms of symbols, the thinking process, may thus be 
seen in its proper place, that is, as an aspect of human behavior. 
 ^ --------
Devey-Ames Correspondence, cit., a letter from Dewey 
to Ames dated July 27, 19li8.
The question as to whether all thinking is verbal is by no
means a settled one. Some of those who do not limit Mthinking" to
the verbal level believe that ’’verbal thinking” renders creativity
27impossible. Korzybski says, "If we ’think’ verbally, vie act as 
biased observers (perception) and creative work well nigh impossible. 
Granting that verbal thinking may limit the thinker’s creativity, 
and that thinking may go on -without the use of the spoken or 
written word, it does not follow, however, that ’’thinking” can all 
occur without the manipulation of some sort of meaning-endowed 
signs or symbols. This is evidently clear, since thinking, as Boyd
p Q
H. Bode has phrased it, is ’’the finding and testing of meanings.”
It is only when we conceive of thinking as a mechanical process
that we may dismiss meaningful symbols as playing an essential role
in the process of thinking. But in this event the whole notion of
creativity, in any genuine sense, would be out of place. Thus, the
fact that Jacques Hadamard,fs observations indicate that the majority
29of outstanding mathematician reported that they think in terms of
visual structures, does not exclude the interplay of ideas and 
_  _
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This is Bode’s definition of the thinking process and it is 
in line with our foregoing discussion. See Boyd H. Bode, Funda­
mentals of Education, Ch. VI.
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Jacques Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the 
Mathematical Field, p. 111*.
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meanings through the medium of these "visual structures." Hadamard 
found further^  that most generally ircages are used, very often 
of geometrical structure. This is to say, in other fjords, that 
these mathematicians simply used a language of their own; a language 
characterized by its own distinctive symbols, and one which is 
learned.
The conclusion seems warranted, then, that language is essential
for thinking; or that thinking is impossible without language. We
must recall that "language includes much more than oral and written
speech. Gestures, pictures, movement, visual images, finger
movement— -anything deliberately and artifically employed as a
31sign is logically language." We may come back, then, to 
Korzybski1s assertion that "verbal" thinking makes "creative work 
well night impossible" and ask whether the same statement applies 
to all other kinds of language? Apparently, Korzybski does not 
seem to think so, since to him only "verbal" language tends to 
keep us "in our rut of old orientations." The distinction here 
implied between verbal symbols or signs and other kinds is not at 
all clear.
Thought deals not with bare things, but with their 
meanings, their suggestions; and meanings in order to be 
apprehended, must be in sensible and particular existences. 
Without meaning, things are nothing but blind stimuli, 
brute things, they must be anchored by attachments to some 
physical existence. Existences that are especially set 
aside to fixate and convey meanings are symbols
30 Ibid., p. 11U.
33- John Dewey, How We Think, pp. 230-231 (italics supplied). 
Ibid., p. 231.
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If5 then, signs or symbols are essential for thinking to take 
place at all, the question becomes what are the factors that render 
the written or spoken word and not the other signs, such as visual 
images, limiting to creativity in the thought process? The fact 
that signs bear meaning is not the distinguishing factor in this 
regai'd. All kinds of signs stand for specific meanings, and 
thinking does not depend upon signs, as such, but upon their 
meanings. Thus Dewey assertst ,fIn the case of signs, we care 
nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what 
they signify— it makes no difference what the outward thing is, 
as long as the meaning is presented.^
One might speculate, however, that because of its conven­
tionality verbal language does not lend itself as easily as some 
other signs to manipulation and change and that, in some cases, 
oral and speech language falls short of conveying the meaning of 
certain experiences because of the lack of appropriate words.
We often hear it said, "I just can't say it. I just don't find 
the words to describe this (or that) experience." But when the words 
to describe the experience are at hand, the word "selects, detaches,
35a meaning from what- is otherwise a vague flux and blur."
33
Ibid., p. 231.
3^4 Verbal language is, nevertheless, the most versatile of 
all symbols with respect to communication in almost allspheres of 
human associations.
^  Ibid., p. 233.
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How the word as visual or auditory stimulus carries its load of 
the meaning in the occasion or transactional event is still, of 
course, an unexplored problem. Associationism explains this in 
terms of stimulus substitution, but this explanation does not 
answer the problem as here conceived. All we can say is that so 
long as the word, as a sign, is lacking, the experience remains a 
vague flux and blur and the act of thought, if initiated, cannot be 
completed. One may justifiably conclude that this is equally 
true of other signs, as in the case of geometrical images, and the 
like. In other words, in some experiences "some meaning seems almost 
within reach, but is elusive; it refuses to condense into definite 
form; the attaching of a word somehow*... puts limits around the 
meaning, draws it out from the void, makes it stand out as an entity 
on its own account."^ 6 it seems that all other signs, where they 
function instrumentality in the thinking process, do exactly the 
same thing— namely, put limits around the meaning of the 
experience that is had and, insofar as they do, they limit the 
scope of the phase of the experience attended to. Thus, paradoxical 
as it may seem, the process of attaching meaning to signs, whether 
verbal or otherwise, makes the thinking process possible, on the 
one hand, and yet, on the other, limits the scope of thinking and, 
perhaps, also limits creativity. This, of course, does not rule
3S
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out the value of signs and symbols, whether verbal or otherwise, 
in their appropriate functions.
In order to pursue this problem further, let us consider an
experiment which was designed, in a way, to show the relationship
between oral language and perception, or, rather, the influence
of the former on the latter. Strictly speaking, the authors,
Carmichael, Hogan and Walter, attempted to control reproduction
37of visually perceived form by means of language. A series of 
12 ambiguous figures were presented to two groups of subjects.
The subjects were instructed to draw the figures as accurately 
as possible after the series had been viewed. Just prior to the 
presentation of each figure, the experimenter said, ’'The next 
figure resembles....” (and offered one of the two names of the 
figure). The result was that the reproduced figures were 
markedly modified to conform with the names suggested to each 
group of subjects. It is worthwhile to note, however, that the 
change from the original in the reproduced figures varied from a 
slight change to almost an complete one. The drawings were rated 
upon a five point scale by two judges. In commenting on the result 
of their experiment Carmichael, Hogan and Walter said:^
3S-------
Ibid., p. 87.
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If a verbal, stimulus-form and a visual stimulus - 
form are presented 'bo a subject in certain temporal 
relationships the processes in question may be modified, 
or rather a new, total process may reult, which is in 
certain respects unlike either of the previous sets of 
processes. On subsequent arousal by any ‘past* stimulus 
the reproduction is thus a complexly determined total, and 
not either of its compound processes.
The results of this experiment and the conclusions of the authors
seem to show that the spoken word has its effect on the reproduced
figures and most probably on the perceived object, also. The
authors infer, therefore, that verbal stimuli affect perceptual
processes.
The effect of the spoken word is not a direct one so far 
as our problem is concerned, however. On the one hand, the 
spoken word was introduced by the experimenter as a co-stimulus 
with the visual form. On the other hand, the experimenters were 
interested in the reproduction of visual forms rather than with 
perception as such. The fact that the subjects were Instructed 
to draw the figures as accurately as possible seems to indicate 
that the subjects in general did accept the verbal stimulus as 
representing the visual stimulus form to some extent at least.
Some measure of this acceptance could have been secured by 
estimating the degree of change of the reproduced figures as 
compared with the original. Such an estimate could be checked 
by a report given by the subjects about their opinions concerning 
the accuracy of their original images. An experiment designed
on the same basis as the one referred to above and so modified 
as to include a control group with no oral stimuli, with a 
report given by the members of the experimental grain concerning 
their acceptance of the verbal stimuli should prove valuable.
To inquire into the relationship between the spoken word and the 
visual figures further, the aforementioned experiment could be 
carried out with subjects tiio have a special experimental back­
ground in geometrical figures or drawing, such as engineering 
or drafting. Such an experiment should prove vaLuable in 
deciding on the influence of the spoken word on the perception 
of visual figures against an esperiental background of similar 
visual figures. The assumption here is that subjects having 
experiences with drawing or geometrical figures may prove less 
susceptable to the influence of the verbal stimulus, hence, the 
change in the reproduced figures might be minimal. The purpose 
suggested here is the exploration of the different conditions 
under which the subject accepts or does not accept the verbal 
stimulus as'a sign for the visual stimulus and the extent to which 
his past experience affects this acceptance.
So far it has been argued that signs or symbols, as bearers 
of meaning, are essential for perception and thinking. More 
pertinent to our problem are Bartlett’s classical, experiments 
dealing with visual perception. The material used in these 
experiments was graded in character, and passed from simple
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shapes and patterns, through designs, the complexity of which
was considerably greater, to concrete representational picture
material. Bartlett then had his subjects immediately reproduce
and/or report on their percepts. In commenting on the results
Bartlett classified the schemes of settings which make perceiving
3 9
possible in the following manner:
(1) The first reaction to material of very simple 
construction to be observed was the assignment of 
a name. ,rThe names were, as a rule, given as soon 
as the designs were exhibited,,Bartlett adds 
further that "the name thus unreflectingly given 
may, and in many cases demonstrably does, determine 
what is perceived,"^ 1
(2) In case of relatively more complex objects, there is 
often a search for analogical material, to which, 
when found, a name is given which acts as in the 
former case.
(3) In this case the setting or ground is given (by the 
subject) in the response to a plan, or order of 
arrangement, which does not demand naming at all 
and the process may be unreflective and immediate 
as in the first case.
(U) This is the case of complex representational
material. Here there may be hesitation, followed by 
the emergence of a definite sensory image which at 
once constitutes the necessary ground "for perception."
See Bartlett, Remembering, p. 32.
Uo
Ibid., p. 18,
^  Ibid., p. 32.
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If we accept the reports c£ Bartlett’s subjects as indicated, 
above, we may conclude that naming is usually concommitant with 
perceiving when a name is available. In this case, the name may 
determine, or at least influence, what is perceived. Unlike the 
former experiment by Carmichael, Hogen and Walter, the name here 
is not introduced by the experimenter but Is given by the subject, 
but with almost identical outcomes. In Bartlett’s experiments, 
however, a name was not always given. A name, according to him, 
was immediately given only in the case of familiar material with 
simple construction. We may assume, therefore, that naming in 
such cases, is nothing but a process of finding meaning in what­
ever visual structure is presented. When no name directly fits 
the object presented, especially when it is unfamiliar, the 
subject tries to find meaning in the perceptual object presented 
by searching for analogical material and then giving the name, 
which then functions as in the previous case. The perceiver, in 
otter cases, may respond to a plan or order of arrangement. Such 
would be the case when the visual stimulus is constituted of 
geometrical lines and designs. We may assume that this kind of 
response serves the same function that naming serves in the 
previous instances, to give meaning to whatever is presented 
and that it is the setting that makes perceiving possible. Tbs 
subjects may still be considered to be using language but not 
overt verbal language. Perhaps the inadequacy (that is, for
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the lack of appropriate terms) of the verbal language in such 
cases accounts for the use of a different and more adequate 
medium to grasp the meaning of whatever is presented to him.
Another experiment which is of some significance here is 
that of the line demonstration.^ In this experiment the 
relationships between the verbal stimulus and the visual stimulus 
are demonstrated. It was shown, for instance, that when the 
verbal stimulus was accepted as a sign for the visual stimulus 
it affected it drastically. The short line of light was seen to 
move backward in space to correspond to a telephone pole. But 
•when the stimuli (verbal and visual) could not be made to fit in 
the total pattern the conflict that arose between the different 
stimuli as signs rendered perception unstable. This was the case 
when a shorter line was named a fencepost and the longer line 
simply as a line. The moral is that words are signs or rather, 
in their elaborate forms, are symbols and their functions are 
those of other signs. Mooney says, "Words are perceptions. They 
are learned in the same way as other perceptions are learned and 
they have the same function. Verbal cues will therefore affect 
visual perceptions and visual cues will affect verbal perceptions."^
£2
See Ross L. Mooney, Perception, Language, and the Fart 
Whole Problem, Op. cit., pp. 7-13*
^3
Ibid., p. 9.
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This is to say that signs, whether natural or artificial, as 
well as symbols, function as instruments for man*s cognitive 
commerce with the environment. In general terms, in short, they 
are means for communication, they are tools.
We do not learn, as it is usual to think, one language so 
much as we learn different languages to fit and express different 
kinds of experiences. Certainly objects of art are languages.
"For each art has its own medium and that medium is especially 
fitted for one kind of communication. Each medium says something 
that cannot be uttered as well or as completely in any other 
tongue.
It would seem to follow, then, that the language we use for 
a certain kind of experience is the language we have learned to 
use in just such sorts of experiences. Hadamard1s mathematicians 
reported that they used images of geometrical structure in their 
mathematical work simply because they had learned to use the 
language which fits best their area of inquiry. It would be 
impossible for them to use verbal language alone as completely 
or as well in their work. It may befit the present situation to 
cit an example to show the relationship between naming and per-
b5
ceiving as represented by Bogoras1 study of the Chukchee. Bogoras 
found that in spite of their extreme impoverished color nomencla- 
John Dewey, Art As Experience, p. 106.
^  See ¥. Bogoras, The Chukehee.
ture, as reindeer herding people, the Chukchee were able to apply 
more than two dozen names to the task of distinguishing the 
patterns of reindeer hides, many of which at the outset looked 
identical to him. This instance, as many others, helps to 
illustrate the instrumental value of names as signs in perception. 
The hides as "external" stimuli were the same for Bogoras as 
they were for the Chukchee people, but he was unable to see what 
they saw. The past experiences of the Chukchee people in herding 
reindeer accounts for their remarkable perceptual ability in 
this instance. This is only to say, however, that they acquired 
a language which made their successful adjustment to differences 
in hides possible.
The speech language may, and does, vary from culture to 
culture. Corresponding words may differ in meaning and the 
grammar of one language may so differ from another as to render 
the meaning conveyed by such a language vary differnt* The 
language of the Hopi Indians, for instance, differs from the 
English language, among other things, by the fact that its verb 
is timeless (i. e., the verb does not distinguish between the 
present, the past or the future). It must always, however, 
indicate what type of validity the speaker intends his statement 
to have. The statement may report an event, expectation of an 
event or a generalization or law about events. The Hopi language
does not have a concept of dimensional time and the universe can
thus be described without recourse to such a concept. ¥horf
suggests that without T (time) or V (velocity) a physics could
be perfectly constructed by the Hopi language, though, of course,
it would require a different ideology and perhaps a different
mathematics. He further suggests that since the Hopi language
has no word really equivalent to our "speed" or "rapid," a
new term, "I" (intensity), would have to be introduced in this
new physics to describe anything or any event, whether as moving
or as just enduring. "Perhaps the I of an electric charge will
U7turn out to be its voltage or potential," In other words, 
with such a language one would have a different outlook on life, 
a different ideology, different meanings. It would still be a 
proper language, however, available for use by those who spoke 
it in coping with life situations and with natural phenomena.
Concept and Concept Formation
Reference to concepts, or to concept formation, has been 
deferred up to this point on purpose. The reason is that the 
word "concept" is a word of such varied meaning that it ends up
T&
Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," Readings 
in Social Psychology, pp. 216-218.
hi Ibid., p. 217.
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frequently almost meaningless. A "concept" in ordinary usage
may mean a notion, an idea, a rule, etc. The term, however, is
widely used and is found everywhere in scientific writings. The
difficulty apparently lies in what seems to be a carry-over from
its old scholastic usage as an item of knowledge, considered as
a static structure. But as Bentley has pointed out, "Its old
scholastic implications have long since disappeared and we may
properly demand of the modem user of the word, ■Where can you
show us a sample of these concepts you talk so much about?1
We get no answer whatever in any modem sense.... at its best
18
it is a mere schematic term." Bentley has conferred with both 
Bridgman (a physicist) and Dewey concerning the use of the term. 
Their responses confirmed the contention made above that, in 
general, the term is overworked.
Professor Bridman once checked a portion of his 
own unpublished manuscript in which the word concept 
appeared fifty-three times, and found that without 
any sense of loss he could omit it in all but four 
cases; in two of these forms, the casual word ‘notion1 
did service, leaving only two resistant cases out of 
the fifty-three.
The same applies to Dewey!s writings. "Professor Dewey has
written that he has made sufficient examination to convince him
 IB--------
Arthur Bentley, The Human Skin, Op. clt«, pp. 13-11.
19
A. Bentley, Ibid., p. 1U (footnote)
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that ’the word is useless at least four-fifths of the time— *r»y 
own included* ’
All this is not to say, however, that the term is without 
value when used in its proper place. The vague usage we have 
shown to prevail may provide a partial clue, at least, as to why 
the term has been largely neglected by modern psychologists*
Even when it is used in psychological terms it is treated, in 
the same of its scholastic usage, as a rather static structure, 
an end product, not as a dynamic term. r,0n Dewey's basis 'concept' 
may appear as forward looking, a 'oossibility— realizing ’idea’ 
or 'rule1 or 'habit' of behaviro, or alternatively it shows 
itself as a name for certain intricate language behaviors."' ’^ 
Concepts and concept-formation from this point of view are 
important tools for the understanding of the higher levels of 
human behavior. But as we have indicated, they are not given 
any genuine attention as phenomena to be investigated on their 
own merits by modern psychologists. "Where they are dealt x-iith 
they seem to be treated implicitly in terms of principles derived 
from lower modes of behavior*
It remains for us to find out, in terms of modern psycho­
logical theory, how these modes of behavior may be interpreted.
 50--------
Loc. cit.
^  Ibid., p. 15 (footnote)
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Hullfish pointed out -wherein Thorndike’s psychology failed to 
give an adequate account of concept formation, centering as it 
did on the principle of common elements. He aptly showed that 
if the (physical) common elements are taken away from a series 
of squares of different sizes, nothing would remain to account 
for the concept ’squareness.* The alternative, he showed, would 
be to imply a mental entity to account for the concept. Explicitly, 
Thorndike did not allow for such an entity. He had to resort to 
some physiological correlate of ’squareness1 in order tc account 
for the concept. But this alternative was aB ambiguous as was 
the mentalistic concept. By the same token Hullfish showed the 
inadequacy of James’ treatment of the concept of ’rotundity.’
The fallacy, he insisted, lay in treating learning as a matter 
of analysis and analysis only. Hullfish said,
When Thorndike says that ’all learning is analytic,’ 
he assumes that the ’elements’ which direct behavior 
are present whether the organism knows it or net, and 
are capable of suddenly popping into view and becoming 
prepotent determiners of conduct. The organism, as 
these elements emerge, reacts to first one and then 
another, until finally an element appears that directs
the completed r e a c t i o n ,52
In this citation, Hullfish reacted against the atomistic approach 
of Thorndike, as well as his dualism between the stimulus and the 
response. His criticism is particulary valid in this respect,
^2
H. Gordon Hullfish, Aspects of Thorndike’s Psychology 
in Their Relation to Educational Theory and Practice, Op. cit..
p. 69.
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especially when we consider Guthrie's system. Guthrie's treat­
ment of concept formation would essentially be in terms of new 
additions of associations between new stimul and responses.
Meaning, naturally has no place in such a mechanistic system.
Hullfish slid of Thorndike— and the same would seem to apply 
equally well to Guthrie—  Thorndike entirely neglects the
implications or meanings, which are known experientiaily to guide
the bulk of man's conduct. Meanings are given no work to do*
53There is no significant 'making over' of the situation,"
When we turn to Hull we find essentially the same state of 
affairs as in Thorndike's and Guthrie's psychologies. If we seek 
a lead to the understanding of concept formation in his treat­
ment of habit, for instance, we have to contend with a mechanical 
static structure defined ultimately In terms of primary reinforce­
ment. We have seen that Hull recognizes that the stimuli 
playing upon the organism are many and that repetition of the 
mode of behavior in a given situation makes for conditioning 
only to those stimuli which are consistently present and hence 
relevant to the response. If we take our clue from this concept 
formation becomes a matter of sorting out irrelevant stimuli or 
cues. The forward-looking aspect of a concept is almost completely 
out of place. Hull's treatment of stimulus-generalization, response- 
5 3
Loc. cit.
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generalization and stimulus-response-generalization does not 
help, since it is equally mechanistic* Per laps the nearest 
Hull comes to an explanation of concept formation as here con­
sidered is In his treatment of the habit-family hierarchy.
This falls short of our understanding of concept formation and, 
in any case, Hull, as Brunswik has repeatedly pointed out, does 
not make much use of the hierarchy* It certainly is not as 
dynamically treated as is Brunswik’s cue-family hierarchy nor 
does it have the significance of Brunswik’s emphasis on vicarious 
functioning.
Skinner’s position leaves us confused. We can see some 
possibility in his concept of reflex reserve, but its rigidity, 
together with the mechanistic meaning Skinner gives it, makes 
it useless. When we turn to the field theoiy, as represented 
by the Gestalt position, we find ourselves confronted with the 
rigidity of the ’physical Gestalten’ and the mentalistic connota­
tion of the process of perception. This latter difficulty reaches 
a peak in such a system as that of Snygg and Combs.
From, the transactional point of view the prohteru is seen 
differently. We know that words are alive. They are like 
living creatures, in tie sense that they have their birtq they 
grow and eventually they may die. The dictionaries are full of 
archaic words which may be called dead so far as today’s usage is
yy*
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concerned. To some extent, at least, this evolution may be 
observed in an individual * .3 usage of words* As human beings 
become acquainted with new words they may be at first on a level 
of sheer memory and not usable. In time, however, they may 
become an integral part of the individual's vocabulary. Later 
these same words may languish and die. What we are interested 
an here is the birth and growth of the meaning of a word* The 
meaning of a word depends, of course, on the past experience of 
the individual who uses it. This should not prove surprising 
since, as mentioned before, words are percepts, so far as their 
origin is concerned and percepts, as has been shown, depend on 
past experience. We have then to reject the fallacy of ’one word, 
one meaning.* It is impossible to fixate the meanings of words, 
Dewey taught this lesson long ago and, more recently,
Hayakawa has said:
Everyone, of course, who has given any thought to 
the meanings of words has noticed that they are always 
shifting and changing in meaning. Usually people 
regard this as a misfortune, because it ’leads to 
sloppy thinking’ and ’mental confusion.’ To remedy 
this condition, they are likely to suggest we should 
all agree on ’one meaning’ for each word and use it 
only with that meaning. Thereupon, it will occur to them 
that we simply cannot make people agree in this way, even 
if we could set up an iron clad dictatorship under a 
committee of lexicographers who could place censors in 
every newspaper office and a dictaphone in every home.-^
 % ---------
S. I. Hayakawa, "Meaning, Symbols and Levels of 
Abstraction,” Headings in Social Psychology, p. 191.
Hullfish in treating the growth of the word "dog”— the 
’concept of dogness’— in the life experience of a young child, 
showed how, after the child had acquired the word "dog" as a 
sign for that animal, the sign kept shifting ahd changing its 
meaning as the child had new experiences with dogs. Where is 
the concept "dog," one may ask, in the above example? Is it in 
the word "dog" as such? Obviously not. Is it in the physical 
thing as described by physics? We have to say "No" to this ques­
tion, also. As a concept, the dog is a possibility, a forward 
looking sign for action. Is it a friendly dog to play with, is 
it a harmful one that may bite? There is a question mark? This 
is the case with all concepts.
Conceiving carries the function of congnition 
a step— or many steps— beyond perceiving, freeing the 
organism from what is immediately given, here and now, 
enormously increasing both the refinement and range 
of its operations, enabling it to work symbolically with 
the absent and the distant, with the past and the future, 
and to go beyond the actual and construct the merely 
possible.55
In other words, the experiential background becomes part and
parcel of the present event.
Of the concept ’dogness,1 for instance, as it functions
in a new situation, we must note that, "The entire background
of experience serves as a guide in bringing out the meanings of
56
the puzzling stimulus." This state of affairs signifies that _  ■
Edna Heidbreder, Toward a Dynamic Psychology of Cognition, 
Op. cit., p. 12.
^  H. Gordon Hullfish, Ojd. cit., p. 73*
we cannot draw a sharp line between perception and conception; 
they are not of different orders psychologically speaking.
The demonstration experiments have made this point clear. This 
reminds us also of Kant's assertion that conception without 
perception is empty and perception without conception is blind, 
Kant's position, however, is based on a fonn of apriorism. From 
the present point of view apriorism is out of place. Perception 
may then be defined as that cross-section of the transactional 
process of the here and now in reference to the organism and 
objects of the here and now. Yet it is not completely contained 
in the here and now nor is it confined to the immediate event 
or occasion which forms its locus. Conception is characterized 
by its ongoingness. It is not determined completely by one event 
or occasion. We need to observe here the use of the word 
'assumption' in the transactional approach as set forth by Ames.
He treats it as some sort of weighted average of past experience.
In this definition, the meaning of the •weighted average,' will 
bear watching. We have seen that as a result of action, rela­
tively limited, in the case of the distorted room, the illusion 
disappears. The consummatory affect of the present action ineluded- 
needs further inquiry to clarify the significance of this notion 
of 'weighted average.'
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An examination of the thinking process will reveal that the 
relationship between perception and conception finds a corres­
ponding relationship between induction and deduction. The tradi­
tional distinction between the two aspects of the thinking process
57is invalid; they are not "separate forms of thinking." They
are as are perception and conceptions, "at most distinguishable
aspects of a process that presents the same general features 
58everywhere." We cannot see where induction as such starts 
in the steps of the process of reflective thinking. Without a 
hypothesis, the particulars of the situation are mute, meaningless, 
and hence provide no lead for thinking. This does not mean, 
however, that the distinction is without its function. A 
hypothesis is necessary to guide our action, to give meanings to 
our percepts and to bring new connections to bear upon the problem. 
The hypothesis serves as a guide for the finding of certain facts 
which become meaningful as they relate to the hypothesis and 
confirm it. In the process, however, facts may be come upon 
which do not support the hypothesis as formulated and hence may 
necessitate a change in, or modification of, the hypothesis.
It is always because of a hypothesis that facts become meaningful, 
whether they confirm the hypothesis or invalidate it. The 
£7
Boyd H. Bode, Fundamentals of Education, p. 119.
Eoc. cit.
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distinction between induction as the gathering of facts and 
deduction as generalization is artificial and, at best, arbitrary* 
"The reason why induction has seemed as different from deduction 
and as independent of it is presumably that the gathering of facts 
has loomed up large in the sciences*"-^  The mistake arose from 
the assumption that facts speak for themselves, which they do 
not do* We may make a proper distinction between deduction and 
inducation along with Bode by noting that they represent aspects 
of the one process of reflection, as follows, "*... induction 
may be defined as a name for the methods of arranging or regulating 
evidence,"^ whereas "deduction, accordingly may be defined, as 
the process of drawing out the implications of meanings*"^
The foregoing exposition was intended to shed light on two 
points* The first is the direct implication of the foregoing for 
the understanding of the highest cognitive level of human behavior- 
reflective thinking— within the framework of the transactional 
approach. The second point is indirect. It is the implication 
of this approach for psychological theorizing. Dewey has referred 
to "the reflex arc" as a concept, a concept that helps us organize 
our knowledge with respect to human behavior. Strangely enough,
59 '
Boyd H. Bode, Ibid., p. 1*23*
60
Ibid*, p. 126.
61
Ibid., p. 125.
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Skinner early in his career, treated the concept "reflex" in 
more or less the same manner. He wrotes
We have been proceeding, of course, upon an un­
necessary assumption, namely, that there is a flexion 
reflex which exists independently of our observation, and 
which our observations approximate. Such an assump­
tion is wholly gratuitous, but it is remarkably insistent—  
If we remain at the level of our observations, we must 
recognize a reflex as a correlation. But the immediate 
uncritical reaction to a definition on that basis is 
not enough. There is an urge toward solidification, 
clearly evident, throughout history. We turn insistently 
to the reflex arc for material support. ^
It is clear, then, that if we conceive the 'reflex arc,1 not as
a self-actional entity but as a construct or concept, that its
effectiveness will depend on the breadth of our envisionment of
behavior. Skinner, however, as we have seen, has kept his
envisionment narrowed to reflex reserve, extinction rate, etc.
From this limited envisionment he generalized his findings with
respect to rats or birds in the confinement of a box (Skinner's
box) to account for all human behavior. This practice has been
the case,unfortunately, with respect to human inquiry in general.
Bridgman says, for example, referring to the concept of the
electric field, that
In the first place, an examination of the operations 
by which we determine the electric field at one point will 
show that it is a construct in that it is not a. direct 
datura of experience. Now nearly every physicist ta.kes
62
F, B. Skinner, "The Concept of the Reflex in the Descrip­
tion of Behavior," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1931, 5, Pp. h27- 
ii2«3.
the next step, and ascribes physical reality to the 
electric field, in that he thinks that at every point 
of the field there is real phenomena taking place**..
(The field concept) is considered the most fundamental 
concept of all modern electrical theory. Yet in spite 
of this I believe that a critical examination will 
show that the ascription of physical reality is entirely 
without justification....There can be no question what­
ever of the concept of the electric field as a tool..*.
Here we find a genuine psychological problem which pervades
human thought in general. It is the task of psychology not only
to reckon with the problem of describing behavior, but also, and
perhaps primarily, to reckon with the logic of psychological
systems* Holt attributes this difficulty to the reifying power
of words. Yet he points out that this explanation in terms of
the reifying power of words simply "names a psychological
phenomenon which may be said to underlie the logical fallacy'
which we are now considering... .Eut if I supposed, myself to have
really explained the fallacy by adducing the reifying power of
words, I should be committing that very fallacy-why words tend
to be taken for things is what would still need to be explained."
This is an area which is yret to be explored. Kh.en it is,
if the conclusions of this study are correct, the cultural,
historical and experiential background of words and their use
mil have to be taken as facts relevant to the inquiry. The
P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, 1937, New 
York: Macmillan Vo., pp. £k-5>7 (italics are mine). ~
6h
E. B. Holt, Animal Drive and the Learning Process, 1931, 
Henry' Holt, p. 6.
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hypothesis is advanced, therefore, after this study of the problems 
of perception, conception and thinking that the answer will be 
found to lie within the terms suggested by the transactional 
approach in the study of human behavior.
Conclusion
Thus far we have surveyed some possibilities of the trans­
actional approach in psychology. We have seen how with this 
approach the highest levels of human behavior, such as conception, 
refelective thinking, and inquiry in general, may be treated 
psychologically as natural phenomena along with other modes of 
behavior. This is a very promising sign. Without such an 
approach the psychologist on occasion, unwittingly reveals a split 
between his general approach to psychology and his psychological 
formulations and findings. In fact, he is disposed to leave the 
former to the philosopher and devote himself to the perfection 
of laboratory techniques and the reporting of such findings as 
these uncover.
Psychology will continue to fumble uncertainly in the dark­
ness, it seems evident, so long as the higher levels of cognitive 
behavior remain outside the domain of psychological inquiry. The 
problem will not be solved by coming at these cognitive modes of 
behavior after the problems of the lower forms of behavior,
especially animal behavior, have been settled in one way or 
another. The moral is that the psychologist should no longer 
leave the analysis of, and inquiry into, the methods of thinking
which give his experimental!on meaning to the philosophers. His
\
own mode of thinking, his logic included, inasmuch a matter for 
his reflection as is the experimentation in which he engages.
The split he now occasions between his methodological approach 
(philosophically speaking) and his psychological formulations 
inevitably channels his thoughts. The former imposes itself upon 
the latter and, consequently, the psychologist finds himself 
"consciously" or "unconsciously" moving in a viscious circle.
Communication between psychologists of different methodo­
logical approaches becomes, as a result, a very difficult task, 
when it is possible at all. We have observed that most of the 
different psychologists agree that the scientific method is the 
only legitimate approach to psychological phenomena. But this 
is as far as they go in their agreement. They differ in their 
understanding of the implications and significance of the 
scientific method, in their psychological models, in their 
experimental designs and interpretations. This situation is 
unfortunate, being unparalleled in any of the natural sciences. 
Psychology has to overcome this difficulty if it wishes, as it 
does, to assert itself as a natural science.
To illustrate the point we may refer to our previous 
analysis. We have seen how behaviorism, particularly in its 
early days, insisted upon empirical positivism and the rigor 
of scientific empiricism. Hence, it focused its attention almost 
exclusively on observable phenomena, that is, bodily movements.
But the behavior of the organism must (according to the mechanistic 
law of causation) have a cause. The environment provided that 
cause in terms of stimuli. Behaviorism thus, by talcing its point 
of departure from the organism*s reactions, ended by becoming an 
environmentalistic psychology. In contrast, we have seen that 
gestalt started by making perception the central object of study. 
The focus of the gestaltists was on the structure of the objects 
perceived. They thus inquired into the structure of the objects 
of perception and the environment in general* and, in order to 
account for the organism’s behavior, they had to assume it to 
be natively equipped with dynamic structures which copy, so to 
speak, the structure of the outside world. This is done by 
intermediary processes, such as sensory organization, the law 
of pragnanz and its sub laws, the principle of isomorphism and 
the invariance factor. In other words, gestalt reverses the 
reversal of behaviorism. It starts from the structure of the 
outside environment, yet ends by becoming the nativist psychology.
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There is no suggestion here, of course, that the vast 
wealth of psychological study and literature is useless. What 
is needed is reinterpretation in a new and wider envisionment.
The transactional approach has within it this promise. It does 
not throw away the pastj it builds upon it and out from it.
We believe that the basis for this new envisionment of 
psychological phenomena lies in the long neglected article by 
John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," written in 
1896. The recent experiments conducted by Ames at Hanover 
Institue throws some light on the problem, showing that neither 
the organism taken alone, nor the environment taken independently 
of the organism, can provide an adequate explanation of behavior. 
His work appears to substantiate the contention of the trans­
actional view that the environment, the medium within which the 
organism reacts includes, in fact, the organism as part of its 
total character, and as a totality becomes the locus of inquiry.
Ames* transactional approach has been so far concerned with 
perceptual illusions. It provides solid ground, as we have seen, 
for the understanding of the meaning and significance of the 
transactional processes of life. But it must move forward from 
its present level, if it is to serve the purpose of providing 
a wider framework for the study of behavior. So far as the 
knowledge of the present writer goes nothing has been done within 
this approach to inquire into the growth aspect of experience or,
282
to use Dewey’s terminology, into that reconstruction of experience 
which, is learning. The transactional approach, in other words, 
should follow the growth of experience, perhaps along two lines. 
First, by experimenting with different age groups; and, second, 
by a follow-up of the responses of single individuals over lengthy 
periods of time, so that the ambiguity of the ’’weighted average of 
past experience" may be cleared.
One further remark about Ames1 transactional approach is that 
it should become more concise in the use of its terms such as 
"assumption," "presumption," and "prognosis." This it needs to 
do in order to rid itself of traditional "mentalistic connota­
tions. " The present study has attempted to suggest a new 
linguistic basis for explaining behavior in terms of John Dewey's 
theory of inquiry, psychologically expressed in his conception 
of transaction as a substitute for the now repudiated conceptions 
of self-action and inter-action.
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